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Introduction 
The usual way to approach the philosophical study of emotions is to start out from our 
emotional experiences. The feelings of anger, joy, envy, fear, sadness and so on, that we 
have all experienced are taken as the given facts, the data, and the research is carried out as 
an investigation of what is implied and presupposed in such experiences. Such approaches 
will reveal that emotional states contain cognitive components like beliefs, categorisations 
and propositional attitudes. I believe that such an approach is indispensable for the 
understanding of human emotions. However, even given that emotions are conscious 
phenomena it doesn‟t follow that they should also be explained exclusively in terms of 
conscious, or even potentially conscious, states. Such a conclusion would be based on the 
additional assumption that any true and explanatory relevant sentence describing an 
emotional state could also, in principle, be recognised by a subject as a true description of 
her mental condition.  
 
It is certainly true that human emotions are the emotions of beings that also have rational 
and linguistic abilities. I also take it to be true that these abilities have impact on our 
emotional development. Understanding the connection between the various human abilities 
is part of the understanding of human emotions.  
 
On the other hand, emotions might be approached from a perspective that doesn‟t so much 
relate them to our conscious and reflective awareness. Emotions might be viewed as parts of 
our “navigation-system”, parts of the way we relate to and map our surroundings, identify 
our relative positions in these and prepare for adequate responses to changed conditions. To 
be sure, conscious awareness and propositional knowledge are parts of the human mapping-
response system. But by focusing on the general system-features, we might see that 
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emotions can be studied, not only as a faculty of rational beings, but also as a species of 
organisms‟ ways to interact with their environment. The following text is an attempt to unite 
these two approaches.  
 
One idea underlying the following is therefore that emotions might be regarded as something 
existing on different levels. There is a basic level where emotions exercise their influence as 
navigational devices in our orientation in the natural world. This function doesn‟t necessarily 
have to be described in mental terms. On this level William James‟ famous description 
seems, to me, better suited. According to James “the bodily changes follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of the exsisting fact, and … our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS 
the emotion.” (James, 1884). In short, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike, afraid because we tremble … “(Ibid). The mental quale that is usually considered 
essential to an emotion is, if we are to follow James, a mental response to an organic 
adaption that has already taken place independently of the conscious reaction, rather than 
part of the adaption itself. 
 
There is however, I believe, another, a social level, where the conscious feelings play a more 
primary role. This is a level where our conceptualisations of our own states make them fit 
into inter-personal co-operation and action-schemes. It will be my claim that these 
conceptualisations have an underlying structure or grammar that corresponds to the structure 
or grammar of social situations. Emotions on this level therefore enable us to detect social 
situations and our own position within them, and the terms used to describe such emotions 
also serve to describe the corresponding situations themselves. On this level, so is my claim, 
the phenomenology of the emotions, the conscious experience of them and the experiencing 
of emotional adjustment, is part of their essential features. 
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Emotions play several roles in our lives and they may correspondingly be studied from 
different perspectives. I do not pretend to present a comprehensive theory of this multi-
faceted subject. For that reason I feel that I should say what this book is not about. First of 
all, it is not about the individual experiences of particular emotions like sorrow, love, 
happiness etc. Those interested in the phenomenology of these emotions will have an 
abundance of other literature to consult (for instance F. Alberoni‟s books on love, friendship 
and infatuation or Stendahl‟s writings on love). It is also not about the relationship between 
emotions and aesthetic experiences. And finally, except for a few remarks, it is not about the 
ways emotions influence our moral judgements. If it contributes to ethical theory, it does so 
only by implication. 
 
In the first chapter I will discuss some general problems concerning the study of mental 
phenomena. In the second chapter I will introduce the concept of “mapping”, the process of 
conscious or unconscious monitoring of the environment that any organism has to perform. 
The third chapter is an introductory discussion of the relationship between affects and 
cognitions. In the fourth chapter I discuss the composite nature of human emotions and the 
consequences of this as relates to rational articulation of emotional states. The key concepts 
emerging from this discussion will be those of a formal structure or grammar of the 
emotions and of emotional prototypes or paradigms. In the last two chapters I try to weave 
together the mapping aspect and the grammar aspect into a theory of the connection between 
emotions and the conception of “self” and “person”. The main thesis in the last three 
chapters will be that certain emotions, viz. those which I shall call “social”, function as a 
system mapping social situations, and that the same emotions play a major role in the 
construction of autobiographical selves. The theory of emotions as a system mapping social 
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situations will be presented in a sketchy and rather tentative way. However; social situations 
are “social” because we conceive of them or “construe” them as such. So, if we understood 
the mechanisms behind our construals of certain situations as “social”, I do believe that this 
would contribute to our understanding of what social situations are.    
 
Useful comments to the manuscript have been given by Atle Måseide and Karl Halvor 
Teigen, both University of Tromsø. I have also benefited from the seminars of Paul 








The Study of human Emotions 
 
On the level of subjective experience, human emotions probably emerge as some sort of 
unspecified states of awareness whose dominant qualities are vague feelings of comfort or 
discomfort, not felt to be located in any specific part of the body. As we develop, we learn to 
think about these states as definite emotional states of various sorts, such as sorrow, 
happiness, anger etc. and also to think about them as mental, as opposed to bodily states. 
During our further development, we learn to “analyse” them, that is think and talk about 
them as having distinct and separate components like objects, motivating aspects, some 
normative dimensions, descriptive aspects and so on. At this point we may come to think of 
such states as more or less rational. 
 
But the rationality approach, or rational assessment of our own ways to conceptualise our 
mental states, will be incomplete if it does not include asking the question whether or not we 
do actually give correct descriptions of these states as mental states. I take it for granted that 
when someone says that he is angry because John stole his money, he may in fact give a 
correct description of what John has actually done. But that does not imply that he is also 
giving a correct description of his own mental state or even that his conceptual framework 
provides an adequate tool for understanding this. So, what I am saying is that there are two 
separate rationality-questions here. One concerns the description of the intentional content of 
an emotion the other concerns this description as a description of a mental state.  
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It is possible to approach the study of emotions from two opposite sides that in certain 
respects relate to the two rationality-questions. One concerns the biological basis and 
function of emotions, the other one concerns their public expression and propositional 
articulation. One of the basic ideas upon which this text is founded is that the results of these 
two approaches need not be contradictory. Any investigation of the emotions would have to 
include some account of the system of discriminations that they express or realise. The kinds 
of discriminations I have in mind are those between different emotion-types, different 
dimensions or structural components of emotions and the degrees in which these are present 
in particular emotions. Any theory about the relationship between emotions and rationality 
would have to identify various aspects of emotional expression along which it can be 
evaluated. It will therefore have to assume that emotions can be analysed. Doing so, it will 
have to face the question whether the components in this analysis is a result of features of 
linguistic expression, for instance some basic universal grammar, or if it based on certain 
features of our biological, or, to be more precise, our neuro-physiological system. Now, we 
know that the neural networks in our brain map our environment along a number of 
dimensions, a number that varies with the different kinds of features of the environment that 
is mapped. We also know that these systems are capable of performing extremely fine 
grained discriminations, and that damages in different parts of these systems affect our 
conscious awareness of corresponding differences, including the emotional ones. I find it 
highly implausible that these facts about the working of our neural system should be 
irrelevant to the working of our conscious emotional discriminations. For these reasons I 
assume that descriptions on this level also have some kind of explanatory force as to why 
our emotional life is the way it is.  
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On the other hand, the fact that we are social and linguistic beings has important impact on 
our emotional development. More about this later. 
 
Whether or not a theory that explains emotions in neural terms is correct, is an empirical 
question that cannot be decided on a priori grounds. The reason for this is that a priori 
decisions in such questions (except of course in cases of self-contradiction) confuse the 
subject with the interpretation of the semantic content of the name given to the subject. 
 
Our ways of conceptualising our emotions very often have explicit or implicit references to 
action. Different emotions are often taken to be states that are typically followed by certain 
forms of action. The same emotions are also regarded as typical responses to situations that 
precede them. Some philosophers, like Gilbert Ryle, have regarded this as part of the logic 
of reports of mental states. Such reports would then really signify inclinations to act in 
certain ways. On the other hand, the same phenomenon could also be explained by the 
propensity that a perceptual system has to fill in missing typical pieces of information about 
a situation. Either way, the emotions are conceived as inter-mediate, in the way that they 
stand between a situation and actions that are regarded as typical consequences of such 
situations. Conceptualised that way, they come to be mental representations of situations and 
event/action-sequences as they pass through us.  
 
Newborn babies are believed not to conceptualise their condition in mental terms as states of 
definite kinds. If the only correct description of a mind would be in terms that the mind uses 
to know or describe itself, then it would follow that there is no possible description of 
newborn minds at all. And if the criterion of success for such a description should be to 
make it vivid to us how it is for the baby to be in the state it is, then there would indeed be 
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no possible description of infant minds. But the fact that I cannot experience this is just 
another way of saying that I am not that infant. 
 
On the other hand, we could describe what is going on in the infant‟s body including the 
neural system and the brain. And this would perhaps be the best description of that mind that 
we could possibly give. So, why wouldn‟t such a description still be the best when it comes 
to adult minds? One obvious answer to avoid easy a priori conclusions is that it might, and 
that the burden of argument is on those who say that it is not!  
 
Let‟s assume that someone asks why an infant behaves in a certain way, for instance why it 
has a certain motor behaviour. An adequate answer could probably be given in terms of that 
infant‟s brain activity. Let‟s on the other hand assume that someone asks why an adult does 
certain things, for instance reads the newspaper or runs towards the subway-station. Would 
an answer in the same terms still be adequate? It might very well be the case that such an 
answer would be correct in the sense that certain brain circuits initiate and co-ordinate his 
behaviour into the sequences of movements that we recognise as reading or running. Even 
so, such an answer would in most cases not answer the question. Even if it were correct that 
what seems to be caused by a wish to be informed about the latest news or to reach the train 
really is caused by certain neural events, still the question would be unanswered. If we still 
were to say that the answer in neural terms would be more scientific, and therefore in a sense 
more true, we would probably also have to say that the question that would adequately be 
answered in terms of intentions is in some sense the wrong question, a question that, at least 
scientifically minded people ought not ask because there are no scientific answers to them.  
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What I have said here might seem to contradict what I have said earlier about a priori 
arguments. I said that it shouldn‟t be decided a priori that emotions, and more generally 
mental phenomena, are not really neuro-physiological processes. Now I say that answers in 
terms of such processes wouldn‟t answer certain questions, which very reasonably may be 
posed. However, there is a difference between saying that (1) an adequate answer to a 
certain kind of questions about an object, o, should have certain features, f, and (2) any 
account of o should have the features f. The adequacy of the answer is a function of the 
question, not only of the object. I believe that John Searle is right in assuming that questions 
about human actions in daily-life contexts should be answered in intentionalistic terms. The 
reason is that the meaning of such questions presupposes possible answers in such terms. 
But if we admit this, we should also recognise the possibility of other contexts where 
answers in other terms, e.g. neural, would be more adequate. Let‟s for instance consider 
conduct or behaviour that is considered as expression of some kind of malfunction like 
dyslexia or HDAD. In such cases it would often be apt to explain the behaviour in neural 
terms. Consider now that dyslexia and HDAD are not necessarily sources of malfunction 
under any condition. In fact the behavioural profile connected with HDAD would under 
many conditions give the individual an adaptive advantage. Would it, under such conditions 
still be adequate to explain his behaviour in neural terms? If the answer is no, why would 
such explanations be adequate on one occasion, but not on another? If yes: What‟s so special 
with this kind of behaviour that makes it call for a kind of explanation that is radically 
different from the explanation of other forms of behaviour? So, answering a certain question 
about an object is not necessarily the same as giving the best possible account of that object, 
at least if we are to follow Kant‟s advice to the scientist and ask like a judge addressing a 
witness, not like a student addressing a teacher. 
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How should we describe a certain state as “mental” or as a certain kind of “emotional” state, 
as opposed to an external state? We might of course indicate a different modality by using 
mentalistic words like believe, hope, fear or feel, followed by some proposistion. Such 
expressions are taken to describe certain contents, the ones described in the proposition, as 
mental contents. The mental states thus connected with a proposition are usually called 
“propositional attitudes”. What we describe here is a “mind” as it is involved in, or part of, 
observable actions, relating to culturally defined situations, having projects in a social world 
that is ruled in certain ways. The use of first, second or third person modality indicates that 
the described interaction system is seen from the perspective of a certain individual 
partaking in that system. If that is so, what we are doing is to express and interpret some 
mental state by describing it in terms of external, publicly accessible phenomena, but seen 
from a certain perspective. But what about the mental mode itself, the way some content is 
said to be experienced? It can be named, but it evades further description. A description of a 
mental content is also a description of publicly accessible phenomenon. Therefore the 
mental seems to be indescribable except for exemplifications as perspectives on such 
phenomena. All this seems very reasonable. I can see no reason to assume that we have 
some state, that we in due course recognise as, say “embarrassment”, only to discover that 
this state fits perfectly into certain situations, those where we are caught doing something we 
shouldn‟t do. But even so, features of externally observable situations are also represented as 
mental content. And as such they seem to be parts of the explanations; that is adequate 
answers to questions about why we act the ways we do.    
 
The explanations in question would be intentional explanations. The question about why an 
adult is reading the paper or is running towards the subway-station is supposed to be 
answered in intentional terms, explicable as an intentional explanation. Intentional 
 13 
explanations are of course based on the assumption that the ways we conceive of our own 
mental states have explanatory force as to how we in fact act. This in turn is based on the 
assumption that descriptions of mental states in terms of propositional attitudes might be 
true description. For instance; If x is running towards the subway-station and we explain this 
behaviour by saying that she does so because she wants to reach the train, then the following 
statements are supposed to give true descriptions of her mental state: 
1. x desires to reach the train. 
2. x believes that the train is leaving soon. 
One more condition applies: It should be possible to identify the references of 1 and 2 
independent of the fact that it claims to explain. However, we should consider it an open 
question whether or not this is possible. How should we for instance identify “a desire”? 
Two possible answers immediately present themselves. A desire is a tendency or disposition 
to bring about a state described in a proposition, namely the proposition that together with 
the attitude mentioned (desire) makes the propositional attitude in question. In that case our 
explanation of x‟s behaviour would go like this: x runs towards the subway-station because 
x is in a mental state that tends to make her run towards the subway-station. Does this 
explain anything? Hardly! The other possibility is to define a desire in terms of antecedent 
conditions. A desire is something that people get under certain conditions. Given that 
someone depends on the subway to get to work, then this someone would desire to reach the 
subway. The explanation would then go like this: x runs toward the subway-station because 
x depends on the subway to get to work (and x is late). This seems to be a perfectly 
reasonable explanation. However, it works perfectly well without the use of any mentalistic 
term (desire). If the proposition expressing the explanation is true and if we accept it as an 
explanation, then x‟s behaviour can be explained without reference to her mental state at all. 
But then again, this would hardly be an intentional explanation.  Consider how easy it is in 
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daily life encounters to predict, or rather anticipate, the behaviour of other people without 
any reference to their mental states or propositional attitudes. You walk into a grocery store 
and ask for milk. You anticipate that the man behind the counter is going to get you some 
milk, which he does. Why? Well, because you asked for milk! You enter a bus and 
anticipate that the driver is going to drive to the destination where the sign in the front says 
that the bus is going. Surely he does just this. Why? Well, because that is where his schedule 
tells him to go! You stop your car at an intersection and behave towards the intersecting 
driver in a way showing that you are going to wait. He enters the intersection. Why? Well, 
because you showed him that you were going to wait! These explanations, or rather 
explanatory fragments, work perfectly well, and they make no use of mentalistic terms.  
 
If anyone would try, from these examples, to infer that we could, in general explain human 
action without the use of mentalistic terms, the obvious objection would be that such terms 
(or rather the phenomena to which they refer) are, in some way, presupposed in interaction 
of the sort mentioned, and that the phenomena thus presupposed should be part of the 
explanation of the action. And basically I believe that this is a correct and adequate 
objection. We should however ask ourselves what this objection does and does not imply. 
Being presupposed does not imply being object of conscious awareness at the moment of 
action. At most it implies the possibility of being the object of conscious focus. But if so, 
then mentalistic terms are not necessarily parts of the self-understanding of the agents as 
they act. If we still insist that they should be part of the explanation of action, we would 
therefore also have to say that such explanations might go beyond the conscious intentions 
of the agents. Now, this seems very reasonable; but would such explanations still be 
intentional explanations? If so, we would also have to say that “intentions” include more 
than what is part of the conscious mental content. This wouldn‟t necessarily be very 
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problematic. We might say that human action is performed on the background of some 
intersubjectively shared convictions about what is the case, that convictions about mental 
states are among these and that such convictions might, if the demand is made, be mobilised 
as reason for the actions even though they are not at the moment in the focus of awareness. 
This distinction between smooth, unproblematic, linguistically mediated interaction and, on 
the other hand, the mobilising of reasons corresponds to Habermas‟ distinction between 
communicative action and discourse (Cf. Habermas, 1981). If I have understood Habermas 
correctly, he is partly formulating a norm for rational interaction and cooperation and partly 
describing a communicative practice and its foundation in a modern differentiated life-
world. But does the possibility of discourse also explain the pre-discoursive interaction? I 
believe that it might do so in cases where this possibility is part of the conscious awareness 
when the action is initiated, like when you know that you can throw in more reasons if 
necessary without spending time figuring out in advance what those reasons more precisely 
would be. But in many instances this is simply not the case. In many cases the discourses are 
actions distinctively different from the communicative actions (or other kinds of actions) 
that precede them. In such cases the mentalistic terms might be part of the explanation of the 
temporally last action, but not of the first. This doesn‟t, I believe, conflict with Habermas‟ 
theory, as this is set forth as a theory of the preconditions for certain kinds of rational action 
with a certain degree of consensus-orientation, not action in general.  
 
One more possibility must be considered. Perhaps one would say that intentional 
explanations do not presuppose the possibility of independent identification of motives or 
intentions. The motive, one might say, is considered to be part of the action of any actor as 
far as this actor is considered rational and capable of being ascribed an action at all. The 
reason would be that the concept of action in some way incorporates the concept of an actor, 
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which, in turn, presupposes the concept of an I who has taken some decision. It seems to me 
that this concerns the way other people are able to relate to someone‟s actions and only 
indirectly how the actor herself is able to do this. It is, in my opinion, indeed true that 
partakers in human communication and interaction relate to their own actions through some 
kind of anticipation of the likely response of other people. But that also entails that the 
explanandum of an intentional explanation is an action as it seen from at least one more 
perspective than that of the actor i.e. an action at the level of social mediation. I should add 
that I take this to be nothing more than a special case of the relation that Donald Davidson 
has called triangulation and that he takes to be basic in any knowledge or interpretation of 
any object in the world (Cf. Davidson 1991, 1996 & 1997). This concept is part of a theory 
that takes a subject‟s knowledge to be the result of a double relation, this subject‟s relation 
to the object of knowledge and her relation to some other subject‟s knowledge of the same 
object and response to the first persons conceptualisation of this object. The general 
significance of this theory is that “(T)he identification of the objects of thought rests, then, 
on a social basis. Without one creature to observe another, the triangulation that locates the 
relevant objects in a public space could not take place.” (Davidson, 1991 p. 8). Davidson‟s 
theory is developed in relation to external objects. Nevertheless I find his arguments to apply 
equally well to conceptualisations of any object, external or internal. 
 
Anyhow, the main outcome of this is that the presupposition of proper application of certain 
mentalistic terms applies to the possibility of explanation or interpretation of the action. If 
this is taken to imply that it also applies to the action itself, an additional assumption would 
be necessary: The self-understanding and self-interpretation are themselves parts, or in some 
way essential to, the explanandum. For many kinds of actions I take this assumption to be 
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perfectly legitimate. It does however leave the part played by human nature and the organic 
response not mediated by determinate conscious states unexplained. 
 
I said above that the adequacy of an answer is a function, not only of the object in question, 
but also of the question itself. When something is done several conditions must be fulfilled, 
but that does not imply that these things should be part of any answer to the question about 
what is done and why it is done. Let‟s say that Peter takes his car and drives to his office. 
What is he doing? A good answer might be that he is driving to work. Why? Maybe because 
there is a bus strike. Surely he couldn‟t have done this if there were no fuel on his tank or air 
in the tires. A description or explanation of his action shouldn‟t for that reason include any 
account of these facts. There might however be given other descriptions of his action that 
would make such facts relevant parts of such description and explanation. These 
considerations might suggest that we should ask ourselves what kind of questions is it that 
makes answers in mentalistic terms adequate. Under what kind of perspective is a situation 
conceived when it seems meaningful to ask such questions? 
 
One outcome of these considerations might be that it is in rather complex interaction-
schemes, whose basic framework is one of deliberation of alternatives, actions that are 
performed under the conscious awareness of the possibility of some kind of failure and that 
are being performed under the conscious awareness that the action is part of a larger 
sequence of actions, that mentalistic terms enter into consideration. But if that is so, then 
such terms work in interpretations and explanations of actions as these are involved in more 
or less developed and culturally structured forms of action-schemes.  
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The problems relating to the use of mentalistic terms in explanation of behaviour can, 
therefore, be met with another kind of considerations, considerations taking common-life 
mental terms and their embeddedness in common-life human interaction as their basis. So 
far the remarks concerning the problems related to the use of mental terms has mainly 
referred to the single isolated agent and his mind. But there is also a world of human action-
systems that we grow into and in which our emotions are developed and elaborated. It is 
possible that this world has a logic of its own, like the one described by Shakespeare or 
Machiavelli. This logic is based on mentalistic words like “ambition”, “greed”, “motives”, 
“hidden goals”, “pride”, “vanity”, “revenge”, “shame” and so on. Many writers, from 
Hobbes to Searle, has suggested that such terms lead us into a world different from the 
natural one, call it “artificial” or “intentional”. Maybe it is the way Thomas Hobbes assumes, 
that such words denote nothing but subjective experiences of some deeper process going on, 
the attempt to keep up the “vital motion” inside the body. Anyhow, in this world people act 
and other people respond in anticipated or not anticipated ways. As a result of these 
responses, new situations are created, situations that diminish the manoeuvring-space of the 
initial agent or create new, unexpected forms of interaction and institutions, and so on. To 
understand this world seems to be a question of understanding people‟s actions in the terms 
of their own self-interpretations. But is this necessarily so? A closer look at such situations 
seems to reveal that what they really show is how people may reduce their own options (and 
perhaps ascribe this to destiny or fate). On the other hand it also shows that it is possible to 
study the relationship between, on the one hand people‟s ways to conceive of themselves, 
and, on the other, their actions and construction of their action-space. Some such spaces are 
constructed as “political”, others as “social”, still others as “private”. There are emotions 
that fit into one space, but do not fit into the others.  
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Again; do the way we conceptualise our own mental states and actions really explain 
anything about why we think and why we act the ways we do? If the answer is going to be 
yes, there would have to be situations were someone is justified in saying the following: x 
gave a true description of the way she conceived of her mental state when she said that she 
desired that d and believed that b. This conception of hers caused her to perform the action 
a. So the fact that she desired d and believed b explains why she did a. But then again; how 
could we possibly know that such a description is true? We have, in the conceptual 
framework of intentions, after all, no independent access to the state of affairs described. 
 
In spite of the problems mentioned; my answer to this question is going to be that the ways 
we conceive of our emotional states have explanatory force as to how we really think and 
act. One reason, given in the context of human co-operative schemes, is that the way we 
conceive of ourselves is a sort of anticipation of the corrections, sanctions, i.e. responses we 
are likely to be met with if we act in certain ways (under certain condition). The co-operative 
scheme as such is built into our conception of our own action and of the anticipated 
responses. We therefore adjust our actions in accordance with our way of conceiving them 
as parts of an inter-personal interaction-system. The reason why I believe that there is a 
legitimate way to study action that goes through the way in which the agents themselves 
conceive of their own actions is not that people‟s way of conceiving of their own actions 
necessarily also provide the only possible, or even a correct description of the same actions, 
taken as an existing entity waiting to be described. It is rather that it would be impossible to 
include some notions of purposes, aims, values and beliefs in the description of their actions 
if their own conceptualisations were taken to be irrelevant to their behaviour. And in that 
case the language games that are played within existing action-spaces like the political, 
forensic, private or public would lack the adequate pawns. The assumption of some adequate 
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relation between self-conception and action seems to be constitutive for a certain aspect of 
human cooperation- and interaction-schemes. This goes even when people misunderstand 
themselves. Let‟s say that Hobbes is right in assuming that when someone performs an act 
that he conceives of as an act of friendship, what he really does is to attempt to extend his 
own power. He cannot see this because he has no direct experience of “the vital motion” as 
such in his own body. So why should we pay attention to the agent‟s own description instead 
of going directly to the core? I believe that Hobbes himself provides us with the answer. 
Such a conception of action would be in conflict with an essential human need, the need to 
establish a space or an arena for human co-operation (in Hobbes‟ case, a political space, i.e. 
a space based on legitimate power). Put in a more general way; there must be some possible 
description of human actions that make them conceivable as part of a scheme of human 
actions. For this to be possible, there must also be some way to conceptualise this scheme 
(or these schemes). And there must be some points where the conceptualisation of the 
schemes and those of the individuals‟ selves, must converge. The individual‟s 
conceptualisation of herself is caused by the way cooperating individuals conceptualise their 
cooperative scheme. To follow the Hobbes-case, one such point of convergence is his 
concepts of the Rights of Nature, defining some essential property of persons as well as 
some constitutive rules of a certain sort of interaction-scheme. It is then, if I am right, the 
need for peaceful legitimate cooperation that explains why the individuals can understand 
their own actions as exercise of individual interests (as a source of problems) as well as 
natural rights (as a source to the solution of problems). 
 
I will try to generalise the assumptions that are at the bottom of the foregoing considerations. 
I invite the reader to accept, at least for the sake of argument, that it is a fact that people‟s 
conceptualisations of their own beliefs and desires have explanatory force as to how they 
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really act. Having done this we should however ask under what conditions it is at all 
possible to form conceptions of one‟s own beliefs and desires (as well as those of others). 
Forming conceptions involve linguistic acts. Such acts should not be understood as 
involving a concept-giving subject and a conceptualised phenomenon only. Such a model 
would amount to a belief in the possibility of a private language. Concept-formation is part 
of interpersonal cooperative practices involving more than one perspective on the segment 
of the world that is the focal area of cooperation. Having beliefs and desires in the form of 
propositional attitudes relevant to action depends on the possibility that others can recognise 
that we have such. Our correct use of terms needs confirmation from those with whom we 
are involved in some kind of cooperation. And this in turn presupposes a common 
involvement in some action-scheme. Once this is the case, the language of beliefs and 
desires is the way we can make our own participation, and the ones of others, intelligible to 
others and to ourselves. And it is within the same framework that we can conceptualise, and 
hence comprehend, the various kinds of actions that are being performed. The bottom line of 
this is that it might very well be true that the language of mental qualia, intentions and 
propositional attitudes doesn‟t explain anything about our actions. But that holds only as 
long as these are considered from a perspective from which they are seen as not already 
involved in human interaction and cooperation.  
 
A relevant and highly interesting example of mentalistic terms getting their significance in 
the context of cooperative schemes is to be found in the legal sphere. In American law the 
term “knowingly and willingly” plays a central role. You will probably find corresponding 
terms in all modern legal systems. In Norwegian law the terms “forsett”, “hensikt” and 
“overlegg”, meaning various degrees of premeditation and deliberation, denotes something 
that must be ascribed to anyone who is to be held responsible for an action in the field 
 22 
regulated by criminal law. In spite of the obvious mentalistic character of these terms, they 
do not designate anything that could be identified independently of their meaning within the 
relevant action-space. In short, these terms get their significance through the way a certain 
cooperative scheme functions. The real foundation for their meaning is specific features of 
this system. There is of course the possibility that they refer to some independent mental 
entities, but anyhow; the alleged presence of such entities can only be demonstrated through 
the presence of some actions or utterances relevant to the specific case at hand (“He bought 
the gun the week before”, “He gathered information about the victim‟s whereabouts” etc). 
So, I find it reasonable to hold that the kind of terms in question gets their significance 
through their role in the interpretation of the relevance of the law in relation to certain 
actions and the ascription of the relevant qualities. Apart from this, it would hardly be 
possible to ascribe to them any reference at all. An alternative strategy, which I consider to 
fall under the “hardly possible”, is, of course, to give some metaphysical account of such 
terms. This would be the strategy employed by St. Augustine or Kant
1
. But even such 
strategies necessitate some kind of conceptual edifice, built up around concepts like 
“immortal souls” or “transcendental egos” to make the relevant terms intelligible. 
 
The question behind these considerations was whether or not our conception of our mental 
states has some explanatory force as to how we in fact act. My answer has been that it has to 
the extent that explanations in these terms give adequate answers to questions about human 
behaviour that we can reasonably ask and because our actions are parts of different co-
operative schemes. Such schemes must be understood by the participants to be of certain 
kinds, certain pragmatic modes. There are political actions because people understand 
certain acts to be of this kind. Had they not done so, there would be no such actions. Similar 
applies to other kinds of action. To be sure, this is not to say that people cannot misconceive 
                                                          
1
  The relevant sources are Augustine: De libero Aribitrio and Kant: Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten. 
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of their own actions. Actions that should properly be understood as political ones are, by the 
agents, often understood to belong to the private sphere. But were there no conceptions of a 
field of action as political, neither would there be such a field at all. Each field contains 
certain rules that action within this field should be (in the sense of “ought to be”) in 
accordance with. What I am saying is that people‟s understanding of such rules has impact 
on how they in fact act. It could be the case that our actions and mental states could be given 
descriptions in quite different terms. Anger, revenge, greed etc can be described in, say 
terms of synaptic connections and brain circuits. In fact it is not an open question whether or 
not this can in principle be done. To deny it would amount to the implausible opinion that 
mental processes are not sustained by neural and other physiological (hormonal, muscular) 
processes that are specific to each mental modification. I believe that it is important to be 
aware of this and to recognise the explanatory force of descriptions in such terms, that is 
their explanatory force in relation to certain kinds of explananda involved in human action. 
If not, we would be in danger of trying to explain mental phenomena and consciousness 
under the presupposition that mental phenomena and consciousness already exist. We would 
also be unable to appreciate the enormous amount of discriminations and connections that 
are performed by our neural system beyond our conscious awareness, and the significance of 
these processes for our conscious life. But the kind of explananda that would be explained 
would not be a person‟s actions considered as political, moral or social actions, but his 
actions considered as automated responses to his antecedent synaptic configurations. It 
would give a description of a person‟s behaviour at another level than the one where we find 
politics or morals or even jealousy, envy, greed or happiness. Should a description in terms 
of brain physiology altogether replace this, it would also have to grasp the political, social 
and other kinds of modes of human action with the moral implications of these. But on the 
other hand, maybe it will, even if I can‟t see how. After all I don‟t believe that we should 
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place too much trust in apriori or categorial arguments when it comes to considering a 
possible future. And, as a matter of fact, I don‟t think we have to. After all there is, to my 
knowledge, no empirical evidence suggesting that the different modalities (political, moral, 
social, private) of human action could adequately be described in terms of brain psychology. 
But again, maybe the future will be different, and perhaps this will result in new and better 
forms of human interaction. Maybe such a change would alter the way people conceive of 
their own mental states. Maybe future beings will be able to be directly aware of their own 
neural processes, and conceive of these as the reason for their actions. If it were true that we 
need politics because we are greedy, or even that we are greedy because we recognise 
politics as a potential field of interaction, it wouldn‟t be a great loss to lose the need for 
politics. But even so, such a possible future state cannot explain why people interact the way 
they in fact do today. 
 
Paul Churchland has, however, made the claim that the terms we use to conceptualise the 
mental states of ourselves and others are based on a theory of human action (folk 
psychology) that is in fact wrong (Churchland: 1988). He envisages a development where 
this theory might be eliminated and replaced by theories formulated within a different kind 
of paradigm, that of neuroscience. An alternative might be that it would be reduced to a 
description given on a deeper level. In that case we could still consider its explanations as 
true, even if there might be some more basic description of the same phenomena. But if it is 
correct that the theory is in fact untrue, we can, as Churchland points out, hardly expect to 
find some smooth one to one reduction to a basic level.  
 
Again; whether or not Churchland is right here can only be decided empirically and with 
reference to common standards of evaluating scientific theories. One should for instance 
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evaluate folk psychology, provided that one accepts that it is a theory at all, as to its 
explanatory force in relation to phenomena that it should be expected to explain. I will not 
try to assess Churchland‟s theory here. It seems however to me possible that even if people 
understand their actions in terms of a wrong theory, this theory might still be part of the 
explanation why they in fact act the way they do. The alternative seems to be that beliefs 
play no role in actions at all. We now know that there are no witches, and most of us also 
assume that there has never been any. Even so, people have burned other people on the 
assumption that they were witches. And such an assumption might very well be part of the 
explanation why they did so.    
 
On the other hand; we should, as the example shows, correct our wrong theories and stop 
acting in accordance with them. When we consider this it might be that there is a certain 
paradox connected to Churchland‟s position. Let‟s, as he does, assume that there is a 
possible correct theory of human action. Let‟s also assume that the terms of this theory 
would give us a true conception about what is really going on in the human mind. Let's also 
assume that people in general hold a wrong conception of their own mental states and 
actions. Now, do we at all act according to a theory? If yes, does this theory explain our 
actions? Is this theory the correct one or is it the one of folk psychology? Assume now that 
the answers to these questions are: yes, yes, and the correct one. My point is not that this 
involves some logical contradiction. It does not! There is rather a moral problem related to 
the relationship between scientific progress and civilisation.  If our wrong theories do not 
affect what we really do (and if they do affect them we would have to say that these theories 




Besides: Wrong theories certainly affect what we say. And what we say certainly affect what 
other people do to us. So, in some way or other the existence of wrong theories determine or 
influence the course of events. 
 
Alternatively we might answer that we act according to a wrong theory, but that this does 
not explain our actions in the sense that we would have acted likewise even if didn‟t have 
that theory. As we know, any event, or rather any description of an event, can be coherent 
with a number of wrong theories about the cause of that event. Coherence therefore does not 
ensure correct causal explanation. We think we do what we do because we have certain 
wishes, desires and beliefs, but that is simply wrong! We do it for some other, for us 
unknown reason, and this really explains why we do it. There was for instance a time when 
some people had some urge to burn other people, and so they developed a (wrong) theory 
about the nature of those people and of their own motives. Now, this is perfectly possible 
and even probably often the case. But should we say that it is always the case when common 
life vocabulary is involved in explanations of human action? My answer will, as the 
reasoning through this book will show, be no! 
 
Whatever the answer to this question might be, Churchland‟s contribution is important in 
relation to the distinction between a mental state and the content of this state indicated 
above. His position seems to be that the explanatory power of the mental in general is not 
primarily to be found on the content-level. The reason is that this level is filled with false 
opinions about what is going on. This does not imply that he takes the semantics of the mind 
to be unimportant or without explanatory force as to how we act.  However, he advocates a 
different theory of the origin of semantics, a theory based on the structure of neural system 




Brains and experiences 
The problem I have been discussing is whether emotions should be taken to be references of 
subject-related or absolute terms. A few words to clarify this distinction: Some terms refer to 
things whose existence depends on conscious activity of human beings, others to things that 
have an existence quite independent of any human perspective on them or any involvement in 
some human project. Among the first ones are nations, contracts, friendship, and war, among 
the second are oceans, pine trees, mountains and bears.  
 
Not everyone would agree that there are things existing independent of the human 
perspective. Some will emphasise the fact that our perceptual and conceptual make-up 
determines every aspect of the world as it is presented to us. I will not argue against this 
conception, but merely point to the fact that it is also part of the human perspective on the 
world to presume and act in accordance with the validity of the distinction I have just 
made.  
 
On which side of this division should we then place the human emotions? It would at first 
sight seem obvious that they are among the first class of things, and I believe this to be 
correct with regard to some aspects of human emotions. But that relates to human emotions 
that have already undergone a considerable development, i.e. the emotions of beings that 
have already learned to conceptualise their own mental states. It is certainly possible to 
formulate sensible statements about emotions that do not presuppose the development of 
such abilities. Such an approach will be based on the assumption that emotions do not have 
to be studied from the point where there is conscious awareness of some definite emotion. 
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It will regard such consciousness as a later stage in a longer sequence, a state that in a 
sense occurs after some of the most important things have already been put in place.  
 
As a tentative approach to the question whether or not our emotions are some sort of 
“constructs”, I will assume that there are naturally given emotions, that these are 
“reconstructed” by us into certain conceptual complexes, and that such “constructions” 
come to have real impact on the way we actually feel and behave. The reason why I 
assume that there are naturally given emotions is that some basic emotional awareness of 
certain features of our environment have obvious evolutionary advantages. 
 
In recent years neuroscience have made substantial progress in understanding the neuro-
physiological processes that “underpin” our emotional life, at least with regard to some of 
our emotions. Joseph LeDoux (Cf. LeDoux, 1996), who has been particularly interested in 
the emotion fear, assumes that emotions to a large extent are determined by processes that 
take place outside our consciousness, i.e. without our conscious awareness of them. He 
also shows that some of the typical emotional-physiological reactions take place 
independent of conscious involvement. Antonio Damasio, who has developed a 
comprehensive theory of the biological basis of human consciousness (Damasio, 1999), 
starts from the same assumption. And it would indeed be odd to suppose that 
consciousness originally evolves from phenomena that are themselves conscious, or, even 
odder, that it pops up ex nihil. LeDoux‟s and Damasio‟s approaches are thus very different 
from what is often termed phenomenological. By a “phenomenological approach” I mean 
an approach that starts from some consciously experienced mental content and proceeds by 
analysing the experience of this content and asking what is involved in such experience. 
Even though these two approaches are very different, I do not think that they contradict 
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each other in the sense that the results of the one would exclude the results of the other. I 
believe that they are about different levels of the evolutionary history of our emotions. Put 
in a synchronic fashion, they represent different levels of description. A short comment on 
the concept of “levels of description”: An object could be described from the perspective 
of the physical elements and laws that determine its existence. Take for instance a building 
like a 13
th
 century cathedral. The building is a system of physical elements put together in 
such a way as to carry a certain weight and construction. The cathedral could be given a 
purely physical description that would be a description of materials and construction-
principles. It could however also be given several other types of descriptions. Some would 
be in terms of the meaning and significance of the different elements and of the edifice as a 
whole. Some Italian renaissance architects in fact described their works in moral terms and 
conceived of the different architectural elements as moral expressions. But they were still 
masters of physical construction-principles. Had they not been, their architectural moral 
and religious expressions would have been impossible. What I am saying is that something 
might be given different, but true, descriptions on different levels. This is the case with 
mental phenomena. They can be described as neural events and sequences, and they can be 
described as conscious experiences. And I take it to be a plain fact that there could not be 
any conscious experiences, had there not been something that could be given a true 
description of the first kind. But this also implies that emotions are more than the 
conscious experience we have of them. It may hence be consistent to hold a theory of the 
evolutionary origin of consciousness and emotions on the one hand, and a theory of the 
structure of the conscious experience of emotions on the other. In fact, this could be stated 
stronger : If we take for granted that our emotions have a pre-conscious evolutionary 
history and we also take for granted that we have conscious emotional experiences which 
are accessible to phenomenological analysis, then it must be some possible consistent 
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theory including both levels. More about this later. At the moment it is enough just to state 
that we as human beings are biological beings, that we are among those biological beings 
that have consciousness, that we are conscious biological beings that have language, and 
that all these features are results of the development of human biology. All these things are 
important in the formation of what we know as human emotions, but it is not necessarily 
the case that everything that is part of the formation of these emotions is also part of their 
consciously experienced mode of being.  
  
One reason to emphasise the importance of the phenomenology of the emotions is, as 
already mentioned, that this could open up an approach to a quality of emotions that is 
important for a certain kind of emotion-theory, namely the role played by our 
conceptualisations of our own mental states as they relate to describable action and inter-
personal action-schemes. One thesis of this book is that this makes conceptualisations 
essential to some emotions, which means that they wouldn‟t exist as the kinds of emotions 
they are, were they not conceptualised. Another is that such emotions play an important 
role in the making of autobiographical selves and of an important class of social 
phenomena. So, I assume that it is an essential property of at least some human emotions 
that they are experienced as such, that they exist in a certain mode, as subjective 
experiences of the situations we are in.  
 
All this implies that human emotions may be explored from two perspectives, bottom-up 
and top-down. The bottom-up approach will show us how our biological, especially our 
neural, devices have evolved so as to make possible and support conscious phenomena, 
among them emotions. This line of investigation has provided us with a theory of mind that 
works in terms of systems and networks. Now, one might give some standard anti-
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reductionism arguments against this approach, saying that it does not describe 
consciousness as we experience it. One might say that it reduces the phenomenon to be 
studied in such a way as to change the very object. Descriptions of consciousness in terms 
of neural networks cannot be recognised as descriptions of consciousness at all. If such 
objections are valid, the bottom-up approach could be said to start out by raising one 
problem and, at best, end up by solving a different problem. But in fact I do not believe 
this to be the case. What we recognise as terms adequate to describe conscious states, is a 
question of acquaintance with cultural codes. The Greeks, and most noteworthy Plato, 
taught us to recognise descriptions in visual terms as descriptions of different modes of 
knowledge. There are descriptions in terms of systems and network that are at least as 
recognisable as descriptions of consciousness as are descriptions in terms of, say 
“reflection”, “insight”, “enlightenment” and other visual metaphors, or in terms of logical 
structures or mental qualia. Besides, the argument that the “how conscious phenomena are 
felt” cannot be recognised in neural descriptions and that such descriptions therefore 
cannot be descriptions of mental phenomena, misses an important point: The “how-
feeling” cannot be described at all. A description does not picture a feeling. At the most, 
some descriptions presupposes them, for instance ostensive definitions. Perhaps the 
objection mentioned is based upon the feeling that the network approach diffuses the 
distinction between the subjective and objective side of consciousness, the first and the 
third person description. If so, it might be answered that the borderline between these two 
sides is a changing one. Descriptions that are at one time taken to be descriptions of objects 
are often later felt as descriptions of subjective experiences. Now and then you hear 
complaints that there is a trend to use the language of the computer-world to describe the 
mental. What such complains often ignore is the possibility that this linguistic development 
might correspond to a change in how mental processes are actually felt. After all, people 
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have probably always used analogues from technology that they considered to be advanced 
to conceptualise their mental states, and such metaphors may very well shape their own 
feelings of what is going on while they think or feel. Certainly the computer-language 
applied to mind is metaphorical. But we shouldn‟t therefore a priori assume that it is just 
another change of metaphors that is just as good or bad as another. One should even be 
open to the possibility that it in fact comes closer to a true description of what is in fact 
going on.  
 
I believe however that there is one feature of human consciousness that perhaps will be 
inadequately described if dealt with in network-terms only. This doesn‟t have so much to 
do with the first-person aspect; it rather concerns the semantics of the mind. To put it 
plainly, it has to do with the meaning and content of mental phenomena. I must confess 
that I am not too certain about this, but I do suspect that a theory about the semantic 
content of the mind will have to contain some top-down approach. It is plain enough what 
“semantics” is all about. It has to do with the meaning of linguistic units. Applied to mental 
phenomena, I take it to deal with the so-called “intentionality”. The adjective “intentional” 
is connected with a description of a mental content, what a mental state is about.  
 
There is an argument against the claim that semantics can be explained in terms of the 
neural system, that goes like this: At some point in time Jimmy Carter decided to campaign 
for the Presidency of the United States. At that moment there was a certain synaptic 
configuration in his brain. Assume now that 5000 years ago, there was a man who at a 
certain moment in time had the exact same synaptic configuration. Did this stone-age man 
then decide to try to be the next president of the United States? However decisive this 




2000 I was sitting at my computer in my office in the philosophy department at the 
University of Tromsø trying to write a book on the human emotions. Let‟s now assume 
that 5000 years ago there was a man who, at a certain moment was in the exact same 
situation as I was on that date. Was he then sitting at his computer in his office in the 
philosophy department at the University of Tromsø, trying to write a book on the human 
emotions? If my situation was the one described and he was in the exact same situation, 
then, yes of course he was! But on the other hand, the conditional isn‟t very likely to 
describe any actual situation. Just as unlikely as the conditional saying that there was a 
stone-age man having the same synaptic configuration as Jimmy Carter had at a certain 
time. This cave dweller had no concepts of presidency, of states (united or not), of political 
parties, of election campaigns and so on. So how could it be that his neural system was 
mapping a situation identical with the one facing Jimmy Carter? After all there are 
virtually infinitely many possible synaptic configurations. And any realised possibility 
maps a situation in which a subject finds himself. In fact the argument presupposes that it 
is anachronistic (which it indeed is) to assume that the stone-age man should aspire to 
become president of the United States. On the other hand it presupposes that it is not 
equally anachronistic to assume that his brain-state was identical with Carter‟s the moment 
the former president decided to do so. In short, the argument presupposes the truth of its 
own conclusion. Admittedly, so does my counterexample. Of course, if A and B are in 
identical situations, then they are in identical situations. My point is that the Carter-
argument does the same. It assumes a neural situation causing and supporting someone‟s 
decision to be the president of USA and then pretends that the existence of presidency and 
USA are not part of that situation.   
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On the other hand, the argument has a certain appeal because it reminds us of something 
important. The content of mental states must be described in terms of the phenomena they 
are about. If John loves Mary, then “Mary” is part of the content of this mental state of his. 
If he envies Paul because Paul is richer than he, then Paul and his wealth is part of this 
mental state. The case is more complicated than this, but for now it is enough to say that 
the intentionality of a mental state can be described in terms that seem to have certain 
meanings because they also refer to things that are outside the mind.  
 
One way to put this is to say that syntax, or structure, alone is insufficient for the 
generation of semantics. One reason would be that syntax is conceived as a formal system 
that is indifferent to the semantic content of the units filling the spaces in the formal 
syntactic scheme. Any given space in any syntactic scheme can be filled with different 
words expressing different semantic content. The scheme in itself therefore cannot 
determine distinctions of meaning. Even if the conclusion is correct, I believe that one 
premise is false, or at least inaccurate. A neural system can be described as a formal 
(network) system. And in fact it is capable of making far more distinctions than is our 
language. I can distinguish between far more colours, tastes, sounds, shapes, and moods, 
etc than I can name and ascribe semantic meaning. In fact, our semantic system probably 
blurs far more distinctions than it clarifies (which probably is the intuition at the bottom of 
philosophical nominalism). So, if we were to hang our defence in favour of a theory that 
semantics require more than a formal system on semantics‟ capacity to express 
distinctions, we would really have a bad case.  
 
However; could we find a neural pattern in John‟s brain, that we could possible recognise 
as “Mary”, “Paul”, “money” or “theft”? The common sense answer, and the one I will 
 35 
tentatively stick to, seems to be no! Now, I do realise that this is not so obviously true as it 
might seem at first sight. In fact a neural network-map could very well represent John‟s 
mind as containing a space of possible persons, a space where Mary and Paul hold 
exclusive positions. The same could be done with regard to possible actions. I find it 
highly plausible that this would actually explain how it comes to be that John can reserve a 
unique place in his mind for Mary and another for Paul. But the example at hand includes 
more than John‟s ability to individuate them among potentially infinitely many persons. It 
also picks them out as having some sort of special significant importance for John. My 
assumption is that the semantics of the terms, is a result, partly of distinctions/exclusions 
and partly of the significance attached to them. Such significance is influenced by the way 
John figures that these distinct entities have impact on him, and how he ought to organise 
his own behaviour towards them. All this makes up a kind of configuration including 
persons and their significance with regard to oneself and one‟s actions. Such 
configurations could be regarded as prototypes of various sorts. The tentative thesis is here 
that the component parts of such prototypes get their semantic meaning in light of the 
prototypical configuration as a whole and their general significance in people‟s lives. The 
word “theft” gets its meaning partly from the significance and importance that situations 
thus referred to have for our lives and our conception of our person (our own and other‟s) 
and of collaborate and other inter-personal schemes. 
 
Let‟s, at least for the sake of argument, accept that semantics, in addition to being 
sustained by a system of discriminations, is based on the significance of the phenomena to 
which we refer. If so; are some information of a certain significant importance because it is 
processed in certain parts of the brain, or is it processed in these parts because of its special 
kind of importance? It is for instance assumed that information about imminent danger is 
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processed in the amygdala. It seems implausible that the danger represented by an 
approaching tiger depends on the fact that the information about it is being processed in the 
amygdala. The fear that is the result of such processing may depend on this. But the fear 
merely informs us that something of special importance is going on, it doesn‟t (normally) 
create the danger. This line of reasoning seems to indicate that a mental state refers to 
something external that determines the content, the semantic dimension of that state.   
 
Conscious phenomena are experienced as subjective. But what does that mean? Especially: 
What would it mean that at least some emotions are distinguished by the conscious 
subjective mode of their existence? After all, any appearance in our consciousness is a 
subjective state. I can see a tree outside the window and the tree is my subjective 
perception. But there is a difference. I perceive the tree as something existing independent 
of my perception. This mode of perceiving is in fact distinctive of the way this and similar 
perceptions are experienced. Pride and shame, on the other hand, are not sensed in this 
way. However we conceive of these emotions, they have a subjective, first person 
phenomenology (some would even say ontology). Having a possible phenomenological 
description is part of what it is to be, at least some, human emotions. Such a description 
would cover conceptions of values, of ourselves, i.e. conceptions of who we are and of our 
future projects. Thomas Nagel has discussed the relationship between an objective 
description of consciousness and the subjective experience of conscious mental states. 
According to Nagel (Nagel: 1974), a being having consciousness, means that there is 
something for this being to be the kind of being it is. That does not imply that it would be 
impossible to give a neuro-physiological description of the perception-system of this being, 
but it does imply that such a description would not tell us what it is like to be this being. 
We may describe how bats fly around at night, navigating with a sonar-like system, how 
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they sleep upside down and so on. But this does not give us any knowledge about what it is 
like to be a bat. As Nagel points out; I might try to imagine how I would feel if I developed 
long fingers connected with skin, if I lost my sight and flew around at night hunting insects 
and slept upside down in caves. But still, what I would do even if I succeeded in imagining 
this, would at most be to imagine what it would be like for me to be a bat, not what it is 
like for a bat to be a bat. Correspondingly for us, and our emotions: we can imagine 
creatures quite different from ourselves being capable of a complete and accurate neuro-
physiological description of how the human emotions work. But that would not give them 
an understanding of what it is like for us to be us. If this is correct, it must also be correct 
that such a description would not give us such an understanding of what it is like to be us, 
even if given by one of us. This certainly does not mean that neuro-science cannot increase 
our understanding of ourselves, far less that neuro-scientists cannot understand what it is 
like for humans to be humans. The main point is that we, neuro-scientists included, already 
have this knowledge from first-person experience. Everyone would agree that the third-
person system-description can, and indeed does, increase our understanding of the way our 
emotional life works, and almost everyone would agree that this understanding can even 
contribute to change our attitude towards our own emotions. To deny this would amount to 
claiming that our understanding of our mental life cannot be increased by extension of the 
field of investigation beyond what can be directly accessed by our immediate subjective 
awareness. But still, without the underlying first-person experience of the significance of 
emotions and emotional nuances, we would miss some of the essence of the role played by 
emotions in our lives. 
 
There are however a couple of problems with Nagel‟s position. First: if it is the case that a 
third-person description of our mental system (given by ourselves) really contributes to 
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changing our mental life, then it cannot be completely true that such a description doesn‟t 
say anything about how it is for us to be us. People have, for instance, probably always 
been confused. After sociology became a social force, some of us began to feel, not only 
confused, but being trapped in “role-conflicts”, a term that originally was introduced as 
part of a third-person description. So, part of what it is for me to be me, is to be in role-
conflicts.  
 
Second: Nagel may be right in claiming that for a being to have consciousness is that there 
is something for this being to be this being. But the analogy between bats and humans 
underscores an important difference between bats and humans. Bats probably do not know 
that they are bats. But part of what it is like for humans to be human is to know that we are 
humans. And knowledge, as opposed to feeling, already implies perceiving from a third-
person view. Knowledge goes beyond feeling. And, after all, neuro-science is not 
something conducted by Extra Terrestrials on humans, it is part of a larger project namely 
human‟s endeavours to understand themselves. Who could know what it is like to be a bat, 
and what does it at all mean to have such knowledge? To answer the first question there 
can be only one possible candidate, humans, since presumably only humans have 
propositional knowledge. But since they are not bats, they don‟t know. Knowing what it is 
like to be a bat excludes that you know what it is like to be a bat since knowledge is not 
part of what it is like to be a bat. Therefore no one can possibly know what it is like to be a 
bat. As to the second question, the answer has already been given; there is no such possible 
knowledge. More precisely, the closest possible answer would be that it is for a bat to feel 
“batness”. But if that is so, saying that we can‟t know what it is like to be a bat, amounts to 
saying that “only bats are bats”. But it is hard to see how this could teach us anything about 
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the relationship between human biological make-up and the knowledge about how it is for 
humans to be humans. 
 
Maybe these comments don‟t hit Nagel‟s argument very good. After all he doesn‟t believe 
that bat-consciousness, being the “something” that it is for bats to be bats, consists in 
flying around trying to find propositional descriptions of its activities. But then again, 
perhaps his point would be better stated as an answer to the question “What does it feel 
like to be a bat?” rather than the ambiguous; “What is it like to be a bat?” Imagine a 
conversation like this: 
A: I know what it is like to burn my arm on boiling oil. 
B: Oh do you! I‟ve never done that, so please tell me. 
A: Well, it hurts! 
B: Sure, but please describe the specific feeling of having that experience, so that I can 
recognise it and appreciate your pain! 
A: It‟s like an extremely intense biting feeling that almost paralyses every other perception. 
B: Those analogies and consequences still do not make me know what it is like to have 
such an extremely intense biting feeling. 
A: Of course I can‟t describe it in a way that would make you know that. You will have to 
experience it, or something similar, yourself. 
B: But you said you knew. And surely you can describe what you know. 
A: Well, I meant that I know how it feels. 
 
Bottom line: We can know that some events are taking place in A‟s body, but that does not 
imply that we know how that feels. We can also know that bats perform certain operations, 
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but that doesn‟t imply that we also know how that feels.
2
 Knowing how is not a species of 
propositional knowledge. 
 
Third: As an expansion of the preceding considerations there is a certain moral problem 
with Nagel‟s argument, at least if we are to make it relevant, not only to human-bat 
relations, but also to interpersonal relations. It is obviously correct that I am not a bat, 
therefore I cannot know the feeling of batness. But I am not you either, so I cannot feel 
what it is like for you to be you. But does that imply that I cannot know what it is like to be 
you in any sense? And what does it mean to know what it is like to be you? What would be 
a morally relevant meaning of such knowledge? After all I am expected to abide to certain 
rules in my actions towards you. Many of these rules can be applied only on the condition 
that I know something about you and the situation you are in. What kind of knowledge is 
required here? Is it for instance the first-person knowledge that I do not have about what it 
is like to be a bat? Now, I do not have that knowledge about you either, so I miss the 
conditions required if I were to follow moral rules in my behaviour towards you. Would 
things be better if I had such knowledge? I will never be very successful in pretending to 
be a bat. But I might be quite successful in pretending to be you. I might take over 
decisions concerning your life, I might tell you what to mean and do and I might pretend, 
or even imagine that your sorrows and joys are actually my sorrows and joys. In fact I 
believe that people often do that sort of things. If we give a certain phenomenon a name, 
we will more easily detect it when it is present. I propose we call the described 
                                                          
2
 This is actually a reformulation of an argument given in lecture by Paul Churchland. His version is an 
argument against the assumption that consciousness is not a feature of an organic system. The argument for 
the assumption mentioned goes like this: Mary is a neuroscientist specialised in vision. In fact she is the 
world’s leading scientist in this field. She knows everything that can possibly be known about our visual 
system. But Mary is born blind. She therefore doesn’t know what it is like to see red.  Therefore this 
knowledge cannot be inferred from knowledge about our visual system. The argument can be formalised like 
this: P 1. Mary knows everything about our neural visual system. P 2. Mary does not know how it is to see 
red. Therefore: How it is to see red is not a feature of our neural visual system.  
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phenomenon The Talented Mr. Ripley Syndrome (TRS), the essence of which is a lacking 
ability to see the significance of the difference between oneself and another person. The 
reason why I do not consider this to be morally desirable, is that I believe it to conflict with 
a central ethical concept, that of “a person”. Since “person” is, as John Locke says, “a 
forensic term” it is perfectly possible to act as another‟s person. I will treat this concept 
below. Here I will just say that it is used to ascribe certain rights, actions and experiences 
to human individuals and that it is used to define the borders between human beings. 
Pretending to be the other person is to violate these borders. In fact I believe that TRS in 
some form is an essential ingredient in all abuse. What I am saying is that it is desirable to 
know the situation of other human beings, but it is not desirable to confuse such knowledge 
with an attempt to experience another‟s situation as he himself experiences it. My ethical 
point here is simply that we may represent other people in various respects, and such 
representation usually requires knowledge about them. But representation should not be 
confused with substitution. 
 
Iris Marion Young (Young: 1997) has elaborated a conception of the moral significance of 
the points just stated. In her reconstruction of a moral conversation or relationship the 
asymmetry of the interpersonal relation is a constituent of its moral significance. The key 
term is “asymmetrical reciprocity” meaning that mutual respect is built on the assumption 
that each party involved has a perspective that is genuinely hers in a non-substitutional 
way. Any attempt to “take over” the other person‟s experience, identify with the “what it is 
like” to hold her position, should be considered a kind of violation of integrity. Young‟s 
basic message seems to be that the moral significance of human experience is inseparable 
from the fact that they are made from the perspective of individual persons. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
This inference is however invalid since the meaning of “know” is changed from “know that” to “know how” 






Emotions and Rationality 
We will now leave this for a while and start at another end. Many emotion theorists have 
asked questions about the relationship between emotions and rationality. In fact, explicit or 
implicit questions about this are probably among the oldest in the history of emotion 
theory. If the question is conceived to concern what we could call the rationality of 
emotions, it could be taken to mean two different, but interrelated things. It could either be 
taken as a question about the cognitive
3
 content of emotions, or it could be takes as a more 
general question about our possibility of some sort of reflective and corrective attitude 
towards our emotions. By “reflective and corrective attitude towards our emotions”, I mean 
our ability and willingness to adjust our emotional attitudes to reasonable norms, 
interpretations of facts, social expectations and personal goals. Interpreted either way, the 
question about the relationship between emotions and rationality starts with the fact that 
we are conscious biological beings with language. I consider this to be a legitimate starting 
point for an investigation of human emotions in spite of the fact that it puts aside a lot of 
facts that determine our emotional life. One reason for this is that language makes a 
difference because it makes it possible for us to relate ourselves to some symbolic aspect 
of objects, to ascribe some sort of significance to this aspect and to let this determine our 
actions. The rationality question simply starts from the fact of this difference. Language 
may not be the point where reflective consciousness starts, but it surely is the point where 
symbolic representations start.  
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Further; it is possible that emotions of different kinds play an important role in creating 
circumstances for human discoursive practice that we usually conceive of as reasonable. 
When we, for instance, accept other peoples opinions and the reasons they give to hold 
them, there is often an element of credibility involved, an element without which such 
acceptance would have been impossible or at any rate difficult. The feeling we have 
towards someone whose credibility we accept can be called “confidence” or “trust”. In 
adult humans confidence/trust is a meeting-place between emotional desires, perhaps 
grounded in the need for safety and stability, and the consideration of reasons. This implies 
that there is an aspect of human life that should be understood as determined by certain 
features of emotion-holders who are also rational. All this touches a classic philosophical 
question: What is the relationship between accepting some description as rational and, on 
the other hand, being motivated by this description to perform some action? One might of 
course take the Kantian stand and say that part of the acceptance of something as rational is 
an implicit acceptance of its claim to motivate action. But that seems to presuppose that 
you are already emotionally attached to some social, cultural or institutional context that 
makes it meaningful to you to accept this. 
 
The same state of affairs seems to be confirmed by Damasio (Damasio, 1994), whose case-
studies show a connection between, on the one hand certain brain damages causing a loss 
or narrowing of the emotional repertoire and, on the other hand, a loss of ability to organise 
life and conduct on the basis of rational deliberation and planning. Damasio‟s general 
conclusion on the basis of such evidences is that emotional engagement in one‟s own life is 
essential even to instrumental because without it, there would be no significant goals. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
3




Why should we be aware of our biological nature and evolutionary history as long as we 
start from the point where we (probably) depart from the rest of nature? One obvious 
reason is that our language and our symbolically structured life world is itself a product of 
our biological nature and evolutionary history. Now and then philosophers say things like 
this; “Yes, we are biological beings, but we are also more than that”. When asked what 
more, the answer is likely to be that we also think, reason, pass moral judgements and so 
on. This answer of course implies that this is not part of our biological nature. Organisms 
do not pass judgements or enter into moral obligations! But is this really true? Don‟t they? 
Humans are biological organisms, and they pass judgements and make moral 
commitments. Doesn‟t it follow that there in fact are organisms that do these things? And 
is the fact that it is organisms that perform these activities irrelevant for the understanding 
of the activities themselves? It would seem natural to say that the burden of argument is on 
those who say that our intellectual capacities have a non-biological origin. And this burden 
will not be relieved by mere declarations that material organisms cannot possibly have 
such capacities. Neither will it be relieved by declarations that it would be a “category-
mistake” to assume that they have such, since a very slight switch of perspective makes it 
seem obvious that some of them indeed do have it. 
 
The part of our biological make-up that is most directly related to our mental life is the 
brain and its neural system. Any description of the brain‟s topography, its neural pathways 
and circuits, the way information is coded in receptor cells and transmitted to higher levels 
of the neural system, any such description that could also be recognised as relevant to 
understanding the structure of mental phenomena, is therefore of special interest. This is 
especially true if such descriptions also provide some explanation of the system of 
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discriminations or distinctions characteristic of mental and semantic phenomena and of the 
way mental phenomena are related to our interaction with our physical and social 
environment.  
 
One good reason to pay attention to the biological foundation of conscious phenomena is 
that this allows us to direct the question of relationship between rationality and emotions at 
the proper aspect or level of emotional life. It therefore allows us to give more specific 
answers to questions like: “Can we alter our emotions voluntarily?” “What sort of 
cognitive structures are contained within emotions?”  
 
One fact about us is that we have certain cognitive capacities. We are able to use concepts 
to identify things as things of certain types belonging to certain classes of things. We are 
also able to describe these things propositionally. Another fact is that we live within a 
symbolically structured cultural environment in which things and events get a significance 
that is not readily identifiable from their physical properties. There are some facts about 
humans that are such that they make us conceive of something as something else, a sound 
as a promise or a verdict, a piece of paper as money and another human as a friend, an 
enemy, a rival, a partner and so on. We also form inter-human relations and institutions 
(stabilised and formalised patterns of interaction) that we endow with various types of 
values of various nuances. We form certain attachments and engagements to which we 
ascribe special significance. These things do not exist as such apart from the human 
perspective on them. But the fact that such things do not have an existence separate from 
the human perspective does not make them less important for the understanding of human 
emotions. Many human emotional varieties are in fact constituted and developed in 
relations to such objects. Such emotions should themselves be regarded as belonging to the 
 46 
class of objects not existing separate from the human perspective. Understanding them 
would include understanding how this perspective is structured and how it is experienced 
by the beings that have it. 
 
Part of this perspective is determined by our cognitive and rational capacities. That is why 
I believe we should consider human emotions as closely related to these capacities. One 
aim of this essay is to illuminate the relation between the human emotions and the human 
rationality and cognitive abilities.   
 
I find it important to make one point unambiguously clear: I do not mean that emotions as 
such are rational in any reasonable meaning of the term “rational”. We have feelings and 
emotions before we have a language. Animals that never develop language have feelings 
and in many cases probably emotions. I even believe that it is possible to have emotions 
without knowing that one has them, at least in the sense of “knowing that”. Such 
“knowing” denotes a mental state connected with some propositional content. And mental 
states with propositional content are presumably only possible in language-users. It would 
indeed be odd to imagine a newborn child that, in addition to being hungry also is the state 
of knowing that it is hungry. What I am claiming is that humans, at a certain stage of their 
lives, i.e. when they have acquired the ability of using language, have emotions that are 
related to rationality in both senses mentioned above.  
 
Before we proceed I will comment shortly on the seeming paradox in the claim that it is 
possible to have an emotion without knowing it. The paradox might disappear when we 
consider that consciousness is not an either-or entity, but a graded phenomenon. 
Consciousness (as we know it) makes a kind of hierarchy with conscious focused 
awareness of propositional knowledge at the top. Perhaps the lowest level (which is often 
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considered as a state of lack of consciousness) is our mental state during -sleep (the deep 
dreamless sleep). Consider the following: We have all met strangers that we are instantly 
attracted to and others in whose presence we immediately feel uncomfortable, “the 
chemistry doesn‟t fit”. In cases of the last sort we might be in a state of suspicion without 
being clearly aware of it. Further reflection might clarify that this is the case. Such 
reflection comes temporarily after the initial response. I am later (Ch. 5) going to comment 
on Damasio‟s model of consciousness. In this model there is a top-level consciousness 
(extended consciousness) based on a process wherein past responses are being reactivated 
through memory ( long or short term), and are then being responded to like any other 
object.  
 
How should we conceive of the relation between the propositional content and the 
affective mode in language-users? Does an emotion “strike” an adult in the way that some 
known propositional content is connected to, or “synthesised with” some affective quality? 
Maybe! We might know something and suddenly be struck with jealousy or envy because 
of some known fact that had formerly been indifferent to us. But this probably happens to 
people who already have considerable emotional experience. More originally, emotions are 
likely to “strike” us as undifferentiated wholes. The analytical work of distinguishing 
between propositional content and emotional mode or quale, and of identifying the 
different component of the content, requires some reflective distance.   
 
There is a very obvious methodological problem connected with a study of emotions: Are 
emotions a natural kind? There are some evidences that there are states that we usually 
conceive of as emotions that make a natural kind. As mentioned above, the physiological 
profile of fear is similar in all mammals (Cf. LeDoux and Damasio). But that doesn‟t give 
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us very good reasons to assume that emotions like, say, benevolence, indignation, insult 
and love are instances of one and the same natural kind and far less that everything that we 
give the name “emotion” makes one natural kind.  
 
The prima facie features that we come across when we consider emotions are probably that 
they are responses to some event and that these responses are modes of being engaged in, 
attached to or repulsed from something, and that these modes are in some way pleasant or 
unpleasant. The absence of “indifference towards something” thus seems to be common to 
all states that we usually take to be emotions.  
 
At least at a basic level the responses in question should be conceived as effects caused by 
how we are affected by the corresponding event. Fear is, for instance caused by some 
perceived threat to the organism in its environment. What do such responses do for the 
organism, in what way do they influence the organism‟s interaction with its environment? I 
will claim that at least part of the answer is that the emotional responses are ways to detect, 
map and amplify situations that we find ourselves in. I will return to the concept of 
“mapping”. Presently it is enough to say that the various dimensions of the emotional maps 
can be made conscious and analysed separately. Making emotions accessible to rationality 
is just this analytical process.  
 
What kind of situations do emotions detect and map? To answer this question I find it 
necessary to distinguish between emotions that are basic in the sense that they are 
genetically determined, and emotions that are determined by cultural codes. Fear, as 
response to dangerous situations is an obvious instance of the first. Fear is a kind of 
mapping of danger-spots in our environment, natural as well as social. Envy, jealousy and 
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pride instantiate the last. I take such emotions to be a kind of detecting and mapping of 
social situations. They map the significance of such situations in relation to the systems of 
social hierarchies, values and behaviour-codes. They are, in short, responses to certain 
features of social situations, responses that inform us where we are in the social landscape. 
This social landscape, which is made up of the dimensions of hierarchies, values and 
codes, is represented as an emotional “mindscape”. The activation, in form of consciously 
felt emotions, of certain points in this mindscape informs us that the social situation to 
which this activation is a response, is located in a certain place in the social landscape and 
that we ourselves hold a certain position within this situation. From this, the following can 
be inferred: If it is the case that what we call human self and person in some way is 
socially constituted and situated, then emotions play an essential role in such constitution. 
 
The general conceptions of the human emotions that I want to explicate are the following: 
 
1. Emotions are mapping responses to situations in which the organism, and later the 
person, finds itself. 
 
2. Human emotions, as indeed all conscious human awareness, starts with diffuse feelings 
of something taking place inside or outside the body, something that is felt as influencing 
the organism. From the start such feelings appear as states of various degrees of comfort or 
discomfort. 
 
3. As we develop, we learn to interpret, conceptualise, categorise and explain what is 
taking place. We also make distinctions along lines of different qualities and degrees of 
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comfort and discomfort. As this process involves development of categories and concepts, 
it is related to our linguistic development. 
 
4. The way we learn to conceive of inter-personal relations are of special importance for 
human emotional development. Such conceptions are based, not only on concepts and 
categories, but also on mental images of situations and sequences of actions getting 
symbolic significance. The significance of such situations and sequences can only be 
properly understood in terms of culture.  
 
5. This process also changes the way we actually feel, or better, broadens the spectre of 
nuances of our feelings.  
 
6. This process should not be regarded as one where the importance of one faculty, the 
emotions, taken as a constant, is diminished while another that of reason, also taken as a 
constant, is enhanced. Emotions and reason are levels of the same basic phenomenon, 
situation-mapping and response-preparation, more generally, adaption. 
   
7. The study of human emotions can be conducted as a study of the result of this         







Neural and Mental Mapping 
 
I have occasionally been using the term “mapping”, mainly with reference to neural 
systems and conscious mental states. I am now going to discuss more explicitly the 
application of this concept in the context of mental phenomena in general and emotions 
more specifically. In a later chapter I will focus on emotions from the perspective of their 
formal, grammar-like, components. That is the perspective from which emotions are 
regarded as being capable of propositional articulation. The order of presentation is 
motivated by the theory that the formal component perspective may be an expression of a 
kind of multi-dimensionality that has deeper roots than preparing emotions for linguistic 
articulation. The formal-component perspective may be regarded as intermediate between 
a neural map perspective and a rational, linguistic articulation perspective. 
 
The concept of neural maps has been elaborated in great detail by Paul Churchland 
(Churchland, 1995), so for a detailed analysis I refer the reader to his works. Churchland‟s 
map-concept is elaborated from a theory of the working of our neuronal system and often 
demonstrated through models simulating such systems. An informed discussion of details 
about such systems is far beyond the scope of the present investigations. The basic 
principles on which the models are built are, however, quite simple, hence I will attempt to 
make a very brief outline of the underlying neuro-physiological and model-theoretical 
principles. An instructive (because of its simplicity) example of a neuro-map is the one of 
colours. Let‟s consider the visual system as consisting of tree layers, a reception layer (in 
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the retina), a medium layer (in the lateral geniculate nucleus) and an out-put layer (in the 
visual cortex). Each layer consists of a population of neurons with a number of axons. 
Each axon can make synaptic connections with the dendrites of other neurons (in the next 
layer) whose axons in turn connect with the dendrites of still other neurons, so as to 
constitute a neural pathway. The input layer consists of three kinds of receptors, each being 
sensitive to electromagnetic waves within a certain, but for each kind different, range. 
These three range areas are the ones we conceive of as Red-Green opponents, Yellow-Blue 
opponents and Black-White opponents. The input layer sends impulses to various neurons 
in the mid-layer from where they are forwarded in different compositions to the output 
layer. Add now that the stimuli of the reception cells are vector-coded, that is they are 
stimulated along a non-discrete scale of intensity. The end result is that the input layer 
discriminates between a small number of different colour quality-types, while the output 
layer, that is the layer of conscious experience, discriminates between 10 000. Now, this 
output situation can be represented as a three-dimensional “space”. The dimensions will be 
the shades between yellow-blue, red-green and black-white. The space represents all 
colours that we can possibly conceive. Any specific colour can be represented as spots 







Because this colour-space consists of only three dimensions and hence has a formal 
resemblance to space in the normal sense, it is easy to imagine. The next step will however 
be to extend the space-metaphor to cover all other kinds of mental phenomena and to 
imagine these spaces as consisting of far more than three dimensions. One of Churchland‟s 
favourite examples is face-recognition, probably because it can be simulated by computers 
and therefore demonstrated. Face-recognition operates along an unknown number (n) of 
dimensions. We can however imagine a n-dimensional space that is the space of possible 
recognisable faces. Each face would hold an exclusive place or point within that space.  
 
Even if Churchland‟s map-concept is arrived at from a set of premises formulated as 
neuro-physiological descriptions, I believe that its, at least heuristic, value does not depend 
on the correctness of all these descriptions. In fact, I believe that we could arrive at such a 
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concept also from a top-down account, at least given the conception that mental states 
serve some orientation and navigation functions in human‟s interaction with their 
environment. This is not to suggest that the description in neuro-physiological terms is 
false. The point is that if identical conclusions can be reached from premises formulated in 
different kinds of terms, then, all the better. My claim here is that it involves no 
contradiction to conceive of a mental state as an intentional attitude, for instance involving 
desires and beliefs, and conceiving of it as performing some navigation-function. Both 
regard the states in question as something that can be analysed as complexes involving 
various dimensions. The intentionalistic approach points upward to a potential linguistic 
articulation while the mapping approach points downwards towards the some basic 
functions that must be performed by any organism in accordance with the sort of organism 
it is, the function of mapping the environment in which it finds itself situated. Whether it 
does so in virtue of the focusing of conscious awareness or at some other level isn‟t of 
decisive importance.  
 
Except for a few general remarks, I have avoided the problem concerning the relationship 
between mental states and brain-states. I am not going to discuss this on the general level 
as a “mind-body problem”. That approach tends to give us something that is either a 
problem that allows of no solution or a quasi-problem. I believe that Searle raises a timely 
question to which he also provides a correct answer: “Why do we still have in philosophy 
and psychology after all these centuries a „mind-body problem‟ in a way that we do not 
have, say, a „digestion-stomach problem‟? Why does the mind seem more mysterious than 
other biological phenomena? I am convinced that part of the difficulty is that we persist in 
talking about a twentieth century problem in an outmoded seventeenth century 
vocabulary.” (Searle, 1984. P. 14).  
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I believe that the concept of “mapping” provides a better starting-point than the general 
mind-body approach. The reasons are the following: First, it focuses on what the organism 
does rather than on its extension (in the Cartesian sense). Second, the concept of 
“mapping” can be applied to neural as well as conscious mental phenomena, independent 
of whether or not the first ones are conscious. Third, mapping taken as a conscious mental 
phenomenon is based on a system of discriminations and relations between the units 
discriminated. Such discriminations and relations are also established on a purely neural 
level. In fact it would be impossible on a conscious level if it were not sustained on a 
neural one. Fourth, instead of explaining our conscious mental discriminations as a 
function of neural discriminations, we could think of them as a function of linguistic ones. 
But since the number of discriminations tends to decrease along the line, neural-mental-
linguistic, this seems to be a weak foundation for a general theory. I believe nevertheless 
that linguistic discriminations play a primary role in relation to a certain kind of mental 
phenomena, those related to symbolic intentional objects. This presupposes however that 
consciousness or mentality already exists and can therefore not explain its origin. Rather, 
consciousness should be regarded as a feature of the mapping systems of certain species, 
having a certain kind of mapping functions for these species. 
 
The next step is of course to apply this mapping/space metaphor to emotions. The number 
of dimensions of which the space of possible emotions is constructed must of course be 
decided empirically, which is not going to be attempted here. My point here is that the 
formal components or categories (Cf. Ch. 4), if you prefer that term, can be conceived, not 
as open formal spots to be filled with empirical content, but as dimensions of an emotional 
space-map. This would not invalidate the formal investigation of emotions. It would rather 
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show that this approach applies to emotions of fairly rational or potentially rational 
language-users. It would also show that it applies to these because of the basic make-up of 
their neural system. It would in a way realise the Humeian naturalist program of showing 
the basis of our experienced mental states in the human nature.  It would also be coherent 
with a certain notion developed by emotion-theorists like Solomon and deSousa, the notion 
of myths or paradigm scenarios. I will return to a more extensive treatment of this later. 
Here it is enough to point to the fact that neural networks have a recurrence-factor. That 
means that they are not in-put-feed-forward systems. In-put information is structured 
according to prototypes or paradigms that recur from the top-level back to the bottom-
level. This is the neural network correspondent of the phenomenon that in hermeneutics is 
known as “Vorverstehen”. 
 
One last remark: It seems rather obvious that consciousness has to do with our orientation 
and successful behaviour in our environment. I see that there is a wall in front of me, so I 
change direction. I feel the heat of something, so I withdraw my arm. I hear someone 
calling, so I direct my attention to where the sound appears to come from, and so on. These 
very trivial facts make it appropriate to think of vision, audition and other sensory modes 
as mapping-systems. Now, there are more phenomena than walls, calls and heat among 
which we need to navigate successfully. Among these are other people, their evaluations, 
social position, opinions, resources, etc. Were we not able to determine the various types of 
social situations, where they are located, what features they have, who are involved and in 
what way, we would be unable to act under the presumption that there is a social world at 
all. I can see no better candidate for the, indeed necessary, capacity that enables us to 






Conscious states are usually thought of as “inner” to explain the kind of privileged access 
individuals seem to have to their own minds. And indeed, it seems obvious that each 
person has some kind of access that others do not have to her own inner states. This fact 
has been taken as evidence for different sorts of claims. Descartes, as we know, took it as 
evidence for the truth of certain kinds of propositional content of mental states. It has also 
been taken as evidence for the privileged kind of knowledge that each individual has of her 
mental state (Cf. Chalmers, 1996). 
 
Whatever characteristics our special relation to our own mental states may otherwise have, 
I believe its “exclusiveness” to be of special significance. I call someone‟s relation to her 
own mental states “exclusive” in a sense similar to the one we apply when we say that 
every material object occupies an exclusive place in space. The fact that some state is mine 
excludes that it is someone else‟s. The term “exclusive” has certain advantages in this 
context. It can be used to remove certain apparent difficulties concerning what I can and 
cannot know about other people. I can know what kind of situation another human is in. I 
can also imagine what it would be like to be in that situation. I can therefore through 
analogy reasonably infer what kind of feelings she has; generally what condition she is in, 
what it is like to be her in a loose sense. But I am not that person! Now, does this narrow 
the range of my possible knowledge or imagination? Before we answer, we should 
consider that part of a person‟s experience of being in a certain situation and responding 
emotionally to this situation, is the experience of being an individual person in that 
situation and mental state. Feelings are properties of individual organisms. The very logic 
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of feeling prohibits substitutive feeling. I take (social) emotions to be properties of 
individual persons. I will return to the concepts of “social emotions” and “person”. One of 
my claims will be that an essential part of what it is to be a person is to hold an exclusive 
place within a system of social situations. Presently I shall, however, restrict myself to a 
few comments on my use of the term “exclusive”. 
 
The meaning in which I use the term “exclusive” has a certain reference to my conception 
of mental states as a kind of “mapping”. To put it very simple: If a mental state is 
conceived as a map of certain dimensions in the subject‟s environment, the subjective 
mode of the mental content serves a locative function, the “you-are-here-spot” function. 
Let me give a very simple and trivial example with reference to visual perception. Visual 
perception obviously informs me about certain kinds of features of physical objects in my 
surroundings. Equally obvious: It also informs me of my location relative to those objects. 
Visual perception, like any other sensual perception comes in a double modality, objective 
and subjective or inner. In virtue of the first, it conveys information about the objects. In 
virtue of the second, it conveys, among other things, information about my position 
relative to those objects. This position is recognised as exclusive, as “my” in the way that it 
excludes that it could be any other person‟s or any other position. It is the “where I am”.  
 
It is probably quite easy to recognise visual perception as a kind of mapping involved in 
our navigation as we move around in our physical environment. Now, my assumption is 
that this is analogous to the way other modes of mental content, among them emotions, 
work. Fear, as an intentional state, informs us of danger-points in our action-space. The 
feeling of fear, the quale with which it is typically experienced, informs us of the relevance 
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that these points have for our security and well being. This relevance is, in turn, a kind of 
information about our location and position relative to those points.  
 
I am later going to elaborate the distinction between basic emotions and social emotions. 
My hypothesis is that this distinction corresponds to a distinction between two aspects of 
our environment, the natural and the social. To anticipate a little: Social emotions map our 
social environment in the way that they are responses to social situations. They inform us 
about the various kinds of social situations we are in. Their characteristic qualitative 
features, the feelings of being envious, jealous, proud, embarrassed etc inform us about our 
own exclusive position within the corresponding situations.  
 
I have no ambition to present these remarks as an exhaustive theory about the subjectivity 
or internal character of mental states. I am merely pointing to a feature that I find coherent 
with the conception of mental states as mappings. It seems quite obvious that a mapping 
system is useless, at least for navigation purposes, without some kind of “you are here” 
marker. And I can see no better candidate for this function than the exclusiveness signified 
by the subjectivity of experience. 
 
What I have said here might be taken as a functionalistic account of our mental states, and 
hence subject to the same counter-arguments as, at least some versions of those theories. 
Such theories are typically based on descriptions of mental states in terms of their causal 
profile, that is antecedent conditions, and output results. Two interrelated objections can be 
made against this approach. It disregards the qualia accompanying mental states, and it is 
indifferent to the special characteristics of the physical features in which it is realised. If 
some device made of beer-cans was made to respond to objects that typically cause fear, 
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and if the output of this response-process were one that is typical of fear, then this device 
would have instantiated a state of fear.  
 
I am however saying that the qualitative feelings are important, not just to avoid the 
objections mentioned, but for the operation, and generally for the significance of the 
mapping system. First we have the obvious need for the “position on the map” function 
that is maintained by the quality and intensity of the mental state. Second, the fact that 
some objects are suited as objects of, say fear, joy or sadness, depends as much on 
characteristics of the human body, that is the human biological system, as on features of 
those objects. Rattlesnakes are dangerous for humans, but not for beer-cans. Even if the 
beer-can device were made to avoid rattlesnakes this would not be because of some sense 
of imminent threat for the simple reason that it‟s not threatened. An opposite assumption 
seems to confuse the description and the fact described. 
 
There is however a certain problem as to how mental maps relate to the mapped 
landscapes. In what sense, if any, do the maps represent the relevant features of the 
landscape? I believe that the right way to approach this question requires a (pragmatic) 
rephrasing of it. I suggest the following: What would be the criteria of successful 
application of mental maps? This reformulation shifts the emphasis from the question of 
the correct representation to the successful application. The idea is again very simple: A 
road map is a good map if the correct use of it gets you where you want to go. This implies 
that the quality of the map should be measured, not only by its representative accuracy, but 
also by the success of the application of its implicit action-directives like: “If you want to 
go to Paris, take the second exit from where you are now and then turn left!” There is 
however a crucial difference between roadmaps and mental maps. Mental maps are 
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integrated parts of the map-users. A certain spot, or a configuration of spots on one or on a 
set of mental maps also signifies the mental state of the user. There is no homunculus 
outside that state, looking into it. Before we proceed from this assumption, we shouldn‟t 
however entirely rule out every possible implication of the homunculus-theory. Mental 
states are composite and parts of such compositions in fact monitor and oversee other 
parts. I take this last assertion to be no more problematic than one saying that we are in fact 
able to reflect on certain parts of our own mental states, i.e. make them into objects of self-
awareness and self-investigation. But even so, the desires and wishes that the map might 
help us to fulfil, must, in some way, be internal to the mapping system itself, or else there 
would be no way to explain why certain maps are, in certain situations, picked out as focal 
points of attention. The mental state must therefore represent, not only some existing 
features of the surroundings, but also some desired or anticipated state resulting from the 
application of directives also represented in this state. For this reason I believe that the 
mapping-perspective on mental states must be supplemented with an intentional-content 
perspective. A certain emotional state is characterised by more than the features that 
distinguish it from other possible emotional states. It is also related to some substantial 
content and some substantial aim. I therefore believe that the term “emotional content” 
must be taken to refer to something at the conscious, not merely neural level, of the 
emotion. I take it to refer to the meaning of a potential description given by an subject of 
her emotion. Such a description would, among other things, identify the emotion-object. 
Now, how do such objects exist? I believe that they in a way represent something. But that 
does not necessarily mean that they should be regarded as mere pictures of things, events 
and conditions. In a way they also represent the subject‟s projects and anticipated 
conditions. John Searle (Searle, 1983) uses the term “intentionality” to signify “the 
conditions of satisfaction” of a mental state. That means that the intentional content of a 
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mental state represents the conditions that should be satisfied for this state to be, among 
other things, correct or adequate. Searle specifies this with reference to perceptions. If I see 
a certain object, say a house, the conditions of satisfaction for this perception are, 1. That 
there is in fact a house there, and 2. That 1. is the cause of my perception of a house. A 
propositional description of the intentional content of a perception does not only relate to 
something as existing independent of the perception, it specifies the condition for this 
perception to be successful. The term “conditions of satisfaction” can also be related to 
intentional actions, understood as actions intending to achieve or cause something in the 
world. Part of the intentional content preceding such an action is that the intended changes 
actually take place. Another part is that it takes place as an effect caused by this action. In 
this way we can say that an intentional state specifies conditions of its own successful 
application on the external world. In the concept of intentionality we therefore have a tool 
enabling us to see the connection between representation and action-directives. 
 
In my opinion, Searle‟s terminology is highly useful for the study of emotions, because it 
makes us focus on the inter-actional character of emotions (and other mental phenomena) 
and also because it makes it clear that such states have their internal standards of the 
success or failure of interaction. They are conceived as applied to, or applicable to, 
situations and they contain the criteria for the successful application to those. An emotion 
contains some conditions according to which it is an adequate or correct response to some 
situation. Let‟s say I fear the monster under my bed. This fear has a content that may be 
articulated propositionally. This articulation will specify certain conditions for the fear to 
be a successful mental state. One such condition is of course that there is in fact a monster 
under the bed. As fear is related to danger, another condition is that this is dangerous. Of 
course this matter is more complex. Fear of something that is in fact harmless may be 
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functional and some times even rational. After all, we always live under conditions that are 
to some degree uncertain. But broadly speaking, in the long run we are better off if we 
correct our fear of monsters under beds.  
 
The concept of “condition of satisfaction” may also be used to illuminate the relationship 
between emotions and motives. Motives are the action-directives implicit in the mental 
maps in the sense that they specify the correct way to apply the map to the landscape. To 
be sure: Emotions and motives come as part of larger mental webs. Envy, for instance, 
contains a motive to obtain something that is in the possession of someone else. The 
correct application of this emotion would therefore be some measure that led to this goal. 
Envy is however part of a mind consisting of other kinds of emotions, opinions, allegiances 
and so on. The correct application of the envy-map to the environment is therefore not 
necessarily also the correct application of the mental web taken as a whole.  
 
I should add that I understand the concept of intentional content, not as something grasped 
through introspection, but as something that is clarified by a description of some (desired) 
external state or situation. This also applies to the subject whose intentional content it is. 
The way to clarify one‟s own intentional state is, if my interpretation is correct, not to take 
a closer look into the soul, but to specify some external state of affairs.   
 
In chapter 4 I will claim that human emotions can be analysed as having a sort of 
underlying grammar-like structure. If this is correct, one might ask whether or not they are 
also governed by some sort of rules analogous to the rules that we often take to govern our 
language. To be more precise: We usually assume that meaningful sentences are formed 
according to certain syntactic rules. Is it also the case that significant emotions, that is 
emotions that we recognise to be of certain kinds, are also formed according to certain 
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rules that are in some sense constitutive for their significance? My answer will be that in a 
certain sense they are, but also that this applies to emotions at a far more developed stage 
than we usually think.  
 
The analytical approach that I will follow in chapter 4 justifies, in a certain respect, a 
conception of emotions as rule-conform responses. The reason is that such an approach 
tacitly includes the observable behaviour, not only the neural and mental events in the 
concept of “emotional response”. To be more precise, it views the neural and mental event 
under the perspective of its potential linguistic articulation and accompanying bodily 
expression. It therefore conceives of the emotist as participant in inter-personal schemes of 
co-operation and inter-action. As such she is subject to rules regulating intelligible speech 
and rational, or in other ways acceptable behaviour. But however justified this approach 
might be, its results do not entail that such rules are also constitutive for emotions as they 




Chapter 3  
______________________________________________________ 
Interlude: The Concept of Rationality as applied to the 
Emotions 
 
In the philosophical tradition the question of the relationship between emotions and 
rationality is usually approached as a question about the relationship between two mental 
capacities or two sorts of mental entities each of which can be given an independent 
separate description. It is true that the question concerns mental entities, but that does not 
mean that this fact should also be the unquestioned starting-point for an investigation of the 
relationship between them. At a more basic level, all mental capacities can be regarded as 
ways that the human organism functions. The differentiation of functions is something that 
has an evolutionary history. Concept-formation, inference-conducting, reflecting on 
alternative ways of acting, culture-building as well as emotion-responding are all aspects 
of the human organism‟s way of managing the situations in which it lives its life. Some of 
these functions are evolutionary older than others. But that does not mean that these older 
functions remain unchanged through the evolution of the younger. And it certainly does 
not mean that the later developed functions have an existence independent of its 
evolutionary ancestors. To be sure; I do not believe that the evolution of reason changes all 
the older functions of the human being. But some of them are changed to various degrees. 
And some of our emotions are among these. Our attitude towards them is changed to a 
certain degree and so is their complexity and spectre of variety. Emotions are also changed 
by being objects of cognition, social norms and by their role in sustaining social norms and 
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even cognition (Cf. Elster, 1999, Ch. 4). In short, emotions change when they become part 
of a web of other functions. 
  
What I will have to say about this does not necessarily apply to everything that can be 
termed “an emotion”. The aim is more modest, I want to characterise some distinctive 
aspects of some of the emotions of beings that also have the abilities that we think of as 
rationality. 
 
“Rationality” however interpreted, involves some kind of abstraction, disregarding 
something as unessential, looking for some common or general patterns and formal 
similarities. I have said above that our emotional evolution from early childhood is a  
development from a diffuse state towards a mental life consisting of a variety of emotional 
states that can be identified as different from each other. The introduction of rationality 
implies a development that is, in a sense contrary to this. For an emotional state to be 
considered rational, it must be possible to measure or evaluate this state by standards that 
are to some degree inter-subjective and that can be given some kind of linguistic 
articulation. Now, our emotional language is much cruder than our actual ability to feel 
emotional changes and nuances, as is our ability to make linguistic distinctions in general 
much poorer than our ability to make sensory discriminations. Linguistic communication, 
therefore, encourages a kind of standardisation of expression, emotional as well as sensory. 
 
Humans certainly have mental capacities that other minds do not have. But what seem to 
be distinctively human is not only this, but also the ability to co-ordinate a vast complexity 
of functions in a relatively coherent way over time so as to construe a life-story. For our 
emotional life this means that this functions as a part of a system that also includes our 
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cognitive and rational capacities, not, at least not only, as a faculty detached from the other 
mental faculties. It is therefore worthwhile to consider how our cognitive and rational 
functions are integrated in the functioning of the human emotions. 
 
Human emotions have content, that is, they are about something and they are directed 
towards something. The same is probably the case also with non-human emotions. Antonio 
Damasio traces the origin of all consciousness back to the basic feeling that there is 
“something to be known” (Damasio, 1999). There is something going on outside or inside 
the organism that is in some way important to the organism. But the content of human 
emotions can also, at least partly, be articulated by the beings that have them, as statements 
about objects having certain properties. Because such statements are truth-related and often 
value-related, human emotions are also phenomena capable of being cognitively evaluated. 
More precisely, emotions may be, and in fact very often are, rationally assessed, they are 
criticised by others, and they are, at least occasionally, corrected by the subjects that have 
them. Such criticism and correction may follow different standards of evaluation. One of 
these concerns truth-value, we may get things wrong. Another concern values and norms, 
our emotional reactions may be inappropriate in some way or other. 
 
Not all writers on the human emotions agree that emotions per se have content. There has 
been a discussion among psychologists over this topic. Some say that emotions essentially 
are affections; they are the affective mode that is characteristic of each of them. P. N. 
Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989) claim that certain basic 
emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust) are these affects. We may describe 
situations that we conceive as proto-typical antecedents and consequences of these 
emotions. Such descriptions are however, according to these authors, not descriptions of 
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the emotions in question. “In short, the members of a culture have a prototype for the sorts 
of events that cause an emotion such as sadness, and for the sorts of events that ensue; but 
they do not have a prototype for the subjective feeling itself.” (Ibid.) If this were correct, 
the terms “affect” and “emotion” would be synonymous when used to designate basic 
emotions. (It should be added that, according to J-L & O, the case is different with 
complex emotions.) The arguments with which J-L & O support their hypothesis are 
basically semantic. Statements like, “I feel sad, but I don‟t know why” or “I feel sad even 
though I don‟t show it in any way” are meaningful. Therefore they refer to something that 
may be distinguished from causes, objects and behaviour.  
 
Against this, several things could be said. First, of course, that it is not the case that 
meaningful statements necessarily are also true statements. Second: What could “a 
prototype for the subjective feeling itself” possibly be? And how do J-L&O know that 
“members of a culture” don‟t have such? Is it because no such prototype is reported? 
Should it be reported it would of course have to be linguistically. But no linguistic 
description can report “the feeling itself” or its prototype. But that aside; it could also be 
the case that the terms we use to describe our own condition confuse phenomena that it 
would be rewarding to keep apart. Criticising J-L & O, Ortony and Clore claim that “… the 
linguistic test of the awareness criterion may perhaps depend upon judges tacitly giving the 
candidate term a mood reading. “ (Ortony & Clore, 1989).  They argue that it is important 
to distinguish between mental conditions that should be termed “moods” and those that 
should be termed “emotions”. In their interpretation, moods are part of emotions, but 
emotions also include more: “… (I)n the normal course of events, the appraisal of the 
antecedent condition is causally responsible for the psychological consequences, which 
together lead to an inclination to act (or not to act) in a certain way. Although, together 
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these components cause the experienced feeling of an emotion, the feeling of an emotion 
can be talked about independently of the appraisal of the antecedent conditions and the 
dispositional consequences. In other words the experienced feeling of an emotion is part of 
the emotion, but not the emotion itself. The emotion is the whole package, of which the 
feeling is a necessary, but not sufficient component.” (Ibid.) 
 
The important question here, as I see it, is not whether or not there are pure affective states, 
but whether or not there are more developed mental phenomena that essentially consists of 
cognitive as well as affective components, and that should be regarded as sequences rather 
than instant states. I believe that we should think of the distinctive human emotions as 
instances of the second sort, and I think it convenient to reserve a special term, “emotions”, 
to designate them. Emotions are, according to this opinion, not separate affects that are 
connected to certain contents. Affect and content are aspects of the same phenomenon.  
 
There are however other arguments that indicate that emotions are states that are 
independent of cognitive identification and classification of objects. Zajonc (1980) has 
argued that the distinction between affects and cognitions are based on different 
perception-modes and different ways of processing information.  He claims that affective 
responses work relatively independent of cognitive identifications. The following 
(presumed empirical facts) represents for him arguments against the assumption that 
emotions contain an element of object-identification: 
1. Affective reactions are inescapable. 
2. Affective judgements tend to be irrevocable. 
3. Affective reactions are difficult to verbalize. 
4. Affective reactions need not depend on cognition. 
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5. Affective reactions may become separate from content. 
 
Zajonc assumes that there are two separate systems processing affective and cognitive 
relevant information. The first system operates quicker and is ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic more basic or primary. Zajonc suggests that the ability to respond 
emotionally to stimuli goes deeper that the ability to discriminate cognitively between 
different properties of objects. He therefore introduces a distinction between 
diskriminanda and prefereranda and ascribes emotional responses to our perception of 
entities of the last group. Of this he says: “I cannot be very specific about preferanda. If 
they exist they must be constituted of interactions between some gross object features and 
internal states of the individual-states that can be altered while the object remains 
unchanged, as for example, when liking for a stimulus increases with its repeated 
experience.” (Ibid.) Such preferanda are, according to the theory, conceived temporarily 
earlier than diskriminanda, and they are relatively resistant to cognitive or rational 
correction. 
 
There might be some sound intuition at the bottom of Zajonc‟s conception. It is however 
blurred partly by a vague terminology and partly by his tendency to regard perception of 
discriminate properties of objects as a sort of value-free registration of objective 
properties. He also tends to regard an emotion as a momentary state rather that a 
sequence of events. I believe that we will be better equipped to grasp the characteristics 
of human emotions if we think of them as typical series of events including typical 
antecedents, immediate responses, the possible correction of these responses and the 
typical dispositions for action. I do not deny that there are important elements in our 
emotional responses that we share with other mammals. Zajonc‟s theory might work with 
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regard to these elements. But if our concern is to understand the human emotions, into 
which these elements are integrated, I think it leaves out important aspects. As I have said 
above, I believe that human emotions have cognitive as well as affective aspects. 
Zajonc‟s theory grasps, at best, the last aspect.  
 
There is also in my opinion a very serious weakness shared by the approaches of J.L. & O. 
and Zajonc. They both seem to take our ability to make linguistic discriminations as an 
indicator of our ability to make discriminations in general. The fact is, however, as I have 
already remarked a couple of times, that our ability to discriminate between sensory 
nuances is far superior to our ability to express such nuances linguistically. The seeming 
separation of judgement and content and the seeming resistance to correction of some 
judgements may therefore be due to the inadequacy of language to express differences that 
nevertheless are consciously felt. 
 
In addition: Some of the theses listed above are in fact hard to understand. For instance, 
what is meant by “judgement” in 2? If it means what it usually does, an articulated 
ascription of a property to an object, it is simply untrue. We have all changed our minds 
with regard to evaluation of people and objects. How does  2 go together with 3? 3 seems 
to imply that it is difficult to pass affective judgements at all. 
 
To put it very simple: Zajonc assumes that we have two separate systems. There is the 
intellectual or rational system that, among other things, deals with identification of 
properties, which, he believes, necessarily takes place in a propositional that is language-
like fashion. There is, in addition to this, an affective system that determines our 
preferences and guides our choices. He attacks a model that pictures the process of 
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emotional reaction as a sequence starting with a cognitive identification of things to which 
we later respond with some sort of affect. Zajonc can be, and has in fact been, criticised for 
having a too intellectualist conception of the mental activity that identifies properties. In a 
reply to Zajonc, Richard Lazarus (1982) claims that Zajonc is founding his model on an 
inadequate conception of elementary cognitive processes. According to Lazarus, Zajonc 
equates cognitive processes and rationality. Lazarus‟ own theory is that cognitions of a 
certain type, the one‟s he calls appraisals, are basic in any response to events in our 
surroundings. With “appraisals” is meant immediate evaluative perceptions. “Immediate”, 
because they do not follow as a result of intellectual reflection or elaboration of 
perceptions given independent of such reflection. The standard of evaluation is the well 
being of the organism. Put differently, it is simply wrong that cognitions make their first 
entrance as value-free recordings. In Lazarus‟ theory; “(E)valuations or cognitive appraisal 
also begin at the start … (E)motion or feeling is never totally independent of cognition, 
even when the emotional response is instantaneous or nonreflective, as emphasized in 
Arnold‟s (1960) use of the term appraisal. This is the real import of the expression “hot 
cognition”. The thought and feeling are simultaneous.” (Lazarus, Ibid). Lazarus‟ position is 
that emotions have cognitive and affective components, but not in the way that these exist 
as separate systems that are later integrated. According to him, our cognitive 
discrimination of qualities and properties expresses evaluations from the very start. These 
aspects may later be dissociated. But such dissociations are results of special circumstances 
and special processes, and they should be explained as such. It is the dissociation, not the 
association, that need special explanation: “(I)solation and intellectualization (or 
detachment) which are aimed at regulating feelings, can create a dissosiation between 
thought and feeling. Moreover, attack occur without anger, and avoidance without fear … 
(S)uch separations are less the rule and more often a product of coping under special 
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circumstances.” (Lazarus, 1982). This approach conceives of the dissociation as the 
problem that needs explanation. Special cultural, institutional and other inter-human 
situations would be circumstances that could explain the sort of dissociation in question. 
 
I will draw two general conclusions from the foregoing discussion. The first concerns the, 
already mentioned, use of semantic entities like concepts and judgements as indicators of 
emotional, and more general mental states. If we consider the fact that our emotionally 
relevant neural networks are capable of far more discriminations than our emotion-
vocabulary, it would seem rather futile to use the last to determine the first. This argument 
also has some consequences for the way we should conceive of the relationship between 
cognitive discriminations and factual statements. I can discriminate between the various 
shades of red on the carpet in the room I am now sitting in, but I am unable to describe 
them to you in a way that I myself, and far less any other, would be able to recognise as an 
accurate description.  
 
The second is simply that I will take Lazarus‟ as a support for my own assumptions that 
evaluative responses always are about something and that the evaluative feeling and the 










I am now going to look at emotions and their composite nature as they present themselves 
at a higher level of conscious awareness than we meet when we approach them from the 
mapping-perspective. The formal structure of emotions is discovered through a kind of 
phenomenological awareness of our own mental states. It is the (top-down) description 
given by rational beings of their own emotional states. 
 
The analysis of the formal structure of human emotions has been a subject of philosophical 
investigation at least since Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle may be regarded as the founder of 
the analytical approach in the study of human emotions. By “an analytical approach” I 
mean an analysis of the formal structure that makes emotions into meaningful entities, of 
their basic grammar, so to say. This implies that an analytical investigation, in this sense, 
primarily applies to emotions of organisms that also interpret the meaning or significance 
of events.  
 
It is foremost in the Rhetorics that Aristotle undertakes this kind of approach to emotions. 
Such is his definition of anger: “Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by 
pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight affecting a man himself or 
one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved” (Rhet. II. I. 2) 
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Definiens lists a series of properties that must be present for something to be counted as 
anger. The emotion must motivate a certain kind of action, a certain quality of affection 
must attend the emotion and the object of the emotion must have certain characteristics. 
First, it must be human; an emotion directed towards bad weather or other natural 
phenomena does not count as anger. The human object must be a particular. An emotion 
towards a collective is not anger. The emotion must be directed towards some person 
because of something this person has said or done. This “something” must be conceived as 
an expression of slight, and the slight must be considered illegitimate. Anger can thus be 
seen as expressing a set of opinions and judgements, and these may be more or less correct. 
You may be wrong about what people have done, about who has in fact performed a 
certain act. Something may also be construed as slightful that was not intended that way. 
The emotion in question may thus be considered more or less rational according to the 
correctness of the opinions that are underlying it.  
  
Aristotle‟s definition is part of the Rhetoric. The aim of Rhetorics is decision, and as 
emotions “are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to 
their judgements …” (Rhet. II i), it becomes important to understand what it is that 
determine emotions and emotional variations. This context is worth noticing for two 
reasons. First, because it could imply that there is a connection between the rationality of 
emotions and the fact that emotions can be manipulated. If emotions can be manipulated, 
they can be changed, and if they can be changed, there is at least a possibility that they can 
be changed on the initiative of the person who has the emotion. If the person who has the 
emotions, can change them, there is a chance that this change could be the result of 
consideration according to some rationality standard, e.g. an adjustment to external facts or 
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an alternative interpretation of such. Second, Aristotle‟s approach to the emotions in the 
Rhetoric instantiates what might be called “practical”, it investigates emotions as they 
relate to human action.   
  
Aristotle‟s approach seems to imply that emotions are structured according to some 
categorical formal patterns. And in fact he says something that may be interpreted that 
way: “And each of them (the emotions) must be divided under three heads; for instance, in 
regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom 
they are usually angry, and the occasions which gives rise to anger.” (Ibid. II.B.9) In this 
brief statement we can reconstruct three categorical forms; mental antecedent, object and 
situation, which indicates that emotions may have some general formal grammar or 
structural components. 
 
If emotions are organised according to formal categories it might be possible to 
reconstruct or explicate them, or parts of them, as propositional judgements. Robert 
Solomon is a contemporary writer who has developed this idea. He regards emotions as 
“constitutive judgements”, judgements that constitute a “surreality in terms of values and 
self-conceptions” (Solomon, 1993 p.194). An implication of this approach could be that 
an investigation of the rationality of emotions should not be limited to investigating 
whether or not such judgements are true and adequate. It will also concern the contitions 
of the possibility for such surreality. Inspired by Kant, Solomon calls the object of his 
investigation logic of emotions; “I am employing the term “logic” as Kant used the term, 
to signify the employment of categories and concepts.” (Ibid p. 194). Solomon lists 
thirteen such categorial emotion-concepts: Direction, Reciprocity, Power, Evaluations, 
Scope and Focus, Intersubjectivity, Strategies, Criteria, The nature of the object, 
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Distance, Desires/Intentions and Personal status. The last category is called 
“Mythologies: The synthesis of our    Direction, reciprocity, power, evaluations, scope and focus, intersubjectivity, strategies, criteria, desires, the nature of the object, distance, intentions and personal status. Solomon terms the last “Myth: The Synthesis our 
Emotional Judgements”. This has a special status to which I will return. For our present 
purpose it is not necessary to comment separately on the different categories. Neither do I 
want to take a stand on the question whether or not emotions are underlying categories in 
such strict a sense as is often associated with the Kantian ones. In fact I believe that 
Solomon ties his analytical tools too close up to a linguistic conception of emotions. I 
have few problems with that as long as we speak of certain highly developed social 
emotions, experienced by sophisticated language-users. The main point of interest for me 
at this point is however that Solomon‟s scheme tells us that there are certain things we 
should look for when we want to understand emotions, and he gives a suggestion about 
what those things should be. He tells us that we will probably understand something 
significant about an emotion if we consider various aspects of its object-directedness, or 
if we ask what sort of relation between the self and others that is implied in the emotion. 
Love implies another sort of reciprocity than does contempt. It also implies another 
conception of the distance between oneself and the other. Other emotions 
correspondingly have certain strategies of action that are adequate expressions of the 
emotion. Certain strategies are compatible with hatred, but not with friendship. Every 
emotion also expresses certain evaluations and is at odds with others. Such evaluations 
imply certain forms of arrangement of oneself and the others within a value-hierarchy. 
 
There is no need to enter further into each category. I will merely point out three main 
consequences of Solomon‟s scheme. One concerns the question about what sorts of entities 
one should look for in an analytical investigation of emotions. Emotional changes and 
differences will, according to the scheme, be variations within the basic concepts regarded 
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as variables. The second, which is implied in ascribing the basic concepts constitutive 
status, is that entities like “self”, “objects that the self is engaged in or attached to”, 
“action” and “value”, are entities that are elements in emotional complexes. Given that this 
is true, one might ask if this also means that such entities have no existence separate from 
their function in the formation of emotions. Third, the categories could be thought of as a 
set of mapping-systems, co-ordinates, regulating the interaction between individuals and 
their environment. Such co-ordinates are vital in this interaction and the emotions are ways 
we feel or sense them.  
 
As I have already mentioned, I believe that Solomon is wrong in thinking that emotions in 
general have a linguistic origin, that they are judgements. I do not deny that there are 
emotions that could be analysed in linguistic terms, but we are then talking about relatively 
developed and sophisticated emotions of human beings who are already competent 
members of a language-using society. We are talking, not of the origin of emotions, but of 
emotions reconstructed and measured against other aspects of human capacities and social 
scenes on which they are displayed. On the other hand, if we take a different perspective, 
we could think of the entities that Solomon conceives as categories as a kind of vectors, 
and emotional states as results of what Paul Churchland has termed “vector coding”. This 
would allow us to see a similarity between emotions and other kinds of mental phenomena 
like perception of colours, taste, identification of faces etc (Cf. Churchland, 1996). It 
would, in short, give us a conceptual tool that could help us to understand how we 
discriminate between different emotional states at a pre-linguistic level. When we find 
ourselves in an emotionally relevant situation, there must be some features of the situation 
that determines it as emotionally relevant. Put in another way, we must process the 
situation along certain lines that construe it as emotionally relevant. I find it very plausible 
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that this is in fact part of what is going on when we respond emotionally to certain 
situations. Conceived this way emotions emerge as a kind of multi-dimensional mapping 
system, with as many dimensions as there are “categories”. Together the dimensions could 
be represented as constructing a space wherein any possible emotional state has its place. 
The “space” would be a multi-dimensional “emotion-space” analogous to the colour-spave 
described in chapter 2. What is being mapped are social situations (and for some basic 
feelings like fear, other kinds of situations) and their importance to the emotist. To allow 
for enthusiasm for a moment, I actually think it is a wonderful idea to create a map of 
possible social situations, a map built on the vectors that determine our responses to such 
situations.  It would indeed provide an important tool for social-psychological analysis. 
 
One component that must be identifiable for an analytical approach is the object of the 
emotion. If we are to assess the rationality of an emotion, it would seem necessary, in one 
way or other, to consider its object. But the concept of the object of emotion is not 
univocal. It could refer to “the content of the emotion”, “the cause of the emotion”, “that 
towards which the emotion is directed” and so on. Ronald deSousa (deSousa, 1987. ch.5) 
has suggested as many as seven different meanings, all being relevant for an assessment of 
the rationality of emotions. These are: 1. Target 2.Focus, focal property 3. Cause 4. 
Motivational aspect 5. Aim 6. Proposition 7. Formal object. 
 
This enables us to ask seven different questions (which presumes seven answers with 
different levels of specificity) in a situation where an emotion is to be assessed. If someone 
were angry such questions would be: 
1. With whom is he angry? 
2. What is it about this person that makes him angry? 
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3. What incident is it that enangers him? 
4. What is it about this incident that motivates him? 
5. To what sort of action does it motivate him? 
6. What true proposition describes the situation that enangers him? 
7. What is the criterion that this emotion is successful? 
 
The concept of formal object and the corresponding question need some explanation. The 
formal object of envy would be “something desirable but not possessed”. According to 
Aristotle‟s definition of anger, “undeserved slight” would be the formal object of this 
emotion. In fact there are as many formal objects as there are types of emotions. To use the 
words of deSousa: “An emotion means a formal object, that is, a property characteristic of 
a paradigm scenario and ascribes it to an object” (Ibid. p. 242).  
 
The concept of formal object illustrates a connection between emotions and speech acts. 
Searle remarks that there is a resemblance between speech acts and intentional states 
consisting in that they both represent the conditions of their success (or conditions of 
satisfaction). Searle remarks that it is “... crucially important to see that for each speech act 
that has a direction or fit the speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expressed 
psychological state is satisfied, and the conditions of satisfaction of speech act and 
expressed psychological state is identical (Searle, 1983 p. 10-11). 
 
It should be added that an emotion might be rational even if its conditions of satisfaction 
are not satisfied. But it cannot be rational if it doesn‟t have any such conditions at all. And 
it is often not rational if it remains uncorrected when the person who has the emotion 
realises that the conditions are not satisfied. Now, one might ask if such emotions without 
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possible conditions of satisfaction are themselves possible, given that emotions are 
psychological states and that such states are characterised by their intentionality. I think 
they are if we understand “conditions of satisfaction” as “possible conditions of 
satisfaction”. In fact I believe that much of the pain that emotions can inflict upon us is due 
to some intrinsic contradiction in their conditions of satisfaction. Twenty years ago, in a 
Norwegian parent-run kindergarten, I observed a decoration on a wall. Under a painting it 
was written: “Don‟t do what your mother tells you to do!” Let‟s assume this to be written 
by the mothers. What should the kids do to act according to this message? Let us then 
assume that this message was transformed to be a part of the children‟s emotional attitudes 
towards their mothers. What would be the conditions of satisfaction for such an emotion? 
 
Formal object could also be called second-order objects. This term is meant to signify that 
they are the properties of first-order objects that determine the type of emotion that has this 
object. If I am afraid when someone threatens me with a gun, the threatening person with 
his gun is a first-order object, while danger is the second-order object. 
 
Our ability to distinguish between first and second-order objects is obviously a function of 
our generalising capacity and, as such, probably distinctively human. Without this there are 
reasons to believe that we would have a much simpler way of responding to certain 
objects. To some objects we still have this direct, not generalised, response-system. 
LeDoux shows that we respond with fear-reactions towards some objects much faster than 
we are able to identify them cognitively. Nevertheless, we do in fact possess a generalising 
ability giving us more possible histories for a single emotion-reaction.  
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The distinction between first and second-order objects also gives us a way to understand 
why the same object can cause different types of emotions in different people and also 
different emotions in the same person in different situations and against different 
backgrounds. And because a single object can carry different second-order objects for one 
and the same person, it can contribute to our understanding of emotional ambivalence. 
 
The concept (if not the term) of second-order objects is not a modern invention. In the 
philosophy of Plato it plays a leading part. A passage from the Symposion deals with the 
significance of the distinction between first and second-order objects for our emotional 
development. Socrates recapitulates a conversation he has had with Diotima from 
Mantineia. Diotima describes the education of our ability to love as a process in which this 
emotion changes direction.  It is awakened as directed towards one single object. Steadily 
it grows more independent of the particularity of the object, to end up being directed 
towards “the formal object of love” which, according to Plato, is “the good” (Sym. 205 D). 
Plato always regards the first-order object of emotions (as well as cognitions) as copies of 
the things towards which the soul is really directed, i.e. the ideas.  
 
The distinction between first and second-order objects is an important one. The line 
between them should however not be drawn so sharp as to blur differences between certain 
emotional nuances. One might well ask if love for one‟s children is the same emotion as 
love for a spouse. Do these emotions have the same formal object, hence being the same 
type of emotion? Is pride of a successful bank robbery the same emotion as pride of a good 
university degree? I think not! Perhaps we should say that it is two different species of 
pride. Another problematic example: In chapter 1 I said that fear instantiates the mapping 
of certain features (danger-points) in our natural surroundings. But, as we know, fear can 
 83 
also be triggered by certain features in our social surroundings, like fear of making a fool 
of yourself, fear of the condescending looks of other people etc. I do however find it 
reasonable to consider such instances of fear as a kind of second-order emotions that is 
related to another (first-order) emotion, in this case shame. The formal object of this kind 
of fear would then be shame, the first-order emotion would be the second-order object of a 
second-order emotion. The general lesson we might learn from this is not that we should 
abandon the distinction between first and second-order motives. It is rather that the amount 
of formal emotional objects, and therefor the emotional repertoire within a given culture, 
varies, among other things, with the amount of different first-order object-types in the 
same culture. To put it plainly, the greater differentiation within a culture‟s amount of 
possible first-order emotion-objects, the more fine-graded nuances of emotional experience 
within the same culture. This will have some consequences for what I will have to say later 
on. 
 
At least in one interpretation there is a connection between something being rational and 
the possibility to ask questions about this something. What is rational is open to 
questioning as a test to its rationality. Asked in connection with emotions, questions may 
reveal that an emotion is founded in some sort of mistake or failure, something has “gone 
wrong” in some way or other. I believe that we should distinguish between two different 
kinds of possible wrong-goings. The first is based on getting the facts wrong. The person 
with whom I am angry has not done the things that make me angry. Perhaps these things 
have not been done at all. I may misconstrue someone‟s actions as say, insulting. That type 




The second type has to do with the reasonableness of the emotional reaction and its 
expression. Let‟s say I get things right. One may still ask whether or not these things give 
me a good reason to respond emotionally as I do. There are nuances in this problem-field. 
One may focus on a totally unimportant aspect of someone‟s behaviour. One may ask if a 
certain type of event is a good reason for a certain type of emotion (or emotional 
expression). Or one can be more specific and ask if it gives me a good reason for such an 
emotion. Is poverty a good reason for shame? Would it be a good reason for me to be 
shameful? Is beating Brazil in soccer a good reason to be proud? Does the fact that Norway 
has beaten Brazil twice give me a reason to be proud? After all I am not part of the team. 
To distinguish these kinds of questions from the first (that concerns truth-value) I will say 
that these are about the relevance of the emotion. Obviously the relevance-question (in 
contrast to the question of truth-value strictly speaking) can only by raised within a 
framework of established and stabilised social values and codes of emotional exhibition or 
exposure. 
 
Most people probably agree that we may go emotionally wrong in (at least) these two ways 
– truth-value and relevance. And most people would agree that we are best off avoiding 
such failures. From these assumed facts, I believe that we can learn something about some 
properties of emotions that are specific to language-users, that is humans.  
 
LeDoux has an intriguing example of a seemingly wrong reaction that is in fact the “right” 
one. You walk down a forest-path and suddenly you see something crooked on the ground 
before you. Spontaneously your brain initiates a fear-reaction that prepares your organism 
for fight or flight. A moment later you discover that it is not a snake, but a crooked branch. 
Let‟s say you make this failure nine times out of ten. Is it not irrational to waste energy in 
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this way? It is neither rational nor irrational, but it surely is a good way to survive. LeDoux 
takes this to be an evolutionary old heritage that we share with a lot of other species. This 
sort of reaction is useful, today probably more so in connection with car driving than with 
snake-detecting. As a little aside, this shows us something about the human ability to 
generalise reaction-patterns. Humans are presumably not genetically coded to detect 
potential dangers before they identify them, as they move along a highway at a speed of 
150 km/h. Nevertheless, experienced car-drivers do just this. 
 
But automated stimulus-response patterns like this do not exhaust our emotional repertoire. 
When it comes to emotions carried by symbolic structures, the situation is different. Such 
emotions are part of a symbolically structured human interaction-system, and they are 
based on the fact that such systems work, not only spontaneously, but over time. They tie 
together various parts of interaction sequences and they are based upon the relative 
stability of values and interpretation-systems. In fact, many of them are based upon the fact 
that certain interaction-systems are institutionalised. And the value of institutions, as far as 
they have any, is always based on their relative stability, their ability to uphold a formal 
framework over a period of time. Spontaneous, as opposed to reflective emotional 
responses are therefore often dysfunctional to such systems. I believe that it is vitally 
important not to think of this as something foreign to human emotions. It is rather part of 
what is specific to these. 
  
Aristotle is perhaps the first to see relevance as a parameter in the investigation of 
emotions. For him relevance has a moral significance. In the Nichomacian Ethic he tells us 
that: “It is possible to feel fear, confidence, desire, wrath and pity, generally to feel 
pleasure and pain too much or too little, which is, in each case, not good. But to feel these 
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things when one ought too, towards the right people, from the right reasons and in the way 
one ought to, that is the middle and the best and this is exactly what is virtue.” 
 
According to Aristotle, emotions are tied up with a set of descriptive and normative 
considerations. If these are wrong in some way or other, the emotion is inappropriate, and 
expresses some weakness of character. Such failures may among other things consist in 
ascribing importance to something insignificant or to expose too strong or too weak 
emotions in a given situation. 
 
In an attempt to elaborate the concept of relevance applied to emotions we may utilise 
David Hume‟s distinction in the Treatise between direct and indirect passions. Passions as 
sorrow, fear, joy, hope, attraction and aversion are direct. The prototypes of indirect 
passions are pride, humility, love and hatred. Such passions may also be named “social 
passions”, because they occur within a relatively stable system of values, interaction-
systems and ascription of relationships. If it were at all meaningful to ask about relevance 
for the direct passions it would be about the probability of consequences of the cause of the 
passion. Is the object causing fear really dangerous? Is the object causing hope really likely 
to lead to the desired consequence? 
  
As for the indirect passions the question of relevance can be raised in another way. To 
show this, it is necessary first to sketch the meaning of “indirect” as applied to these 
passions. These passions are not caused by the presence of an object or a property alone. In 
addition, the object must stand in a certain form of relation to a person, a self, mine, or 
someone else‟s. These passions are cognitive and performative attitudes towards people 
and they are caused by something people have or do. The question of relevance can be 
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raised in two ways. First it can concern whether or not the property or quality really is a 
good reason for the emotion. Is the quality/property an adequate formal object for the 
emotion in question? It can also be posed as a question whether or not the relation between 
the object and the person is such as to rationalise the emotion. If someone is proud because 
his child have passed an exam with excellent marks, it would of course be possible to ask if 
he has a good reason to be proud. Why should he be proud over someone else‟s 
achievement? Maybe he would answer that he is proud to have a child who has done this. 
Be that as it may – the fact that it is meaningful to ask questions like this, and the fact that 
the answers give a basis for intellectual reflection, shows the rationality-relatedness of 
these emotions. Emotional reactions and expressions may be tested and assessed against 
standards of truth-value and relevance, cognitive correctness and norms regulating 
personal expressions. 
 
Given that emotions combine different elements or variables, one might ask how, or 
according to what principles, if any, these elements are combined. One possible answer 
would be that they are combined according to certain rules comparable to the grammatical 
rules that are often taken to operate when we form intelligible sentences. I believe that an 
answer based on such an assumption would be wrong at least if it is intended as a theory on 
how emotions generally come to be felt as unified mental phenomena. It may be right if 
applied to some highly sophisticated and developed emotional nuances experienced by 
people who are already capable of analysing emotions and manipulating their different 
components, like language-users who can use the formal grammar of their language to 
create fine-graded distinctions of meaning. Such distinction-making on the basis of formal 
analysis certainly has an important application in the field of justice which requires a 
formal competence similar to that of grammarians. But at a more basic level I believe that 
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emotionally relevant elements are rather combined in imagined proto-typical situations or 
paradigm scenarios. I will however return to this later. 
 
The basic point that I want to bring out of this analytical approach to the emotions is that 
the picture of emotions as being accessible to analysis into different components, yields a 
picture of emotions as a sort of situation-images or, better, prototype pictures of situation-
types. These situation-images are experienced in certain qualitative modes, namely those 
pleasant and discomfortable modes characteristic of the experience of different emotions. I 
will later approach the concept of “situations” more directly. For the present it is enough to 
bear in mind that we have shown that emotions contain elements that can also be thought 
of as building-bricks or constitutive elements of complex situations 
 
Emotions and Motives 
What is the relationship between emotions and the complex will/motives/actions? My 
preliminary answer will be that one aspect of the development of human emotions is that 
the originally diffuse affections that represent the origins of emotions are consciously 
sensed as directing attention to something in a certain performative way. One important 
addition seems necessary: This does neither mean that an emotion determines the empirical 
performance of an action, nor the strategies employed or the way the action is carried out. 
It means, at most, that it determines the kind of action. In cases of developed emotional 
lives, I take this to mean that it determines what I will call the formal motive under whose 
perspective the action can be properly described and understood.  
 
The analytical conceptual tools we have dealt with so far seem to imply that there is some 
kind of logical relationship in the sense that some sort of disposition to act and some sort 
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of aim-direction is part of what it is to have an emotion. This may be correct as far as the 
already developed human emotions are concerned and as far the question of logical 
relationship is an interesting question here at all. If it is, it must be because we have 
already established an emotional web, or emotional webs in certain ways and have already 
started to conceive of these webs as conventionally established patterns of action. 
“Logical” would then mean that we conceive of the meaning of an emotion in light of its 
place in such a web. Actually I believe that it is a bit beyond the point, at least if it means 
that the questions about the relationship between emotions and motives can be answered a 
priori, that is independent of empirical investigations. But before we proceed from the 
assumption that emotions and motives are part of some kind of webs, it is worth 
mentioning an alternative opinion, i.e. of David Hume. According to Hume motives are 
contingently connected with emotions. In his discussion of, on the one hand, love and 
hatred and on the other, desire and aversion, he claims that love does not necessarily imply 
a desire for the well being of the loved one, even if it normally produces such a desire. The 
reason he gives is that “… these desires arise only upon the idea of the happiness or misery 
of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination.” (Hume, 1978, p. 367) Passions 
are, according to Hume, impressions, but the desired state can only be represented as an 
idea. The relation between them can therefore only be one of association, not an essential 
one. The bottom line of these considerations is that emotions cause motives and actions 
and cannot therefore entail them logically. It would probably sound rather odd to say that 
the cause of John being unmarried is that he is a bachelor. Anyhow, Hume‟s discussion is 
within the framework of asking if a quality is implied in, or caused by, something else, 
which means that it tends to be a discussion of emotions as static units (particular 
impressions) rather than about dynamic processes. The sound intuition at the bottom of 
Hume‟s theory is that no single fact as such logically implies the existence of some other 
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positive fact. Descriptions may entail that other descriptions are true (or untrue). Facts 
don‟t have that quality. The impressions which are emotions are, in their origin, taken as 
pre-linguistic facts. 
 
This conceptual framework has been criticised by the American social-psychologist and 
philosopher George Herbert Mead (Mead: 1934). According to Mead, Hume and his 
followers hold a conception of mental phenomena as something substantial and static. It 
starts from a given experience of pain or pleasure that is associated with certain things, 
events or the like. In contrast to this, Mead develops a theory of consciousness and mental 
phenomena as something dynamic. According to this theory a mental phenomenon is part 
of a complex social act, in the sense that it is made and shaped within the context of this 
act. The mental phenomenon is an anticipation, or an opening of, a social act. This act 
should be understood within a sequence of acts in the way that it aims at calling forth a 
response in an addressee to be adjusted as a result of such a response. Social actions go 
through a process of mutual adjustment and adaption and should be understood as parts of 
such a process. The consequence of this theory of mental processes for a theory of 
emotions will be that emotions are mental states being given certain expressions that 
should be conceived as introductions to social acts. This implies that emotions are shaped 
within frameworks of sequences represented in the imagination. They are parts of mentally 
represented “stories”. 
 
As indicated above, one way to proceed in the understanding of the relationship between 
emotions and motives might be through a distinction between first and second-order 
motives (formal motives). If we take this distinction as given, we obviously start with 
emotists with a high degree of generalising capacity. Given that someone is angry with 
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someone, and desires to avenge himself. Revenge may be achieved in different ways. He 
might inflict some physical harm on the other, he might embarrass him in public, he might 
try to make his affairs difficult, and so on. “Revenge” would be the second-order motive 
for all alternatives, while the different options would be different first-order motives. 
Given the emotion in question, there might be different options for first-order motives, but 
only one possible second-order motive. My suggestion is that the second-order (or formal) 
motive is part of the emotion‟s internal structure part of the complex that is an emotional 
state in a developed human being. That would mean that the emotion could not be given an 
adequate description without some description of the formal motive. The first-order motive 
should, on the other hand, be considered as an effect caused by the emotion. Considering 
the formal motive as part of the emotion also allows us to describe the emotion as a sort of 
performative attitude, a disposition to perform certain types of acts. That will in turn enable 
us to utilise the conceptual tools of language-pragmatism. Emotions could be considered 
under the aspect that John Austin calls “illocutionary” (Austin: 1962), and this could be 
used partly as one (out of several) differentiational criteria and partly as a connective 
between the emotion and the action.  
 
The analogy between an emotion and a speech act becomes especially clear if we consider 
the illocutionary aspect of an articulated emotion. The articulation of real anger or hatred 
to the person towards whom these emotions are directed will, with all reasonableness, be 
taken as a real or potential threat. Taken as something else would probably mean that the 
articulation was interpreted as another kind of emotion, for instance fear.  
 
The distinction between first and second order motives also relates to the classic distinction 
between understanding and explaining human action. To explain something we have to 
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understand what this something is. To explain the action of some human agent, we have to 
understand what kind of action she is performing. I might see that someone is cutting 
wood, but that doesn‟t necessarily imply that I understand that she is really helping her 
grandmother, performing an act of felt obligation or gratitude. I might hear that someone is 
misinforming someone else, but that doesn‟t imply that I also understand that she is 
performing an act of, say jealousy. So, it seems that we would need some notion of a 
formal motive to understand what kind of action that is performed. But understanding this 
in light of such a notion is also to understand the emotion motivating the agent. Once this 
is understood, we are in the position to assume some causal chain between the formal 
motive and the first order motive as it is carried out in action under the specific 
circumstances at hand. Such an assumption would then be an attempted explanation of the 
action.  
 
As to the connective function, the clue has already been given. The formal motive is an 
essential part not only of the description of the emotion, but also of the action. A certain 
action may be described as an act of revenge that partly makes it intelligible and partly 
implies that it is motivated by, say hatred. An action may be taken as hostile or friendly, 
which means that it is construed in the light of different formal motives and 
correspondingly as expression of different sorts of emotions. If someone‟s action toward 
someone else were taken to be an act of revenge and it later turns out that the actor wasn‟t 
at all angry, then we would have reasons to suspect that the action was given a wrong 
description. Admittedly, one might perform an act of revenge without being in a state of 
anger in the same way that one might continue to avoid dangers after one have stopped 
fearing them. But even if the state of anger is absent, one must still have the disposition to 
perform acts originally connected with anger. And without some reference even to the 
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relevant emotional disposition it would be hard to maintain a conception of a certain action 
as, say, one of revenge. To summarise: The hypothesis of an internal relation between the 
emotion and the formal motive is based on the assumption that an emotion is, among other 
things, a certain performative attitude, and that the action adequately expressing the 
emotion is intelligible as a realisation of, and caused by, the formal motive that 
corresponds to that emotion.  
 
I have said that the formal motive is part of the internal structure of the emotion. To be 
more precise; it is part of the emotion‟s intentional structure. Achieving a goal or state of a 
certain type is part of what makes up the condition of satisfaction of the emotion. That 
would sometimes, but not always, mean that part of the intentional structure of an emotion 
is the state that would bring the emotion to an end. Shame would disappear when honour is 
re-established, fear when danger passes. On the other hand, the intentional structure of 
symbolically based emotions often does not contain specific ways in which this should be 
achieved (at least in non-ritualistic cases). That is why first-order motives usually are not 
parts, but effects of emotions.  
 
The distinction between first- and second-order motives also makes us see that a 
consciousness with second-order motives as part of its intentional structure is a 
consciousness that has alternative options for action, a consciousness that is not restricted 
to respond along rigid stereotyped patterns.  
 
I shall now try to argue that the first-order motive of an action should in fact be regarded as 
an effect caused by the emotion. A description of an action in light of a first-order motive 
would be a description at a lower level of generality. Descriptions like, “he shot him”, “he 
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ruined his business” or “he gave him false information”, are to be considered less 
generalised than “he avenged himself”.  
 
First-order motives are caused by second order motives applied under the conditions of 
certain beliefs that make the causal conditions under which the second order motive causes 
the action in question. 
 
But how can a non-physical entity like a motive cause anything at all? First of all, if we 
consider that what we are talking about is a (human) organism in a certain state of 
performative attitude, it is not all that non-physical. A formal motive thought in abstraction 
from this would of course not be capable of causing anything. Thus comprehended it 
would however be hard, not only to understand how it could cause anything, but also how 
it could exist at all. 
 
What is vitally important here is to understand that the logic of emotions is such as to make 
emotions properties of something, that this something is an organism and, in the case of 
symbolically founded emotions it is a human organism. Such organisms do in fact feel and 
reason and this fact is part of the explanation why they behave as they do.  
 
The desire to harm someone as revenge is an intentional desire to harm this person. This 
intention implies a desire to be the one who causes the harm, and probably often also that 
the offender knows who caused the harm. So, to start with, causation is part of the 
intention. One reason why we are able to form such intentions is that we have experienced 
that we are able to cause something by acting in certain ways. In this case the intention is 
in fact an intention to cause something. 
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I assume that there is an important (not only semantic) difference between the following 
propositions: 
1.   He hit because he wanted revenge. 
2. He wanted revenge because he was angry. 
1 represents a causal relation. 2 does not. 1 represents a temporal sequence. 2 does not. 2 
describes a pattern of mental states where one part is defined in terms of the other, anger in 
terms of revenge and vice versa.  
 
Finally: I take these considerations on first and second order motives to bear some impact 
on a classic problem in anthropology; how can we understand other cultures? Maybe the 
problem is to understand what kinds of second order motives it is that causes the first order 
motives that we can see followed in action. If so, that wouldn‟t imply that the second order 
motives, once understood would be unrecognisable. It would simply mean that we know 
too little about the circumstances (cultural and/or natural) to understand the causal chains 
between the second and the first order motives.  
 
There is of course also another alternative source of the problem. The interpersonal 
relations in another culture might be so different from our own, and for that reason give 
rise to emotions (and hence formal motives) unrecognisable for us. If what I have said 
above is correct, that would imply that there would be bad prospects for our understanding 




The Shaping of Social Emotions 
Most writers on emotions make a distinction between basic or in some sense fundamental 
emotions and other emotions. Physiological evidence supports such a distinction (Cf. 
Damasio and LeDoux). I see no reason not to accept that there are some emotions, 
emotional reactions and ways of feeling affected that are more basic than other. We don‟t 
necessarily have to draw a sharp line between basic and non-basic emotions. We could 
rather imagine a scale where we, on the one side have emotional reactions that occur 
independent of reflective cognitive and evaluative judgements based on symbolic code-
systems and, on the other, emotional reactions where such judgements play an essential 
role. The formation of basic emotions may perhaps be regarded as an instance of the 
formation of basic-level concepts in general (Cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999. p. 29). Basic-
level concepts are concept on the medium level in a three-level categorial hierarchy. 
“Chair” would be an instance of such a concept, placed between “furniture” and “rocking-
chair”. Correspondingly “anger” could be said to hold a level between “indignation” and 
“hostility”. We hit some kind of median before we specify or generalise. Because fine-
graded emotional distinctions often have references to social rather than natural properties 
of things and events, it seems reasonable to assume that the higher degree of emotional 
nuances, the higher the dependence on symbolic code-systems. It might be tempting to talk 
of such nuances as an emotional functional differentiation on the intra-personal level. The 
reason is that emotional nuances of the sort in question are highly specialised to fit into 
special sorts of social situations. Consider for instance embarrassment, shame, indignation, 
insult and so on. These terms could be predicated, not only of mental states, but also of 
certain features of social situations based on complex symbolic code-systems. Described in 
another way, they can be said to represent means for the individual‟s adaption to the social 
world. I will call such emotions “social” because they typically are caused by situations 
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whose elements are signifiers of some social value or code. These emotions typically occur 
within contexts of “social realities” in the sense used by Searle. A social reality, in this 
sense, is something that is there because people believe and accept certain things about 
them. Such belief and acceptance include three elements, assigning of a function, that the 
object is part of some co-operative system (collective intentionality) and status function, 
something performing a function in virtue of being ascribed a certain status.   
 
There might, however, be a problem here. What I have said about the possible functional 
role of social emotions seems to imply that the individual identifies these emotions in 
terms that could also be applied to social situations. But if that is so, it might be hard to 
understand the origin of the mental quale that seems to distinguish one emotional nuance 
from another. The feeling of being embarrassed can certainly not be predicated of social 
situations. A possible approach to this problem might go like this: Emotional qualia might 
be regarded as ways in which the special significance of social situations or events, and the 
subjects position relative to other elements in these situations/events, are detected and 
sensed by the individual. That would be analogous to a claim that fear is the way danger is 
felt or sensed. But even if this would work for fear/danger, it is not obvious that it would 
do the same for, say embarrassment/a situation were one misunderstands some social code. 
The reason is that the first would have a more straightforward relation to our evolutionary 
history. It seems that we would have to say that, not only are social codes and culturally 
determined ways to describe social situations learned, the mental qualia that characterises 
the adequate response to the various situations are also acquired in the same learning-
process. Is that plausible? I believe it is! After all there are many sensory nuances that are 
acquired through some kind of “cultivation”. Consider the ability to distinguish the taste of 
red wine made from Cabernet, Merlot or Pinot Noir, or even the ability to taste, which are 
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best on different occasions. The same phenomenon could also be instantiated with 
reference to food and special occasions. It wouldn‟t be all that exceptional if it should turn 
out that the spectre of our feelings undergoes a similar process and that what we learn to 
conceive of as certain emotional qualia really are subjective experiences of significant 
features of social situations and our position within such. Maybe Jean Jacques Rousseau 
had this in mind when he said that culture teaches us to mistake the cultural qualities of 
things and needs for natural ones. Anyhow, the quale that typically accompanies an 
emotional nuance would serve the locative function (the you-are-here function) with which 
I have dealt earlier. 
 
Some emotional sensations, physiological reactions and expressions are given with our 
biological nature. There are numerous investigations, beginning with Darwin, of facial 
expressions in certain animals and human infants which clearly indicate that facial 
expressions of fear, anger and joy are genetically determined and even very similar in 
humans and some other animals. The visceral physiological reactions that are connected 
with these emotions are also common to humans and other mammals (LeDoux, Damasio). 
But it seems unlikely that all human emotional experiences and expressions should be 
genetically directly determined.  Where that to be the case, it would also have to be true, 
not only that we are social animals, but also that all the nuances of a complex society 
originate in our genetic heritage. Fear is obviously connected with dangerous situations. If 
we had not been born with an ability to react adequately on such situations, we would not 
have been born at all. Natural selection would have eliminated our ancestors long ago. But 
there are, as mentioned above, other more specialised emotions that cannot be so directly 
related to our evolutionary history, emotions that could only operate within highly 
symbolically structured human interaction. 
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There are two things I want to emphasise in this connection: 1. There are some emotions 
that can only be identified and described in terms that also apply to social situations or 
relations. 2. I have said that there is a difference between having an emotion and knowing 
that one has that emotion. The sort of emotions mentioned in 1. are more closely connected 
with “knowing” than is the case with more basic emotions. They are, so to say, more 
intellectual.   
 
As already mentioned, John Searle tells us that the intentionality of any mental state, 
emotions as well as other perceptions, consists in their having “conditions of satisfaction 
which are determined by the content of the state.” (Searle, 1983. p. 409.) If I see something 
as a bear climbing up a tree, this cognition contains the condition of satisfaction that there 
is in fact a bear in the perceived place, that it is in fact climbing up a tree, and that this state 
of affairs is the cause of my perception of a bear climbing up a tree. If I feel fear 
anticipating that it might climb down, this emotion contains the additional conditions of 
satisfaction that it might in fact climb down and that I would in fact be in danger if it were 
to do so. This way of thinking would suggest that understanding the development of 
emotional nuances would require understanding of the development of nuances of 
intentional states. This would entail learning nuances of “conditions of satisfaction”. The 
conditions of satisfaction of an emotion are, among other things, that the emotion is an 
adequate response to a situation correctly conceived. The adequacy of an emotional 
response often cannot be understood apart from the cultural codes of the society in which it 
is expressed. One will for instance have to master the unwritten rules of construing social 
situations and interactions as demeaning, debasing, honourable, virtuous, vicious, elevated, 
respectful and the guidelines for how to respond to such situations. 
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Now this would perhaps not imply that such construals represent something real. I might 
construe something as dangerous that is in fact completely harmless. But there is a 
difference here, viz.: Something might be dangerous or not, quite independent of my 
construal, whereas there are other formal objects that are constituted by being construed as 
respectful, honourable etc. (on the precondition that such construals express some 
collectively shared value-system or symbolic code, not only individual idiosyncrasies). 
 
Forty years ago Norwood Russel Hanson (Russel Hanson: 1961) formulated the, still quite 
useful distinctions between three perceptual levels, seeing, seeing as and seeing that. This 
could be thought of as corresponding to an increasing degree of linguistic structuring of the 
perception-process. Seeing as may be regarded as a perception of objects that implies 





Corresponding distinctions may also be utilised in connection with emotion-objects as well 
as with emotional content. As for the first, the various modes would be similar to the 
modes of other perceptions with the difference that what one sees as or that would be 
value-relevant properties. As for the second, we could distinguish between pure sensations 
of pleasure or pain, the conception of these sensations as pride, contempt, envy etc. and the 
experience of these states as situations of certain types where certain types of actions are 
likely to occur, actions that are relevant to the formation of certain motives. The mental 
activity of conceiving something as, could be termed “construing”. If someone responds 
with respect at the sight of someone performing a self-sacrificing act, he construes this 
object as, say, virtuous. “Construing” or “seeing as” is the mental activity of determining 
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the formal object as being of a certain kind. It may well be asked how we learn to do this 
and how we learn to predict probable actions and form relevant motives in the given 
situation. 
 
We have all experienced mental states in which we are not clearly aware of, or even 
confused about the conditions of satisfaction of those states. Such states could be called 
“diffuse mental states”. We may feel unpleasant without being able to locate the source of 
this feeling or to form an opinion about what we ought to, or would like to do. In absence 
of a better option we may symbolise the conditions of satisfaction in a chocolate bar, a beer 
or something of that sort. Such conditions are, as all parents know, often observable in 
children. When we grow up we develop a capacity for emotional nuances. How do we do 
that? How are diffuse feelings of comfort or discomfort systematised into a repertoire of 
distinctly different emotions with highly specialised conditions of satisfaction?  
 
Modern culture offers a large variety of terms designed to interpret desires and needs, to 
keep some types of desires apart from other and to verbalise the corresponding feelings of 
frustration or satisfaction. This state of affairs applies to desires that are experienced as 
physical as well as those to experienced as emotional. The condition of satisfaction for 
thirst is something to drink, but the desire to drink wine is not satisfied by beer, neither is 
the desire to drink red wine satisfied by white wine and so on. This phenomenon can be 
regarded as an experience of the differentiation or specialisation that is part of modern 
society and culture. This culture, as is suggested by Bourdieu, actually encourages the 
development of the ability to make ever more sophisticated distinctions. In fact, the very 
ability to make fine-graded distinctions is often taken to signify social competence. Of 
course it is not all that obvious that the ability to make distinctions is actually accompanied 
                                                                                                                                                                                
4
  The fact that Russel Hanson wants to show that there is no pure seeing, is of no importance here. 
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by a corresponding distinction of mental qualia. But when it is, it would seem more 
reasonable to regard such felt qualitative distinctions as a result of the first mentioned, 
rather than the opposite. What I suggest here, is that there are certain cultural codes and 
symbol-systems to signify hierarchies and labour-division systems that are internalised as 
felt emotional nuances and that these nuances are quite fine-graded in modern societies. 
The relation between such emotions and their formal objects is less straightforward than is 
the case with basic emotions like fear, whose relation to danger is as direct as it can 
possibly be. Sophisticated social emotions tend to disguise their formal objects and their 
conditions of satisfaction. They may therefore be regarded as resulting from a sort of 
double coding, viz. the system of coding given in our neural system and the one that is 
based on cultural value-hierarchies. 
 
This, or related problems, have been dealt with by classical sociologists and social 
philosophers, most noteworthy Rousseau and Durkheim. These writers have obviously 
made great contributions to our understanding of some of the mechanisms of this process. 
Their contributions mainly concern the modernising process on the level of functional 
differentiation of labour and, in Rousseau‟s case, the growth of inter-human dependence. It 
seems to me that Rousseau‟s basic intuition here is that the progress of civilisation is 
accompanied by an increasing symbolisation of inter-human dependence, recognition and 
rejection and that these changes also have impact on the subjectively felt emotional life of 
the individuals. I will however leave these contributions aside and comment on another 





Imagining a Drama 
I have said that our emotional development partly is determined by our learning the 
significance of different inter-personal situations. I have also said that our knowledge of 
the significance of these is acquired, not only as concepts naming them, but primarily as 
proto-typical mental images of situations and sequences of actions. If this is correct the 
significance of the general emotion-terms are learned through experience of some 
particulars that come to be accepted as representative. To state my point in the words of 
David Hume: “ … some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their 
representation.” (Hume, 1978. p. 22)! 
 
It is possible that some mental states like fear and pain (maybe also joy and sadness) are 
learned by a sort of inner ostention, that is, learned by recognition of the feel of them in 
instances that are taken to be typical. But it seems implausible that all emotions are learned 
that way. What about feelings of insult, betrayal, debasement and annoyance? Such states 
seem to be learned through a more complicated process than a mere directing of awareness 
towards a definite modification of the mental. But maybe some sort of ostention still plays 
a role in learning such emotional states. Let‟s say that someone tells us that the feeling of 
insult is what you feel when someone treats you with disrespect or disregard in a way that 
you have not deserved. Or, the feeling of betrayal is the emotional state you are in when 
someone has gained your confidence and later uses this against you. If you recognise this 
state, it would of course not be through a pure inner ostention, you would have to 
understand the significance of the words “disrespect”, “disregard”, “deserved” and 
“confidence”, which could hardly be done through inner ostention. But let‟s assume that he 
says: Imagine yourself in a situation were you have told someone some about your intimate 
secrets. The next day this someone finds out that he will reap some advantage by revealing 
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the secret to a third person. This situation would instantiate “betrayal”. I might answer that 
I have experienced such a situation. I might say that; sure, I had some feelings, but I didn‟t 
recognise them as feelings of betrayal, I just felt a bit confused and disappointed. Well, he 
says, you are still too naive and inexperienced to understand what is really going on. You 
ought to have felt betrayed!  
 
This story could be interpreted as one where someone presents a paradigm of betrayal. It 
has three crucial elements:  
1. It gives a paradigmatic description of a social situation of a certain sort.  
2. It gives a normative evaluation of such situations.  
3. It appeals to imagination as a mean to learn and accept a certain propositional attitude 
(that of betrayal) toward some event.    
 
Now, this is not an instance of inner ostention in the proper sense. There is an appeal to a 
social code and a cultural hierarchy of values. Even the sort of imagination that is appealed 
to is acquired. So is the authority that is ascribed to this imaginative capacity and to the 
example that is (presumably) accepted as paradigmatic. What I am suggesting is that such 
learning is a stage in a process of growing into a society and culture, a stage that presumes 
that we are already fairly well acquainted with, and emotionally integrated in, the same 
society and culture. Once this is done, and the possibility of appealing to imaginary 
situations conceived in a certain way, is established, it seems to be possible to establish a 
finer spectre of emotional nuances by some sort of imaginary ostention. This is presumable 
what is done in exemplary stories that children are told, in movies, literature etc. What is 
done is something similar to what Descartes does when he establishes a criterion of truth. 
“Establish the background of the process of methodical doubt. Then imagine that, as you 
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do this, you suddenly realise that, in this doubt, you can be certain of your own existence. 
There you have the paradigm situation of being in a state of certainty!” To make my point 
even more recognisable I will mention that I regard the classical theories of social contracts 
as instances of the same way of delimiting a phenomenon, in that case duty or political 
allegiance. “Imagine a situation where people have no duties towards one another, but 
where each individual have a natural right to defend its own life. Imagine then that they, 
for some reason, find this situation to be contrary to their real interests. As a civilised being 
you surely know what a contract is and what is implied when you enter into a contractual 
relationship. Imagine therefore that these people enter into such a relationship with each 
other and with a political institution that they establish through this contract. There you 
have a paradigm situation of duty and political allegiance!” Note that this way of 
representing duty/political allegiance does not explain how these phenomena come to exist. 
It presupposes that those to whom it is directed are already acquainted with cultural codes 
that make the described situation intelligible as one of establishing a certain type of 
relation. What it does, is to establish a scene with a high degree of dramatic, and hence 
emotional appeal, a scene that can be used to identify and classify real situations as being 
of a certain type and exclude other ones from the same type. As an aside it could be 
mentioned that there are slight differences within western culture as to what situations 
should properly be understood as instances of this mythical scene. American children 
would for instance probably fairly early recognise their relationship to their school as being 
of such a kind, while Scandinavian children would hardly be able to see any such 
connection at all. 
 
There is a neat combination of descriptive, normative and emotional elements working 
together in this sort of imaginative activity. Descriptive of course, as a situation is 
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described. Normative, for two reasons: First, the feeling of being betrayed cannot be 
detected as a pure fact, it has to be conceived as resulting from some wrongdoing. Of 
course, the sequence of events could be given another description, but that would not have 
been a description of a betrayal. Second, the story claims to have some superior authority 
as to what is to count as betrayal. Emotional, because this situation provides a code for the 
individual to interpret his affective state as being of a certain kind, that of feeling betrayed. 
Paradigm examples of emotional significant situations often have a dramatic or scenic 
structure. This probably accounts for their emotional appeal.  
 
Characterising emotions through descriptions of certain situations and sequences of events 
is not a modern invention. In fact it can be traced back to Aristotle. In his book on Poetics 
we read that a tragedy aims at evoking pity and fear. Aristotle tells us that the plot as well 
as the characters must have a number of determinate qualities for this emotional effect to 
be obtained. We may reconstruct Aristotle so as to describe, not only the tragedy as a cause 
of the emotional effects, but also of the intentional structure of these emotions themselves. 
About the hero of the tragedy he says that he must be; “a man who is not eminently good 
and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error 
or frailty. He must be one who is highly renowned and prosperous … (Poet. 1453 a). The 
reason is that “pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man 
like ourselves” (Ibid). He also directs certain demands to the structure of the plot. There is 
no need to enter into details here. The main point is that he describes a relationship 
between certain emotions and a certain narrative structure, a structure that needs certain 
character-types to fit in. Of course he deals with a certain elevated type of pity and pain, 
one that purifies the soul. The point is, however, that he describes these as emotions, which 
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have intentional objects that are peculiar to them, and that these objects (or characters) 
should be of a kind that makes them fit into certain dramatic sequences of events.  
 
A similar point is made in the Rhetoric. An emotion-type is characterised by being 
connected with certain scenes, populated by certain personalities that take part in a certain 
type of chain of events. The definition of benevolence, for instance, goes like this: “Let it 
then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a 
service to one who needs it, not in return for something, nor in the interest of him who 
renders it, but in that of the recipient.” (Rhet. II. Vi.) The emotion is defined through a 
description of a certain social scene where certain types of actions are performed out of 
certain types of motives, and where certain types of intended outcome is excluded.  
 
We would however not have needed Aristotle to recognise the idea that different emotions 
are related to scenes that are typical to them, and which are in fact appropriate to 
characterise them. The war and the courtroom are scenes for a number of emotions. Places 
where you can be seen by everyone, or hidden from everyone, are also such scenes. The 
same may be the case with situations where you help someone or are yourself helped. Who 
has not staged imaginary scenes where one accuses people with whom one is angry or 
jealous? The accusations are targeted against the villain, but aimed at the ears of the 
judges. The defendant is ascribed stupid or naïve attempts to excuse himself, only to be 
annihilated by the impartial judges. 
 
Ronald deSousa has introduced the concept of “paradigm scenarios” underlying any 
specific emotion-type. The concept of paradigm scenarios is connected with the biography 
of the individual and with single or particular emotionally significant experiences as part of 
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this biography. The starting-point is not a complex, but the emotionally relatively 
undifferentiated state of the infant, a situation largely characterised by genetically 
determined responses being elaborated along the way through interaction with the 
responses from the infant‟s social environment. Such is his hypothesis concerning the 
function of paradigm scenarios: “My hypothesis is this: We are made familiar with the 
vocabulary of emotions by association with paradigm scenarios. These are drawn first 
from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art and culture to 
which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are supplemented and refined by 
literature. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the 
characteristic object of the specific emotion-type … and second, a set of characteristic or 
“normal” responses to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then 
very quickly becomes a cultural one.” (de Sousa, 1987. P. 182). 
 
I find it basically correct to assume that emotional differentiation above the genetically 
determined level reflects cultural phenomena as well as individually acquired ways of 
integrating the emotional significance of the various situation-types.  
 
The image of emotions as something being maintained by an inner scene can illuminate the 
structural components of the emotions. In his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the 
18
th
 century Scottish philosopher Adam Smith develops this idea. In Smith‟s conception 
this inner scene also has an imagined audience. Smith calls this the “impartial spectator”. 
The concept of the impartial spectator plays a double role. One function has to do with the 
conception of (social) emotions depending on the existence of certain sorts of social 
situations and phenomena for their formation. Such emotions also need to be exhibited in 
such situations. The impartial spectator is the informed and competent audience. The other 
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function is to provide a standard for the correctness and reasonableness (in Smith‟s terms 
“propriety”) of the emotions. The impartial spectator‟s sympathy with the subject who has 
the emotion provides a confirmation and an acceptance of the propriety of his expression. 
So, the imaginary scene with its audience is a precondition for the subject‟s evaluative 
attitude towards his own emotions. 
 
Smith‟s conception of emotions and emotional expression as something being sustained 
and regulated by imagined social scenes has an important implication concerning the 
multi-perspectivity of emotions. In my discussion of emotions as mapping-system I said 
that the subjectivity or subjective “feel” of the emotions informs us of our position relative 
to the other elements in the mapped situations. Smith‟s theory, which is about emotions of 
the kind I call “social”, tells us that such emotions presupposes the existence of other 
perspectives than my own on the same situation. It also tells us that the “feel” that signifies 
my position reflects the “feel” that signifies a certain other position within that situation. 
Expressed in terms other than Smith‟s this means that the intentionality of such emotions is 
more complex than is the case with more basic emotions. The condition of satisfaction for 
fear is often quite simple. The conditions of satisfaction for, say benevolence, insult or 
admiration include that the adequate expression of these emotions would be conceived in a 
certain way from a perspective other than one‟s own. Isn‟t it partly this state of affairs that 
makes social emotions “social”? 
 
I shall now proceed to comment on the significance of the concept “mythologies” for the 
understanding of how we establish and maintain emotional differences. The concept of 
mythologies as relevant in this context is taken from Solomon. He claims that certain 
myth-like situations and figures are connected with certain emotions in such a way that an 
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emotion is characterised by the mythology that exemplifies it and makes it vivid in the 
imagination. For instance, the mythology that instantiates anger is normally a “(c)ourtroom 
or Olympian mythology; oneself as legislator and judge; the other as defendant. Oneself as 
the defender of values, the other as offender.” (Solomon, 1993. p. 229). Innocence can 
carry the picture of “(l)amb among wolves, the beautiful soul. (Ibid. P. 273). Indifference 
is entrenched through “(t)he pariah mythology, the man whose name is stricken from all 
records, who is allowed no quarter, no conversation, not even punishment … (Ibid. p. 270). 
 
Similar applies to other emotions. One of the consequences of Solomon‟s approach is that 
it allows a sort of structuralistic and even dramaturgic investigation of the emotions. Such 
an investigation would illuminate not only the structure of the myth, but also of the 
intentionality of the corresponding emotion. One condition of satisfaction for anger would, 
for instance, according to this be that the other really is an offender of values and oneself 
really is a defender of the same values. Another consequence is that learning of emotions 
and emotional nuances, as far social emotions are concerned, is interwoven with the 
learning of the symbolic significance of mythical situations. We learn to imagine ourselves 
into myths, as partakers in significant dramas.  
 
According to Solomon, mythologies function as “the synthesis of our emotional 
judgements”. That gives this concept a special place among the emotional categories. Let 
us make a thought-experiment where we consider each category as a variable that can have 
different values. If we give each of the twelve categories/variables two possible values, we 
will get 4046 possible combinations. If we give them three, we get 1594323 combinations 
that are potential emotional nuances. Thinking the categories as possible combinations will 
however give us a highly inadequate picture of human emotions and the way they are 
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established. An emotion is not an aggregate of different components, but a unified 
response to a situation, wherein the situation itself is conceived as unified from the 
perspective of the subject. Solomon‟s theory seems to be that a theoretically possible 
combination is a possible emotion if and only if we are able to form a mental image that 
combines the categories in a, to us, significant situation or scene, a scene to which the 
emotion applies as a description. The special status of the concept of mythologies 
compared to the other emotional categories is that it functions more like a picture or rather 
a plot, than a concept. Its unifying function rests on the ability to form emotionally 
significant pictures of situations or scenes as part of plots. This would imply that our 
emotional repertoire is connected with our ability to form such scenes or situations in the 
imagination.  
 
When I discussed the categories relevant to emotions, I gave each category a discrete 
value. We saw that a very limited number of values gave a large number of possible 
combinations. If we think of the categories as vectors with non-discrete values, the number 
of possible combinations is virtually infinite.  
 
Paradigm scenarios and mythologies could be thought of as signifiers and codifiers of 
emotions. Signifiers, because they come to stand for the corresponding emotion and 
because stories and scenes provide very strong identifications-objects, codifiers, because 
they in a way express the objective existence of situations as, say, unjust, honourable, 
pitiful, degrading etc, and so rationalising the corresponding emotions as proper responses. 
 
There is probably some limit to the number of emotional nuances that the social 
interaction-system of a given culture is able to handle, in the sense that the agents within 
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the system would be able to recognise them. In a given culture there will therefore be a 
limited number of mental state-types that could be counted as, or recognised as, emotions. 
If this assumption is correct, the amounts of myths that are considered significant within a 
given culture would tell us something about the emotional code underlying the interaction 
in the same culture. If this is true, we should however use the concept “myth” in a very 
broad sense, meaning every situation-type or type of action-sequence to which we respond 
in some emotional way. The main point here is that there is no emotional state that could 
not be referred to some situation-type or action-sequence type. Emotional characteristics of 
a given culture can therefore be taken as an indicator of corresponding social 
characteristics. Elster (Elster, 1999 b) points out that Aristotle‟s theory of emotions also 
serves as a source to our understanding of peculiar features of the social organisation of the 
Greek city-state. 
 
So far I have said that the concepts of “paradigm scenarios” and “mythologies” play an 
important role in two respects: 1. They contribute to the conceptualisation, and hence the 
identification of certain emotional states. 2. They model the emotional states so as to fit 
into a culture‟s code for social situations and interaction. Now, there is also a third function 
that can be attributed to these concepts, a function related to the maintenance of the 
individuals‟ autobiographical selves. There is a need, not only to identify, but also to re-
identify emotional states. The emotional life of an individual displays a certain degree of 
continuity and coherence at, at least, two levels: First, each individual has, or acquires, 
some character-traits or dispositions that shape patterns of response and action which come 
to be typical for this individual. Second, an individual with some degree of emotional 
experience is able to recognise his emotional states as states of a kind that he has had 
before. This rather obvious fact raises two questions whose answers are not all that 
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obvious. The first is this: How is it that we identify an emotional state as one we have 
formerly experienced? The second is this: How can a particular experienced emotional 
state have transfer-value to other emotional particulars? My answer to both these questions 
will involve the concept of “paradigm scenarios”. An emotional state comes to be 
classified as being of a certain kind because it is interpreted as an instance of a paradigm. 
The paradigm delivers a sort of tentative structure in light of which the state is interpreted. 
The paradigm also provides a pre-evaluation of states of this kind and also a prediction of 
what kind of actions, outcomes and so on which are to be expected in these types of 
scenarios.  
 
To conclude: Paradigms or prototypes have references in two directions. On the one hand, 
they picture features of social situations such as to give them a special kind of significance. 
On the other hand they are used to organise emotionally relevant information into 








Dealing with the subject of human emotions we will have to address the difficult problem 
of the self. From Plato to Descartes the philosophical tradition treated this problem as 
concerning a substance capable of independent existence, i.e. existence independent of the 
body in which it was temporarily imprisoned, but not subject to the same changes as was 
the flesh. In this conceptual edifice the emotions were able to distract the self, but not 
really to affect its essential properties. This line of thought was broken in the 18
th
 century, 
most noteworthy by David Hume. There are different and conflicting interpretations of 
Hume‟s writings on the self. Some say that he altogether denies the existence of the self. 
Others say that he denies the existence of a substantial self. Others again say that his 
writings about personal identity in Book I of the Treatise only prepare the way for treating 
the self as a product of the development of our emotional life. Either way, what is fairly 
beyond doubt is that Hume himself found his own treatment of personal identity 
unsatisfactory or at least incomplete. His comments on his own shortcomings are, in my 
opinion, so instructive that I think they are worth a closer consideration. 
 
It is in the Appendix to the Treatise that Hume revisits the problem of personal identity 
with which he had dealt in Book I. He declares that he has been entangled in a sort of 
contradiction or “in a labyrinth” from which he can‟t find his way out. The problem as he 
states it, is this: “… all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences … the mind never 
perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.” (Treatise p. 636). So how can it 
be that these perceptions are in some way unified in a mind or self? 
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In my opinion Hume‟s problems have the following sources: 
 
1. The concept of mind as “a something” that is facing the task of putting different, 
mutually independent elements together into a unified whole. 
2. A static, as opposed to a dynamic, conception of self.  
 
Hume invites us to conduct a thought-experiment. Let us consider a mind that is at the 
level of an oyster. This mind, as Hume asks us to imagine it, has only one perception, e.g. 
that of thirst. Here you can find no self, only thirst. Add one more perception, e.g. that of 
cold. Still there is no perception of self. Add as many particular perceptions you like, the 
introduction of the unifying self remains a mystery. 
 
First of all; I believe that Hume would be better off had he asked us to conceive of an 
organism instead of a mind with one, two … perceptions. What should we say if he had put 
the question that way? Let us assume that this organism has a perception of thirst. Let us 
then assume that it also has a perception of water. It would in fact not be an open question 
whether or not the organism is able to establish some sort of relation between these two 
perceptions. If it were not, it would not be an organism at all. The point here is simply that 
organisms come down to us from evolution with the capacity to unify perceptions like 
these, or else they do not come down to us at all. If we focus on the system of synaptic 
connection and neural circuits instead of mental units, there wouldn‟t be a problem of 
unification of “thirst” and “water” at all. The point is that if there is a problem like this, it 
is solved at a deeper level than the conscious one. 
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But maybe it might still be a unifying problem. People can wake up after a “night out on 
the town” and ask themselves “Am I the person who did so and so?” We also have the 
pathological cases of split brains and dissociated personality syndrome. But these 
situations present different kinds of problems than the one Hume asks us to consider.  His 
problem is not how unity can fall apart, but how it is established. 
 
If we accept that the problem is not how a mind may have a self, but how an organism may 
have, or in fact has a self, we no longer have to accept the terminological and 
methodological platform upon which Hume erects the problem. It might or it might not be 
correct that it is impossible to discover a “real relation” between two “perceptions of the 
mind” if you look at one of them at a time. It might or might not be correct that one already 
existing perception cannot produce any real new perception. And it surely is correct that 
the self cannot exist as a separate perception prior to or independent of other perceptions. 
But it is even more certain that organisms are able to co-ordinate themselves on the basis 
of more than one perception at the time. It is simply a brute fact that organisms, human and 
others, present relatively coherent responses to a huge amount of information, and that they 
do this all the time.  
 
Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 1999) has suggested a model depicting different levels of 
self-hood and consciousness. In fact it is intended not only as a model, but also as a 
description of distinct neural systems. According to Damasio, understanding the evolution 
of the self is a question of understanding the complexity of our neural system. Every 
organism can be described as having a proto-self. This self is concerned with upholding the 
boundaries between the organism and the environment in which it is situated and with 
mapping events relevant to the organism‟s survival and also to respond to such events. 
This mapping depends on a neural system processing relevant information for the 
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organism. The proto-self does not require consciousness. There is also a core self based on 
three neural systems, one mapping events affecting the organism, one mapping the 
organism‟s visceral responses to such events and one supervising and mapping the relation 
between the two others. Damasio calls this third system a second-order system. The core-
self is the conscious awareness of what is going on from moment to moment. The 
awareness of the relation between events in the environment and the organism‟s responses 
to these events, has the form of feeling or is presented in an affective mode. If Damasio‟s 
description is correct, we have the tools we need to solve Hume‟s problem. It is simply not 
true that there is no “real connection” between distinct perceptions. The core-self and the 
conscious awareness that it produces, is this real connection. If we were to look for the 
origin of basic cognitive categories like causality, distance, resemblance and other 
categories relevant for interaction between the organism and the environment, the core-self 
would be a good place to start looking.  
 
It may be added that core consciousness, according to Damasio, also results in an 
enhancement of the image of, and sharpening of the focus on the object affecting the 
organism. It also strengthens the awareness of the feeling that the object causes in the 
organism, even to a level of a feeling of knowing. This seems to have two important 
consequences. First; it strengthens the awareness of the division between the objective and 
the subjective. Second; it seems to imply that conscious states as propositional attitudes 
have a deep biological basis in the origin of consciousness.  
 
In humans there is also awareness, or rather a conception, of a self that can properly be 
termed the autobiographical self. Now, given that there are emotions that are distinctively 
human, what is the relationship between these and the autobiographical self? Addressing 
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this question, it is important not to forget that the human autobiographical self is built upon 
the foundation of the proto-self and the core self. That implies that it is not built out of 
nothing, and that the terms we should use to grasp the distinctive features of this type of 
self-conception, do not signify anything that could alone explain the construction of this 
self. What we are looking for is a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the 
autobiographical self.  
 
Like all levels of self-hood, the autobiographical self is concerned with internal stability 
and borders. Now, what tools do we have that enable us to fulfil such a task? I believe that 
part of the answer regarding stability is that we have a grammar or formal structure (being 
a linguistic elaboration of some basic dimensions of our perception-systems and response-
systems) that enables us to conceptualise a vast variety of situations, narratives about 
ourselves which are relatively coherent, and the institutionalising of our inter-personal 
interactions. The tools we have for border-drawing are, in addition to these, certain means 
of defining or conceiving of ourselves as unique individuals or persons. To be sure, our 
stabilising and individuating endeavours engage more than our emotional repertoire. But 
this fact represents no reason why we should not ask what part is played by the emotions in 
the creation of the autobiographical self.  
 
 It is quite possible, and even probable, that our biological make-up can account for the 
functions and the formal structure of the tools mentioned. The reason is that the functions 
fulfilled are part of our organic survival. Nevertheless there is also a dimension of self-
construction involved in the making of persons. And in the case of making an 
autobiographical self, our biological make-up is such that it also requires the element of 
conscious self-construction to fulfil its task. This construction has the form of 
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interpretation and explanation, interpretation of the significance of the events taking place 
in the person‟s life and causal explanation of the relationship between the various events. I 
am here suggesting that the making and maintaining of an autobiographical self is also a 
question of self-interpretation and self-construction. The intriguing thing here is that this is 
obviously a biological process, but that it works in cultural terms.  
 
The important point is that the culturally and conventionally determined semantic meaning 
of the content of the autobiographical self cannot be reduced to their biological 
underpinnings. Stated in other terms: the formal structure determined by our neural system 
cannot generate the semantic meaning of the terms necessary to maintain an 
autobiographical self through a lifetime. John Searle (Searle, 1984) has claimed that 
“syntax is not sufficient for semantics”. That might or might not be true. But even if it 
should be untrue taken as a universal claim, there is one reason to believe that the kind of 
semantics that could be generated by our formal neural system would be insufficient to 
uphold autobiographical selves. The reason is this: When we think of, and reconstruct, our 
lives as relatively continuous wholes, we use words like “will”, “decision”, 
“responsibility”, “freedom”, “reasons”, “belief”, to mention some central terms. We also 
use terms like “justice”, “shame”, “guilt”, “deserved reward”, “pride”, to mention some 
slightly less central. Two things are important here: 1. Such terms derive their meaning, 
not only from the fact that they serve to individualise the persons of which they are 
predicated, that is, define the borders between this person and other persons. They also get 
meaning from their function as co-ordinators of action in the way that they define the 
social and cultural space within which action takes place. 2. People have not always 
ascribed the same significance to these terms (or rather the concepts that they express) as 
regards the interpretation of the continuity of their lives. The ancient Greeks did not 
 120 
distinguish between reasons and causes the way we do and they would not have recognised 
the significance that we often ascribe to this distinction. Their concepts of “will”, 
“freedom” and “justice” were different from ours. “Shame” played a different role in the 
lives of men. “Guilt” had a different significance during the European Middle Ages from 
what it has today. The semantic meanings of the terms which would be central in a man‟s 
or woman‟s life-story were different. But the ancient Greeks and the medieval Europeans 
had the same neural make-up as we have. If our neural system could explain the semantics 
of the terms able to hold together a life-story, it would therefore also have to explain why a 
system of meaning can function as the spinal cord of a life-story at one time, but not at 
another. This is not to say that our neural system is insignificant in explaining such 
changes. If it didn‟t have the plasticity and the adaptive capacity that it actually has, we 
would obviously be much more vulnerable to changes in our social as well as natural 
environment. But nevertheless, the reasons for the changes of the semantics of individual 
life-story building should be sought in such changes, not only in the capacity to adapt to 
them. As a result of such changes, the efforts needed to construct and maintain an 
individual life-story have slided from adaption to rigid social institutions and stereotyped 
ritual patterns of interaction to the individual‟s own imagination. 
 
One addition: One might ask whether or not words like “will”, “decision”, “belief”, “guilt” 
and so on really refer to anything. However interesting this question might be, in the 
present context it is irrelevant. The present point is just that some concepts work, that is, 
they function as central concepts in the construction of autobiographies.   
 
As opposed to our core consciousness, the maintenance of this self essentially makes use 
of culturally determined semantic meaning and conventionally established conceptions of 
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values. Our neural make-up is probably the key to the grammar we use to construct 
interpretations of events and the continuity of our personal lives. That means that the 
grammatical and categorial basis upon which we build semantic meaning goes deeper than 
the conscious construction of such meaning. Auto-biographical selves depend on the 
ability to use the formal system of consciousness to construct semantic meaning, in short 
transform the formal system of awareness into grammatical rules in the linguistic sense of 
this term. An important implication of this assumed fact is that our language has pre-
linguistic preconditions and that these are operative in our daily use of language. If we 
really accept that we are biological beings with an evolutionary history, this is hardly 
surprising. Language is a transformation of processes that already exist, and this 
transformation is made possible by the symbolic representation of these processes. The 
alternative would be to say that language is constructed according to rules and systems that 
in their origin are linguistic, that is, the evolution of language is possible on the 
presumption that language already exists. To be sure, this does not mean that language 
introduces nothing but a different way of representing ongoing processes. Language makes 
possible the construction of a new level of self-hood, the autobiographical self. Language, 
however, does much the same as what is intentionally contained in any experience, 
ascribing something to something. In addition it builds up the formal system and rules of 
such ascriptions. Such rules are used through a lifetime to ascribe experiences to one and 
the same self and to construe the connection between these experiences as a relatively 
coherent narrative. I tend to regard the self as a concept with certain conditions of 
satisfaction, one of which is that the experiences I ascribe to myself are in fact mine. That 
would mean that it is one of the conditions of satisfaction of human intentionality that there 
is in fact a self. Another condition is that the connection I conceive to be between these 
experienced events are in fact the actual connection between them, at least to some degree. 
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All this seem to imply that the possessive pronouns “mine” and “my” in a way goes deeper 
that the personal pronoun “I”. Without “my experiences” there can be no “I”, while the 
opposite is not necessarily the case. If it is not my arms and legs that I see and feel below 
my head, then it isn‟t I who is sitting here. But I don‟t believe I need to have the concept of 
my autobiographical self in order to conceive the pain in my right leg as my pain. Consider 
a situation that suddenly makes you very happy. First there is the feeling of happiness. 
There is an additional reflection needed for the conscious awareness that “this is happening 
to me”, or even more, “I am the one this is happening to”. The conditions of satisfaction 
for this last mental state are indeed more complex than for the one that identifies a pain in 
the leg as my pain. One reason for this, is that the “I am the one”-state also includes that 
this pain could be ascribed to the same self that went to a movie yesterday, who recognised 
the story of the movie as similar to one he/she had read five years ago, and so on.  
 
It is obvious that one significant feature of the consciousness that goes along with the 
autobiographical self is memory. Memory may perhaps be thought of as a sort of coded 
storing in our neural and motor system of certain events. But it can be no doubt that this is 
greatly supported by language. A single word spoken may in fact cause the release of 
neurotransmitters leading to the activation of motor- as well as perceptual memory that in 
many instances may present itself as a sort of emotional memory. Language also enables 
us to construct extensive narratives where the narrative as a whole makes the parts 
potentially present. Just consider the way you remember songs or poems. You don‟t have 
to feel that you remember every single line in a song the moment you start to sing. One 
line seems to introduce the next. Similarly, a good way to try to remember something is to 
recall the context in which you first experienced it.  It is interesting to note that Damasio 
uses the term “word-less narrative” to designate the most elementary awareness of 
 123 
something going on affecting the organism (Cf. Damasio 1999). What he seems to assume, 
is that narratives, or rather narrative structures, are more basic than language. I find this 
term and the theory at the basis of it, extremely interesting because it implies that 
elementary consciousness starts with construction of connections between events/states. 
But nevertheless, it is obvious that the verbalisation of narratives allows awareness of 
incomparably more complex narrative structures, even so complex as to integrate the 
events of a lengthy human life.  
 
I will have more to say about the connection between narratives and human emotions later.  
At present it is enough to say that human selves in their normal condition are selves of 
language-users.  
 
To conclude, human self and the sort of consciousness that is essential to it, are based upon 
a biological system that can be described as a formal system. This system can be, and is, 
transformed into linguistic rules. The human emotions depend upon this sort of self. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that at least some human emotions can be described 
as having a formal structure that is similar to the structure of these rules. The foregoing 
chapter was an attempt to show that human emotions can indeed be described as 
constructed according to such a system, and that this description is recognisable as a 
description of the phenomena we experience as human emotions. By this I mean that it 










Social Emotions and Autobiographical Selves 
In chapter 3 I tried to establish a connection between emotions and situations, hence also 
between social emotions and social situations. The essential features of this connection, as 
I described it, are: 1. Social emotions are responses to social situations in the way that they 
map them and inform the subject of her location and position on that map. They also 
inform the subject of the significance and importance of the situation and of her position in 
it. Generally, it tells her what is at stake and how. 2. Social emotions construe situations as 
being of certain kinds. 3. This is done according to paradigm examples of such situations. 
4. Such paradigms (or prototypes) are activated in what could properly be termed “the 
imagination”. 5. Paradigm situations can be represented as temporal sequences of events 
and actions, as stories or dramas. That adds a temporal dimension to the map.   
 
In chapter 4 I sketched the concept of mapping. I will now try to knit the topics from 
chapters 3 and 4 together, claiming that certain phenomena, and therefore the mapping of 
such phenomena, are of special significance in the construction and maintenance of 
autobiographical selves. 
 
This knitting together will include some clarification of the concepts “person”, 
“institution” and “narrative”. My underlying assumption is that the meaning of these 
concepts presupposes that they be constructed within a conceptual scheme which is also a 
“social-situation mapping system”. I will therefore first have to elaborate the concept of 





Emotions and Social Mapping 
The approaches of deSousa and Solomon give us an account of the structural elements of 
emotions as a potential for their propositional articulation. For Solomon this even seems to 
be more than a potential. He is in fact very explicit about his opinion of emotions as 
“judgements”. I believe that this account, however valuable it is for the understanding of 
our ability to relate rationally to our own and other‟s emotions, disregards another 
important aspect. What I have in mind is the following: The theory holding that emotions 
are organised according to categories as well as paradigm scenarios and mythologies can 
be elaborated in terms that relate emotions not so much to their potentially rational 
articulation as to their characteristic structure as mental phenomena. The categories and 
other concepts relating to the structural components of emotions can be regarded as 
dimensions of “maps” used in our orientation in our natural and social environments. A 
paradigm scenario may be regarded as a sort of emotional recurrence pattern or recurrence 
model.  
 
I have already sketched the concept of “mapping”. I will now suggest that certain 
emotions, those that I have called “social”, in fact function as part of a system mapping a 
special kind of phenomena, namely social situations. If that is right, we should expect that 
it would be possible to reduce emotional differences and nuances to different variations 
along some socially relevant basic dimensions. What would these dimensions be? As an 
approach toward this question, I will suggest the following four dimensions as a tentative 
answer: Object, Self, Action and Value. This answer is however problematic in certain 
respects. First of all, it is given from a phenomenological perspective. It is therefore a kind 
of top-down approach, initially devoid of empirical support as to its neural basis. It will 
therefore rely on the possibility of finding something on a lower level to sustain it. Its 
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rationale is simply that it seems to cover basic dimensions of our conscious emotional 
experiences. Second, taken as mapping dimensions they differ from dimensions of, say, 
colour maps or taste maps in that they are more complex or composite. The social features 
of a situation are not directly accessible to any sensory modality. The social character of 
phenomena related to one dimension depends on its relations also to the other dimensions. 
An object cannot, for instance, be seen as “social” isolated from its relation to the self-, 
value- and action determinants, and correspondingly with phenomena related to the other 
dimensions. The dimensions, therefore, cannot be based on sensation alone, but must relate 
to something else. If Damasio is right in his assumption that there is a kind of second-order 
neural system as described, it is tempting to think of the dimensions of our social map as in 
some way related to this system. This system, as we recall, produces representations of the 
relationship between the external environment and bodily events and, according to 
Damasio, it is the system in which the affective modalities originate. Such representations 
occur as elementary narratives or categories. What I suggest, is that the system sustaining 
social mapping may be regarded as a third-order system, relating to the second-order 
system. Its input units are the packages “external objects-bodily responses-affective 
modes-self". These, I suggest, are re-evaluated in light of their relevance to the inter-
personal (social) sphere in such a way that they are re-interpreted as to signify social 
situations and systems. This re-evaluation or re-interpretation transforms the response-
factor into an action-dimension, the affect-mode into a value-dimension, the object-factor 
into a symbol related to inter-personal inter-action or hierarchy-systems and the core self 
into a kind of self-interpreting and self-constructing unit. 
 
The radar metaphor that could be taken to be a connotation of the term “navigation” as 
used in this book indicates that navigational aspect of social emotions work through some 
 127 
kind of projection-reflection system. Let‟s try to elaborate this and see if it might hit some 
essential features of the workings of social emotions. We have, as mentioned, the four 
constituent elements of the core-self, representations of external objects, bodily responses, 
affective modes and self. Imagine now that we project each element unto our social 
environment in such a way that each projection hits certain kinds of features in this 
environment. Imagine then that these projections are reflected back to us. How are they 
then received, having thus been reflected through this social mirror? Now, I do realise that 
I can‟t give any demonstrative arguments on this topic. All I can do is to make a suggestion 
that is meant to appeal to the phenomenology of social experience and ask the reader to 
consider if this model might illuminate some of the structures behind our experience of 
certain situations as social. The suggested model for a social navigation system is this 
(where the right-directed arrows represent the projection-element, while the left-directed 





    
An essential feature of a possible system of social mapping would be that it relates to 
phenomena as relatively durable and stable. If it is correct, as Damasio assumes, that the 
core-self has a kind of momentary existence, monitoring what goes on from moment to 
moment, it would therefore be insufficient. I will later claim that such relative permanence 
or durability is, in part upheld by institutions and narratives. 
 
To summarise: I have suggested a possible mapping system representing certain 
dimensions to which we are emotionally sensitive, dimensions which at the same time 
represent features which are relevant for conceiving a situation as “social”. I am here 
suggesting a possible overlapping between an emotional and a social space-map. This 
theory of “double mapping” is obviously founded on the idea that the identification of 
situations as social ones is connected with certain kinds of emotional responses to such 
situations.  
 
Now to the paradigm/recurrence-factor. “Recurrence” shall in this context refer to the sort 
of feedback mechanism which is known to be operative in all perceptual systems. The 
essence of this component in such systems is that the incoming information at an early 
stage (the bottom-level) is selected and shaped according to patterns and structures which 
have already passed through that stage, and are fed back. What we see at one moment is 
for instance selected and shaped by what we have formerly seen. Initially this process is 
performed by our neural network and therefore does not depend on conscious 
interpretation. It may be thought of as an elementary form of memory shaping new 
perceptions on a pre-conscious level. What I am getting at here is that paradigm scenarios 
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may be carriers of emotional memory, structuring emotionally relevant information 
according to certain stereotypical situations, and giving emotional memory transfer-value. 
If this is so, paradigms pick out something as, say envy, admiration or hatred in a chaos of 
emotionally relevant information. Let‟s consider a situation where we experience a set of 
emotionally relevant information with a profile we have never before experienced. After 
all, if the vectored category-model is correct (or, to be more accurate, have representational 
value), this would probably happen all the time. The prototype pattern recurrence model 
allows us to understand how this does not result in emotional chaos. For a set of 
emotionally relevant information to be experienced as an emotion of a certain kind, it must 
be organised according to a prototype pattern, a paradigm. Such patterns fill out what is 
missing and adjust atypical features of a situation. Prototype patterns work in virtue of two 
features. First, and fairly obvious, they establish distinctions between situation-types. In 
addition I believe that they are based on a semantic system. The first feature provides 
something that is essential to any semantic system, a system of meaning-discrimination. In 
addition to that I believe that for a pattern to become established as a prototype emotion-
pattern, the meaning discriminated must also have some sort of significance, it must 
exemplify a situation-type that for some reason or other is taken to be important. They 
must, in short be instances of experiences of some importance in the lives of those who 
have them, small or large dramas where something is at stake. 
 
To summarise: I suggest that the relationship between emotions and prototype patterns 
(paradigms) works through a combination of two levels. One concerns categorisation and 
discrimination, the other concerns the significance of the units thus 
categorised/discriminated. The first gives the logic or grammar of emotional experience, 
the second transforms the units into a sort of signals for appropriate responses, value-
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reactions, action-strategies, adequacy in relation to antecedent events and so on. This is 
done by placing the discriminated emotions in a context of typical (and proper/improper) 
action-systems, social institutions and cultural codes. Such contextualisations transform the 
discriminate entities into semantic-like entities and are therefore probably the contribution 
to the evolutionary history of emotions which is distinctively human (given that humans 
are the only species with a semantically based communication-system).  
 
Persons, Institutions and Narratives 
I have suggested an overlapping between the mapping of social emotions and social 
situations. What kinds of connections are there between these two mapped “landscapes”, 
the “mindscape” and the “socioscape”? This question can be raised on the 
phenomenological as well as on the neural level. An attempt to give an answer on the 
phenomenological level would have to look for experiences, which in an essential way 
involve both phenomena, experience of subjectivity as well as of sociability. I believe that 
the concept of a “person” signifies such an experience-type. A person is a self that is 
defined or experienced in relation to its social context, which in turn is determined by its 
inter-personal relevance. I also assume that an autobiographical self is built around the 
concept of “a person”, and that person-hood is developed on the basis of the type of 
configuration mentioned. Person-hood is a phenomenon that relies strongly on the 
symbolic power of certain emotion-objects, that is, the ability of such objects to signify 
aspects of the identity of the person whose emotion-object it is. Here are my guideline 
assumptions concerning that symbolism: 1. The relevant emotion-objects symbolise the 
person in a possessive mode. I will explicate this below. 2. The stories supporting such 
emotional configuration are conceived as more or less extensive parts of the biography of 
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the person in question, in the sense that she comes to identify herself with them, 
conceiving of them as parts of her life-story. 
 
Thinking of oneself as a person, not only an organism, involves conceiving oneself as a 
possessor of certain things. Another way to put this is to say that it involves the ability to 
develop the sort of consciousness that is expressed in terms connected with the possessive 
pronoun. Among those things that in modern western cultures are considered most 
inseparable from the person are rights, experiences, the body and certain events like birth 
and death, all connected with the person through a very existential meaning of the 
possessive pronoun. “My birth”, “my death” and other important or essential events to 
which that pronoun can be connected, signifies “me” in such a way that without it, there is 
no “me”. The “my/mine” keeps up the borders between me and them. The things, which 
are “mine”, are parts of my person in a certain way, as far as violations of these things, to a 
greater or lesser extent, are violations of my person. Many of the connections between a 
“my” and some term should be interpreted as moral or legal claims, others as claims of 
accountability (my actions, my promise, my opinion). The important things to emphasise 
are that the concept of  “person” is a way to maintain borders, and that such border-
keeping is, to a large extent, articulated in moral and legal terms. It is also articulated in 
epistemic and existentialist terms, “my knowledge”, “my opinion”, “my experience”, “my 
life”. These terms, as person-deliminating terms, serve an appropriating function. 
 
If we as individuals are to think of ourselves as one rather than two, three, fifty or hundred 
persons (each with its own borders), there must be some sort of connection between the “I” 
who claims ownership of this house, the “I” who admits responsibility for this action, the 
“I” who has experienced the death of her parents etc. There is probably a natural 
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connection between the subjects of different experiences as long as we talk about direct 
bodily encounters with the environment. The I on whom this wound was inflicted is the 
same as the one whose wound is now healing. The I who experienced a burning of his arm, 
is the same I that now spontaneously withdraws from a hot object. But when it comes to 
experiences mediated by symbolic code-systems like events embodying social norms or 
institutions, the case is not so straightforward. The continuity of the I must in such cases be 
maintained by a stable pattern of symbol-decoding. Neither is there much, when it comes 
to more than objects that bear direct impact on the bodily survival, in the individual‟s 
organism that let us determine what should be counted as essential to the person and what 
should be regarded as more accidental. There are even no natural phenomena to discover, 
which would tell us how close to the person various things should be regarded to be, to be 
regarded as relevant to her person-hood. During the European Renaissance the individual‟s 
capability to distinguish between true and false statements came to be regarded as part of 
his or her person-hood. There had been a time when the Roman Catholic Church had been 
entrusted that task. Similar things could be said with regard to private property, moral 
decisions, personal opinions and so on. In the eighteenth century, Jean Jacques Rousseau 
describes a culture that is felt as a threat to the individual‟s possibility to experience its life 
as its own. A century later, Søren Kierkegaard and John Stuart Mill describe the same. 
There arises a feeling that there is a dimension of authenticity to individual life and that 
this requires a unified person that is in possession of all important aspects of her own life. 
As a brief aside, I will mention that I consider the autenthicity-ideal (Cf. Taylor, 1991) to 
be distinguished from other ideals of person-hood basically by the kinds of connections 
that it takes to be essential for the person‟s identity. Connections to things that 
involuntarily can be lost are insignificant. The autenthicity-ideal can therefore be regarded 
as a sort of neo-stoicism. There is however no need here to go further into this. The main 
 133 
point is that the requirements for person-hood are historical and cultural variable and so is 
the kind of complexity that must be united into one single biography.  
 
A few words about the concept of “identity” as applied to “persons”. It is not like we 
should first make up our mind about the meaning of “identity” and then apply this meaning 
in an adjective way to the meaning of “person”. The meaning of “identity” in this context 
is rather specific to the meaning of “person”. Applied to the organism it would mean 
something like keeping up the borders between the organism and its external environment, 
the maintenance of the internal homeostasis and the establishing and strengthening of 
neural patterns facilitating individual adaption (memory). Identity of the organism in the 
sense mentioned is certainly prerequisite to the identity of the person, but only as a sine 
qua non. In the identity of the person something is added. It must be sustained by 
conceptual edifices that establish relations between elements that would otherwise be 
unrelated. Such relations depend on the semantics of these edifices. It must also be 
sustained by certain formalised patterns of human action and interaction. I will call such 
patterns “institutions”. And finally, these factors must be supported by various kinds of 
emotional prototyped configurations. 
 
The concept of “the person”, as I have treated it, comes very close to the notion of “the 
moral self” as this has emerged through a philosophical tradition counting, among others, 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant. The person should therefore, in some way or other, be 
conceptualised in moral terms. Such conceptualisation should also include some 
conception of how these terms relate to each other in the determination of person-hood and 
the individualisation of single persons. This notion, or rather our notion of our moral 
selves, has been extensively investigated and analysed be Charles Taylor (Taylor, 1989). I 
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mention this because I believe that in his exposure we can find, maybe unexpected, support 
for the space-map concept and the concept of navigation (or orientation) employed earlier.  
 
Taylor assumes that our moral identity is established in relation to “strong evaluations”. 
Such evaluations relate to three different dimensions that together make the framework of 
our moral identity. He calls this our “moral space” and baptises its dimensions; “the good 
life”, “honour” and “respect”. Taylor thinks of these as dimensions of a map used partly 
for knowledge of the “moral” landscape and partly to identify one‟s own location. Taking 
his words literally, it doesn‟t seem improper to represent the moral space as three-
dimensional spaces are often represented:  
 
To be sure, the map-space-orientation metaphors are basic in Taylor‟s theory, and he 
makes coherent use of them. He says that there is an “essential link between identity and a 
kind of orientation” and “(t)o know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand”. 
(Taylor, 1989. p 26-7). Taylor‟s view seems to be that any possible “self” could be 
represented as a location within such a three-dimensional  “moral space”.  
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Taylor may be right or wrong in his identification of the dimensions of moral space. His 
account may also be incomplete. However that may be, I find the space-map approach 
itself valuable. First it maps a kind of moral landscape in which we orient ourselves. 
Second, it provides us with a conceptual tool to understand a certain aspect of identity, the 
“who am I” aspect. Translated into the map/space-metaphor it would be “where am I”. If 
what I have formerly said is correct, then the key to the understanding of the connection 
between “who” and “where” should be found in the subjective experience of being on a 
certain “location”. An identity-problem should, according to this methodological approach, 
be regarded as a kind of dislocation. Maybe it is also possible to read another identity-
aspect out of Taylor‟s approach, the one concerning identity as sameness over time. If so, it 
would be because the three dimensions could be taken as a framework, not only for moral 
orientation, but also for construction of life-stories, the basic determinants of the topics of 
such stories. Since a life-story shouldn‟t be imagined as a stand-still on a certain point, he 
stories would have to make the patterns of movement between different points intelligible. 
 
Taylor‟s approach has of course nothing to do with neural networks. It is cast strictly 
within a phenomenological mould. It would seem far-fetched to think of the three 
dimensions of the moral space as three separate neural pathways. It has no reference to the 
neural system whatsoever. Nevertheless it is formulated within the logical structure of an 
organism mapping its environment as part of its orientation and navigation in this 
environment. It is essentially the logic of organisms being located in a space relative to 
various types of phenomena and objects among which it has to navigate. The three 
dimensions make this orientation a kind of triangulation. Knowing your position relative to 
three co-ordinates will of course give you the exact, absolute as well as relative position of 
yourself and other objects in a three dimensional space. And this is in fact the one and only 
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point of the formal construction of a space through co-ordinates. So, even if it has no 
reference to neural systems, it is hard to see how it could describe the situations of beings 
other than organisms with such a system. 
 
My notion of the identity of the person, as I have treated it, is a notion of something that is 
not given in the organism. It must therefore, in some way, be created.  I believe that there 
are two phenomena whose functions deserve special attention here, institutions and 
narratives. Both can be regarded as kinds of prototypes. Institutions obviously serve to 
stabilise the conditions of action, and to some extent they do this in their capacity of 
functioning as formal prototypes of certain interaction-forms. Narratives serve to create 
some meaningful connection between the different events that makes up the experiences of 
an individual human life.  
 
I will not try to give any comprehensive account of institutions. I will only focus on certain 
features that are relevant for the inter-dependency between social emotions and inter-
personal situations. Institutions may be regarded as formalised inter-personal situations. 
Institutions like schools, families, hospitals, governmental organisations contractual 
relations etc are all structures that to a certain degree define, for the agents, what kind of 
situation they are in. They are a kind of formalised and standardised situations. They set 
prototype forms to be filled. The prototype forms can be specified as the rules that should 
govern interpersonal interaction within the various institutions. My assumptions are, first, 
that we, as we become participants in institutions, also develop corresponding emotions 
which are also, in some sense, formalised, second, we participate in institutions as 
“persons”. I believe that David Hume makes a correct observation saying that we often 
confuse such emotions, which he calls “calm passions”, with reason, which he takes to be a 
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kind of value-free theoretical insight. I am however uncertain as to the question whether or 
not we have a capacity for such a kind of value-free pure theoretical insight. Actually I 
suspect that “reason” is in fact a kind of “calm passion”. The reason for this suspicion is 
that “rationality”, like emotions, can be regarded as a response-modal to situations in 
which we are in some way engaged. This similarity between rationality and emotions can 
be regarded as more basic than the differences in response-style. Regarding the conception 
of rationality as a response-modal to situations, I will make the following assumptions:  
1. Some kinds of responses to social situations can be called rational.  
 
2. These responses relate to, and map, other situation-features than do responses we 
conceive of as emotionally relevant. Responses of that kind are responses to certain general 
(and maybe formal) features of situations. 
  
3. There is a link between institutions, or the institutional aspect of situations, and the kind 
of responses that could be conceived as rational.  
 
Our ability to construe or describe situations is, according to the theory I have defended, an 
important determinant of our emotional life. The development of that ability is therefore an 
important aspect of our emotional development. Now, rationality can also be regarded as a 
type of situation-construal and -response. Taken in itself, these claims seem to be rather 
obvious and trivial. I believe, however, that they have at least one possible implication not 
quite so obvious and trivial: It seems to follow that the difference between emotions and 
rationality, as related to the topic at hand, is a difference of types of situation-features to 
which we respond. There is, in short, a different story behind a rational response than 
behind a “hotter” emotional one. But that shouldn‟t blur the basic similarity and 
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evolutionary continuity between them, both being kinds of situation-responses. The life-
forms which enable us to respond rationally to situations are those structured according to 
formalised types of social encounters and inter-action. 
 
For institutions to function as stabilisers in a human individual‟s life, this human must in 
some way be attached to, and engaged in, these institutions, that is, she must be able to 
respond to institutionalised situations in light of some relatively highly formalised 
prototype paradigm. Any felt forms of engagements and attachments should be considered 
an emotional response to the situation or object towards which the engagement or 
attachment is felt. The bottom-line of these considerations is that rational responses to 




Now to narratives: By “narrative” I here mean a chaining together of events in such a way 
as to make the sequence intelligible, recognisable, significant or meaningful in some way 
and also make the parts significant in light of the sequence in which they partake. My 
remarks on narratives will be even more narrow-focused than those on institutions. Their 
purpose will merely be to sketch the idea that there is a concept of narratives that relates to 
autobiographical selves, and that such narratives construe these selves as persons. My 
remarks on narratives are therefore relevant only as related to the autobiography of 
persons.  
 
The narrative that is my autobiography shall make it intelligible how the links in a chain of 
events are “mine”, not other people‟s. That means that they must be conceived in some 
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possessive modality that excludes other possessors than me. One way to do this is to give 
some non-replaceable emotion-objects a privileged status in my life-story. I will return to 
this in the next chapter. When we “interpret” ourselves, be it as we act in single episodes or 
our lives as a whole, we create narratives. According to Damasio even the simplest core 
consciousness shows an elementary narrative structure. Core consciousness is constantly 
engaged in a sort of story-construction, whose elements are significant events in the 
environment, such events in the organism itself and categories that connect these two 
chains. The autobiographical consciousness depends on the ability to construct a far more 
complex story, one that can bring together the external and internal chains of events of a 
lifetime, chains that at each moment of life also includes projections of the future. 
Typically, this is done, not only in terms of causes and effects, but also in terms of culture 
and morals. Culture and moral, because the my/mine connections very often cannot be 
conceived as purely natural. Now, such terms might be inadequate in some way, they 
might simply get things wrong, they may have no other reference than they construe 
themselves, they may, as Marx says, in fact be made to obscure some facts. They may also, 
as Max Weber suggests, be made to create some comforting meaning in an objectively 
meaningless world. Nevertheless, the fact that we construct narratives remains, and the 
narratives form some of the structure of the understanding that we, rightly or wrongly, 
have of ourselves. If there would be no autobiographical self without such story-
construction, then the study of narratives will tell us something important, or even essential 
about human self-hood, at least as it is under social and cultural conditions similar to our 
own.  
 
So far I have said the following about the more highly developed human emotions: They 
can be articulated in accordance with a certain category-scheme (or basic grammar). They 
 140 
are connected to certain paradigmatic scenes or myths. They map social situations, are 
conceived as parts of social situations, responses to social situations, as, at least potentially, 
exposed in such situations and adjusted in accordance with the conception of such 
situations. This implies that, as conceptualised, they are already structured so as to fit into 
certain types of social situations. And they very often do that in one out of two ways: They 
either express the distinction between me and what is mine and, on the other hand, others, 
or they counteract destructive consequences of this distinction, such as loneliness, 
helplessness and isolation. This does not imply that nature has been so kind as to give us a 
standardised emotional repertoire to meet all kinds of social situations. More likely it 
means that our emotional development takes place in interaction with our social and 
cultural experience.  
 
There is a striking similarity between life-story construction and social emotions, so 
striking that it is tempting to regard life-story construction as a kind of emotionally 
relevant prototype situation-application on a larger scale. Both are based on underlying 
paradigm dramatic stories. And both take these stories to have some important 
significance, they exemplify something of more than ordinary importance. 
 
These features of our emotions should lead us to conceive of them, at least the highly 
developed symbol-based ones, as sequential rather than static or substantial phenomena. 
By this I mean that emotions should be viewed as forms of our awareness of ourselves as 
partakers in various forms of interaction-sequences and lasting interaction-schemes. These 
human emotions are therefore not only to be taken as instantaneous affections or feelings, 
but rather as phenomena that in a way represent the structural continuity between the 
experienced past, the present and the anticipated future. I am suggesting that the ability to 
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conceive social situations in light of prototypes, and the ability to construct life-stories, are 
stages along a common line of development. Our ability to view ourselves from the 
perspective of a life-story is, according to this, developed from our ability to identify social 
situations. In a way similar to the one in which we apply prototypes to situations, we also 
learn to apply prototype stories of what an individual relatively coherent and meaningful 
individual life is like.  
 
What I am getting at here, is that there is a certain emotional repertoire that enables us to 
maintain our person-hood through a variety of social encounters, and that the construction 
of this repertoire takes place in cultural and moral terms, because these are the sort of 
terms that define such encounters and situations and define the personal roles for the 
agents. These encounters are, in turn, related to each other as incidents in a more or less 
coherent life-story.  
 
I believe it is important to stress the “more or less” aspect here. Persons are complex 
beings and are normally not capable of explaining some logical connection between all 
their actions and experiences. Owen Flanagan (Flanagan: 1991) points to the discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, the philosophical conception of a moral person as a being whose 
actions in all spheres of life are guided and determined by the same basic principles, and, 
on the other hand, our common-life based conception that allows of considerable 
inconsistency and multitude of action-forms. The first kind of concept comes close to a 
concept of “a saint” rather than of a “person”.   
  
What we call memory obviously plays a central role in maintaining autobiographical 
selves. Whatever memory may be, it implies that something past influences the present. 
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Memories are not only past experiences as passively present. They have active impact on 
the present and the way we project and prepare for future actions and events. This is done 
in various ways. One of these concerns the emotional continuity of our selves. Here we can 
see the significance of our emotional paradigms. Human emotions must have some sort of 
transfer value, or else they could not contribute to the maintenance of our autobiographical 
coherence.   
 
The transfer value of past experience involves a bi-lateral relation between the past and the 
present. Not only is the present interpreted in light of past experiences, but also the past is 
continuously reinterpreted and re-evaluated.  
 
I believe that the concept of “recurrence” may be utilised also to understand the function of 
narratives in constructing and maintaining a life-story. I have spoken of paradigms as 
recurrent forms. Now, narratives may also be regarded as recurrent patterns, organised in 
certain sequential ways, in a person‟s life. Certainly there is no contradiction between 
recurrence and variety as long as the variety can be interpreted within a recurrent scheme. 
What I am saying is that narratives function as such recurrent enlarged schemes. These 
schemes are obviously dynamic and sequential, rather than static. Such sequential forms 
may follow different types of logic in different persons. They may for instance be 
homeostatic or morphogenetic. In the first case they will tend to confirm and stabilise the 
harmony of different significant elements in a person‟s life. In the second, they will 
contribute to the interpretation of the dynamics in a life-story as a continuous renewal.  
 
What is the relationship between recurrent emotional prototypes and life-story narratives? 
After all, recurrence itself is no more than mere repetition, which seems insufficient to 
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sustain a narrative. A possible answer might be this: Recurrent emotional prototypes can 
develop into parts of a life-story because such prototypes are changed during the 
recurrence-process. The prototypes themselves therefore come to get a history, the history 
of their application under different circumstances and continuous adjustment according to 
these. This answer would be consistent with a very common experience. Most of us have 
probably experienced that the way we are affected by emotions like envy, jealousy, 
humility, ambition, etc. changes over time, even if we can recognise such emotions in the 
changed feel of them. Thus, what I am saying is that these emotions themselves have a 
history which comes to be part of the life-stories of the persons who have them. I take it 
that the history, or rather histories, of an individual‟s emotional prototypes is what creates 
her personality. A personality cannot be defined in terms of emotional states or particular 
emotional experiences. On the other hand, it seems very reasonable to define it (at least 
partly) in terms of emotional dispositions. We talk about angry, happy and jealous people. 
Now, angry people are not angry all the time. Happy people are not happy all the time, nor 
are jealous people jealous all the time. When we still call people angry, happy or jealous, 
we are talking about their tendencies to activate certain kinds of emotional prototypes and 
to suppress other. The history of an angry man‟s prototype for anger is different than a 
happy man‟s history for the same prototype. It has, among other things, a broader 
application. This might possibly account for the differences in personality between the 
two. 
 
I have assumed that there is a connection between certain emotions and certain situations. I 
have also assumed that some situations obtain paradigmatic status and serve as proto-
typical forms signifying the corresponding emotions. I am now saying that such situations 
can be enlarged so as to signify a life-story. Life-story situations are more open than 
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single-emotion situations, they have a larger sequential potential. Now, here comes a 
hypothesis: To these enlarged situations, the life-story narratives, correspond certain 
emotions or emotional structures that could similarly be regarded as enlarged. I take these 
“enlarged emotions” to be the feelings of the experience of having applied the emotional 
prototypes over time in a variety of situations. The emotional experiences themselves 
become objects of what might be called “higher order emotions”. Among those feelings are 
the ones we often term “moral”. By “moral feelings” I mean the feelings that are associated 
with the character-traits that are usually considered morally good, like kindness, honesty, 
generosity, courage, mercy and so on. The reason why I call them “feelings” is that they 
are also learned through paradigm scenarios which come to be accepted as models of 
prototypes which should be activated as responses to as many situations as possible, 
prototypes that are to suppress alternative, not so desirable, response-types. Hence, they 
instantiate topics around which a life-story should be constructed. The paradigm scenarios 
in question are stories rather than isolated scenes. The story of “The Good Samaritan” 
might serve as an example. In a prototype way the story instantiates, not only a certain kind 
of action and feeling, but also a certain kind of person. Most of us know other stories that 
give prototypes of the courageous person, the generous person, the person who never gives 
up and so on.  
 
Now, no one, or at any rate, very few of us, is such a person through and through. Hence, if 
this is what it is to be a person, it seems to follow that there are in fact very few of them. 
To phrase this as a slightly weaker claim: Each of us would not be one, but many persons! 
In fact, I believe that this is true in a certain sense. Our character-traits are to some extent 
situation-relative. Certainly there are truth-conditions according to which the sentence “I 
am not the same person as I was 20 years ago”, is true. On the other hand, there are also 
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truth-conditions according to which it is false. In forensic contexts it would, in most cases, 
be false. And even if I consider my present personal identity, the “who I am now”, it would 
not be unconditionally true. Were it to be true, this would obviously contradict the 
individualising function that I have ascribed to the concept of person-hood. We shall 
therefore have to look for something that serves to individualise persons in their own 






Replaceable and non-replaceable Emotion-Objects 




I have tried to establish a connection between autobiographical selves mapping their social 
surroundings through some kind of emotional system that can be made accessible to 
rational reflective awareness by the emotists themselves. Does that mean that all aspects of 
human social emotions are rational in the sense which links “rationality” to “universality”? 
The occasion to raise this question is given by my assumption that the concept of “a 
person” serves an individualising and border-drawing function and that our personhood 
depends on a certain emotional development. It might seem that this is at odds with a 
conception of emotional development as an increasing rational reflection on our emotional 
states, at least if rationality is equated with universality. I am now going to discuss this by 
approaching the following question: Are some human emotions uniquely tied up to certain 
particulars in such a way that they cannot be transferred to other objects? If so, would this 
mean that such emotions were irrational? If we were to answer yes to the last question, the 
reason might be that we usually (and correctly) associate rationality with some form of 
universality. It is obvious that universality is also often relevant in the assessment of the 
rationality of emotions. If I am proud to be rich, I might rationalise the pride by saying that 
everyone who is as rich as I am (everything else equal) would have the same reason to be 
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proud. In fact I might feel insulted if they were not, taking this to be an insinuation of my 
pride be irrational. 
 
Before proceeding on the question of the replaceability of emotion-objects, we should 
distinguish between posing the question in the context of first-person experience and third-
person description. In a third-person context any emotion-object is in a sense replaceable. 
If not, it would be impossible to say anything general at all about such emotions. The 
problem we are dealing with here is whether or not emotions that in first-persons are 
experienced as having irreplaceable objects are always at odds with rationality-criteria. 
 
The universality that is often ascribed to rationality can be expressed through a 
formalisation-procedure. We may e.g. formalise a proposition expressing/describing an 
emotion and say that such an articulate expression will be a good reason for the emotion if 
and only if it will still be the same good reason when we, certain conditions given, 
substitute certain words within the form with other words. If there are good reasons for A 
to be proud to be the owner of x because x has the property y, then the same ought to be 
the case with B if he were to be substituted with A. With certain reservations, A would 
have the same reasons to be proud if he was the owner of z, if z also had the property y or a 
property with a value equal to the value of y. Similar things could be said if C was 
shameful because of r, and so on. If fear is an adequate reaction when I believe that a lion 
is waiting around the next corner, it would still be adequate if it is really not a lion, but a 
crocodile. The reason is, of course, that they are equally dangerous. If it turned out to be a 
mouse, hanging on to the fear would be irrational. 
 
 148 
But does this hold for emotions in general? Would any emotion that cannot stand such a 
substitution-test be irrational? What about erotic love? If I love her, should I mean that 
every other man ought to do the same? And should I love every other woman who has 
the same properties just as much? It seems that Plato would answer yes to all these 
questions. As I have mentioned above this could be a conclusion of the argument in the 
Symposion. In fact Plato goes even further and tells us that love ought to change 
direction from the first-order object towards the formal object (the object‟s eidos), 
which, according to him, has a separate existence independent of the first-order object. 
It is reasonable to take Plato to conceive of this as a development towards greater 
rationality. 
 
Two things seem here to be in conflict. First, any emotion, no matter how unique and 
irreplaceable it is to the subject who has it, has a formal structure which it shares with other 
emotions and other people's emotions. Secondly, individuals often experience objects as if 
they express the uniqueness of the emotion-object. One dimension in this conflict is, of 
course, grounded in the difference between the first and the third-person perspective.  
 
Now, this situation characterises not only the perception of emotions. I may say that the 
anatomy of my body is the same as the anatomy of other people's bodies, and it is still not 
irrational to mean that my body has a unique and non-replaceable place in my life. Our 
physical existence as well as our conception of self is essentially based on the fact that 
each of us is a unique particular. But maybe the analogy isn‟t as good as it might seem. We 
may experience emotions of attachment to things exterior to ourselves as irreplaceable, in 
spite of the fact that they may go away while we stay. It might be our children or parents. 
The body can obviously not disappear leaving us behind. Nevertheless I believe one aspect 
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of the analogy to be illuminating. This has to do with what it is that creates our sense of 
individuality. I will return to this below. 
 
DeSousa has a lengthy discussion of a Greek myth, illustrating the problem at hand. The 
myth goes like this: Alkmene loves her husband Amfitryon. The problem is that Zeus falls 
in love with Alkmene, and one night, while Amfitryon is away, he disguises himself as her 
husband and goes to bed with her. Later Alkmene finds out. and feels angry and insulted. 
Has she any good reasons to feel this way? After all there was no conceivable difference 
between the man she loved and the man she had slept with. He had the same properties and 
the same ways of responding to her. If she loved his qualities or properties, she had got 
exactly these. Nevertheless, some of us probably feel that she has good reason for her hurt 
feelings. After all she had been cheated. It wasn't the man that she thought it was, but 
another who had the same properties. But is Amfitryon more than the sum of his properties 
and his ways of responding to things? Even so, Alkmene has been fooled, and one of the 
reasons is that her emotion, in this case, had an irreplaceable object. 
 
What sort of problem is raised by this case? The question is not whether or not Alkmene 
ought to feel insulted, but whether or not she has reasons to feel this way. It isn‟t hard to 
imagine that the episode might be a rather good experience. After all you don't go to bed 
with gods (or goddesses) every day. Let's equate the following two assertions;  
1. She has a reason to feel insulted.  
2. Anyone else would have a reason to feel insulted in an equivalent situation. 
In that case I believe that we are making the mistake of confusing particulars with 
universals. The starting-point of our problem was that Alkmene in fact felt insulted, not 
whether or not any rational person in such a situation should feel insulted. The rationality 
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in her emotions cannot, or should not, be put to a universalising-test. Rather it should be 
assessed on the basis of the intentional content in her way of acting. 
 
One more myth, now from the Old Testament, and, seemingly, with a different morale. 
The Lord wants to put Job to a test, and as a part of the test he sends a desert-storm that 
kills Job‟s seven sons. After operation desert-storm has been terminated and Job has passed 
the tests, the Lord makes things up to Job. He gives Job seven new sons (and even three 
daughters – probably interest). The end of the story is that Job dies 140 years old. A good 
life has come to an end. The Lord has put things even; Job has no reasons to complain. Is 
this a story of paternal love with replaceable objects? In that case one might well ask if it is 
emotionally credible. What about the dead seven? Maybe the story isn‟t about this at all. 
Maybe it tells us that there is only one irreplaceable object of love, God.  
 
In that case the morale would find support in the writings of St. Augustine. He can be read 
so as to mean that mundane earthly love has replaceable objects. There is a demand that 
“thou shalt love thy neighbour”. Are we to abide, we would of course need to know who 
that is. Augustine‟s answer is that it is everyone, and that this implies that we should love 
everyone as much as anyone else (De Doctrina Christiana Ch. I). That does not mean that 
we shall do the same for everyone, or help everyone, but the only reason for this is that this 
is impossible. His basic point seems to be that love is real only when its particular object is 
in a way indifferent, which means that it is replaceable. Every object of real love is in 
reality a stand-in for God. This might perhaps seem as a possible description of justice, but 
to Augustine it is, strangely enough, a description of love. I do not mention this only to 
exhibit a philosophical relict. In fact I believe that the Augustinian conception has had 
deep impact on western thought-models. In my opinion Augustine confuses the 
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significance of closeness and distance. The significance of closeness is underrated in areas 
where closeness is important and it is overrated in areas where it is improper. If this is 
correct, moral philosophers stressing the importance of closeness in all human relations as 
well as value-bureaucrats, are both carriers of the Augustinian legacy. I believe that the 
core of the Augustinian strategy of generalising emotion-objects is to create a public 
sphere were emotional conflicts are neutralised or rather delegitimised, but where authority 
still is founded on the basis of emotional support. Augustine is therefore an important 
source in the construction of a public sphere uniting neutrality, rationality and emotional 
cooling. 
 
Let‟s put historical differences aside and look at Alkmene and Job as our contemporaries, 
modern people with modern emotions. Is Job‟s love more rational than Alkmene‟s? 
Maybe, but if so, I suspect that we should assent to all the following three sentences: 
1. We ought to be rational. 
2. There may be a conflict between emotion e and the criteria for rationality. 
3. Emotion e ought not to be adjusted according to these criteria. 
 
There are two interesting questions involved here. The first is: What is the function of 
emotions having non-replaceable objects? The second is: What would be the consequences 
of confusing replaceable with non-replaceable emotion-objects? 
 
As to the first: I believe that emotions with non-replaceable objects have to do with certain 
preconditions for human rationality. To be more precise, they are important in the 
formation of our sense of individuality or self. They are in other words parts of the process 
in which we create an individual personal identity, i.e. they serve to draw borders between 
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my self and other selves. Generally I find it useful to relate the word “identity” as used in 
the term “personal identity” to “identification” and “identifying”. What we call “personal 
identity” is formed in a process where we identify ourselves with different things. Some of 
these identification-objects are conceived as unique to us, as non-replaceable. If that were 
not the case, the alternative would be to identify oneself with the formal structure of the 
emotional relation between subjects and emotion-objects, not with the substantial 
characteristics of the object. This alternative would imply that developing personal identity 
would presuppose that we were already rational, rather than that the development of 
rationality presupposes subjects with personal identity. What I am saying is simply that 
part of the way in which we are individualised is by identifying ourselves emotionally with 
things that we conceive as unique to ourselves. How else could we hold our own biography 
apart from that of other people? Now, many things are unique to every single one of us. I 
am the only person in the history of the world who occupied seat 29 A on the plane that 
left Tromsø September 8 1998 on flight SK 376. I believe that very few people would 
consider this unique position to be a basis for what we conceive of as personal identity and 
far less rational individuality. On the other hand, in any culture, at least one slightly similar 
to our own, there are certain other criteria of individuality or individualisation. It might be 
that someone is the oldest son of certain parents, that he or she has written a certain book 
or scored the decisive goal in the WC. It might well be the case that there are no universal 
criteria across time and culture. But in any culture consisting of individuals who conceive 
of themselves as human individuals, there must be some criteria. In a paper, written as a 
comment on Hume‟s Treatise, Donald Ainslie calls such criteria “existential connections”. 
I believe that it is important to realise that the relevant differences between existential and 
non-existential connections are identified as emotional differences. And emotional 
involvement in existential connections is experienced as relations to non-replaceable 
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objects. I might add two things: First, I take this to support what I have formerly said about 
the semantic that is necessary to support the maintenance of autobiographical selves. 
Second, if we correctly describe some human emotions as attachments to non-replaceable 
objects, we are probably not describing the human mental system as it must necessarily be. 
At most we are giving a phenomenological description of the way the sense of person-hood 
is developed in cultures similar to our own and hence, how autobiographical awareness is 
established in such cultures.  
 
If we are specific enough when we classify emotions, there are in fact certain emotional 
attachments that have non-replaceable objects (as there are attachments that only seem to 
have such objects). In the Antigone, Sophocles describes a situation of this type. In spite of 
the King‟s prohibition, Antigone buries her dead brother under the prospect of being put to 
death herself. For her the decision to do this is an existential decision in the sense that it 
cannot be avoided without jeopardising her identity as a particular individual or, more 
accurately, as the particular individual she wants to be. “Had I lost my child, and were my 
husband dead I might have a child with another husband. But as mother and father are 
hidden in the bosom of the earth, a brother will never be raised to me.” The tragedy tells 
us, among other things, of the close connection (indeed an existential connection) between 
being a particular human individual and being emotionally attached to a non-replaceable 
object. Antigone‟s emotions towards her dead brother have an intentional structure that is 
such as allowing no replacement. The fact that this situation has been created by 
circumstances independent of her intentionality or choice is of no relevance to her. The 
basic thing is that this is in fact the situation she finds herself in. It has correctly been 
pointed out to me (by prof. Karl Halvor Teigen) that Antigone‟s remark shows that her 
brother is in principle replaceable. Even so, if we add that we live our lives in relation to 
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situations and events that are in principle non-reversible and non-repeatable, the in 
principle replacability functions as a reminder of the existential divide between the in 
principle and the in fact.  
 
Back to Alkmene: The answer to the question whether or not she has good reasons to feel 
hurt or deceived is not to be found in an investigation in the properties of her lover, but in 
the intentional content in her emotions and actions towards him. The intentional content in 
these is not  “making love with a man who has the properties x, y and z”, but “making love 
with a particular man, Amfitryon.” She was mislead to believe that the conditions of 
satisfaction for her emotions were present. Should it be irrational to feel deceived in this 
situation, the reason must be that it is irrational to have emotions directed towards a 
particular that cannot be replaced by an identical particular in such a way that this would 
change the relation between intention and action. And if what I have said about existential 
connections is correct it would also be irrational for her to conceive of herself as a certain 
particular, namely Alkmene. The same would of course be irrational for the rest of us. It 
would then be irrational to form personal identity in the way that we actually form personal 
identity, living through a biography in which relations to certain particulars have an 
essential significance. 
 
One addition: Even if a certain emotion-object has an irreplaceable position in my life, it 
doesn‟t follow that it does not have the same position in the life of another individual as 
well. However, in many such cases our feelings towards such objects are based on the, 
maybe false, belief that we ourselves hold a unique position in their emotional life. This 
would instantiate what Hegel described as an essential part of the development of self-
consciousness, “the desire to be desired” (Hegel: 1970).  
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I have claimed that there are certain emotional operations that have an individualising 
function and that these work as emotional attachment to non-replaceable objects, or to be 
less absolute, to objects that are hard to replace. To be sure, these are not the only 
operations that function as “individualisers”. As we all know we also act in contexts where 
our individual particularity is not the focus-point, contexts that nevertheless function as 
mediators of our individuality. We act as citizens, as professionals and so on. As 
participants in political discussions or as teachers we are not (or at least we ought not to 
be) identified as the eldest son of NN or with other unique properties. In these 
circumstances we should be identified through competencies and ascribability-criteria that 
are general, not unique. Our performances in such arenas are neither emotion-neutral nor 
irrelevant to our personal identity, i.e. our conception of who we are. What I am getting at 
is simply that the emotion-objects in these spheres are characterised by their formal 
features, which implies the relative unimportance of their particular or individual traits. 
Their importance as emotion-objects is essentially connected with their status as 
representatives of universals. They are therefore to a large extent replaceable. It would 
presumably be relatively unproblematic to accept that we act and perform in many contexts 
where our individual biography, personality and emotional attachments are, as such, 
relatively unimportant or irrelevant.  On the other hand, I want to point out some 
consequences of this, consequences that would be more controversial. First, it is inaccurate 
to represent the difference between primary and secondary relations as a difference 
between interaction being guided by emotions and interaction being guided by reason. 
Human interaction is, normally guided by both levels of our mental life. All human 
interactions have elements of emotional attachments and engagements, but there are 
differences between emotion-objects along the lines I have drawn. Second, it would help 
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us understand how our attachments to general emotion-objects contribute to the formation 
of our identity or, to be more precise, how the formation of our identity presumes an 
interplay between different sorts of objects. Third, it will help us formulate a critique of 
different forms of confusion between attachments to particular and more general emotion-
objects. 
 
What I have in mind when mentioning such form of confusion is something along the line 
of Max Weber‟s diagnosis of modern culture and politics. Two key-concepts in the 
formulation of this diagnosis are “disenchantment” and “charisma”. A few words about the 
relevance of Weber: According to Weber the prehistory of modernity is coextensive with 
the history of rationality. One of the main characteristics of this historic process is the 
tendency towards secularisation and “Sachlichkeit”, the bureaucratic version of objectivity. 
Individual phenomena come to be regarded and treated as “cases” not as unique 
particulars. This implies that they are processed administratively as well as cognitively 
within a formal framework that is considered right under the precondition that each case is 
replaceable by other cases that are similar in aspects conceived as relevant. Weber regards 
the modern bureaucracy as the most important institutional expression of this way of 
considering and dealing with tings. The problem with rational bureaucracy is not that it is 
illegitimate or inadequate in the field of public administration and decision-making, but 
that its way of thinking also expands to other spheres of life, to the “management” of 
private and personal life. Parts of this life are organised through emotional attachments and 
engagements that have less replaceable objects than the cases of bureaucratic treatment. To 
be sure, many relations that more often than not have replaceable objects are built around 
an irreplaceability-ideology. One such relation is romantic love, and often marriage. But 
the fact that they are construed within this ideological framework shows that there are real 
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emotional needs here. Such needs are not per se irrational, but they may be transformed 
into irrational expressions. Weber‟s most famous case is the modern version of the 
charismatic leader. The irrationality of this phenomenon consists in his authority being 




I have tried to render a version of human emotions which takes into account the fact that 
they perform functions which must be performed for any organism, the function of border-
drawing and navigation/orientation as well as the fact that they perform these functions for 
beings that are also rational and consciously self-reflective, beings living their lives in 
societies functioning through more or less shared cultural codes. The first, the general 
functions, can be described at a level where terms denoting phenomena that are essentially 
conscious may have a contingent status. As to the second, the phenomenological aspects of 
the emotions seem to be essential.  
 
The conscious aspect of the emotions not only includes awareness of certain instantaneous 
emotional states. In addition it comprises consciousness of intentional content as well as a 
set of sequences of experiences. It therefore involves what we may call a “phenomenology 
of the emotions”. Concepts denoting what we usually conceive of as “persons” and 
“rationality” are part of such a phenomenology. I do, however, believe that any conscious 
emotional state also contains essential elements which are themselves not conscious. I take 
this thesis to be supported by a phenomenological as well by a non-phenomenological 
perspective. By the first one because the alternative would lead to the implausible 
assumption that a phenomenological investigation of oneself might come to an end because 
there would be nothing more to discover or be aware of. By the second one because this 




I have also tried to extend the elementary mapping function that I take any emotion 
(conscious or not) to perform, to apply to human emotions as they work in social and 
cultural contexts. My thesis has been that they perform a double function. They function as 
a system mapping social situations and informing us of our exclusive position within these, 
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